The purpose of a finding of "[c]riminal contempt is to preserve the authority of the court by punishing past misconduct." Welfare of E.J.B., 466 N.W.2d at 770 (quoting In re Welfare of A. W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn.App. 1987)). The prescribed punishment for a criminal contempt is an unconditional and fixed sentence.
The purpose of civil contempt is to coerce future compliance by imposition of a sanction of indefinite duration terminable on compliance or inability to comply.In re Welfare of A. W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn.App. 1987); Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 173, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968) (civil contempt power cannot be used to punish a person for past misconduct). "Criminal contempt is to preserve the authority of the court by punishing past misconduct."
In Minnesota, the purpose of criminal/punitive contempt orders is generally to punish offensive conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the court, Minn. State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assistance Ass'n, Inc., 311 Minn. 276, 285, 248 N.W.2d 733, 741 (1976), and to “preserve the authority of the court by punishing past misconduct.” In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn.App.1987) (citing Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 153 N.W.2d 825 (1967) ). See Tatum, 556 N.W.2d at 544 n. 2 (adopting “remedial” for civil contempt and “punitive” for criminal contempt).
If the court's purpose is to coerce future compliance by imposition of a sanction of indefinite duration terminable on compliance or inability to comply, it is civil contempt. In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. App. 1987). If the court's purpose is to punish the charged person for past misconduct, it is criminal contempt.
But "[c]riminal procedural safeguards are applicable in constructive criminal contempt cases." In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. App. 1987). These safeguards include the right to receive a written complaint, legal representation, and a jury trial.
"Whether contempt is civil or criminal is determined by the court's purpose in responding to alleged misconduct, rather than the nature of the misconduct itself." In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. App. 1987). The purpose of civil contempt is not to punish a party for failing to perform obligations under a judgment, but to vindicate a party's rights by using a sanction of indefinite duration to compel performance of a duty or obligation by a nonperforming party.
Rather, these definitions are found in Minnesota case law. "Whether contempt is civil or criminal is determined by the court's purpose in responding to alleged misconduct, rather than the nature of the misconduct itself." In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn.App. 1987). Criminal contempt involves conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the court.
The purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court and punish the contemnor for past behavior, usually through a fixed, unconditional sentence. Minnesota State Bar Association v. Divorce Assistance Association, 311 Minn. 276, 285, 248 N.W.2d 733, 741 (1976); In re A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987). The purpose of civil contempt is to vindicate the rights of an opposing party by coercing compliance with an order through imposition of a sanction of indefinite duration, to be lifted upon compliance.
"Criminal contempt is to preserve the authority of the court by punishing past misconduct." In re Welfare of E.J.B., 466 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Minn. App. 1991) (quoting In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. App. 1987)). The parties agree that this case involves direct, criminal contempt.
In any contempt proceeding, an "essential prerequisite . . . is that the prior decree or order of a court sought to be enforced by contempt must clearly define the acts to be performed by the alleged contemnor." Mr. Steak, Inc. v. Sandquist Steaks, Inc., 245 N.W.2d 837, 838 (Minn. 1976); see also In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. App. 1987). Bornmann Spears contends that the district court's July 17, 2018 oral order did not expressly authorize the assistant county attorney to engage in ex parte communications with the child's pulmonologist and that she withheld the signed release forms while attempting to resolve that issue with the assistant county attorney. At the contempt hearing, Bornmann Spears expressed that understanding of the district court's July 17, 2018 oral order and explained that she did not promptly deliver signed releases to the county because she believed that the assistant county attorney planned to use the releases to speak with the pulmonologist for purposes of trial preparation.