In re Weisser Finance Company

4 Citing cases

  1. J.S.S. v. P.M.Z

    429 N.W.2d 425 (N.D. 1988)   Cited 7 times

    Thus, the October 22 order is appealable if the June 11 amended order requiring Richard to pay costs and fees would be appealable if made upon notice. See also In re Weisser Finance Co., 169 N.W.2d 420, 421-422 (N.D. 1969). In State ex rel. Olson v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1974), we held that an interlocutory order awarding costs and attorney's fees for discovery violations was not appealable.

  2. CITY OF FARGO, CASS CTY. v. STATE

    260 N.W.2d 333 (N.D. 1977)   Cited 15 times

    When two statutes relating to the same subject matter appear to be in conflict, they should whenever possible be construed to give effect to both statutes if this can be done without doing violence to either. In re Weisser Finance Co., 169 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1969). If an irreconcilable conflict exists, the latest enactment will control or will be regarded as an exception to or as a qualification of the prior statute.

  3. City of Wahpeton v. Drake-Henne, Inc.

    215 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1974)   Cited 3 times
    In Drake-Henne, the court stated in the Syllabus that "Although backfill compaction was deficient at the time the certificate of completion was signed by the project engineer, the City did not waive compliance with the contract specifications by the engineer's certification of completion and, accordingly, is not barred from recovering for defects resulting from the contractor's failure to perform according to the specifications, when defects were discovered during the one-year period as provided for in I(H)3.(b) of the contract."

    "When two statutes relating to the same subject matter appear to be in conflict, they should be construed whenever possible to give effect to both statutes if this can be done without doing violence to either." See also Kosmatka v. Safety Responsibility Division, Etc., 196 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1972), and In Re Weisser Finance Company, 169 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1969). Sections 9-08-03 and 9-08-04, N.D.C.C., are similar to Sections 53-9-4 and 53-9-5 of South Dakota Compiled Laws 1967 Annotated, which we construed in Hofer v. W. M. Scott Livestock Company, 201 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1972).

  4. Keller v. Paris

    207 N.W.2d 239 (N.D. 1973)   Cited 1 times

    Stradinger v. Hatzenbuhler, 137 N.W.2d 212, Syllabus No. 1 (N.D. 1965). See also Kosmatka v. Safety Responsibility Division, Etc., 196 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1972), and In Re Weisser Finance Company, 169 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1969). Applying that rule we conclude that Section 39-06-32, Subsection 1, N.D.C.C., permits the commissioner to suspend a person's driver's license prior to conviction of an offense for which mandatory revocation of a license is required upon conviction, when the records of the commissioner or other evidence presented to the commissioner disclose to his satisfaction that the person accused of such an offense has committed it. The commissioner, after due notice and hearing, may modify a suspension ordered pursuant to Section 39-06-32, Subsection 1, N.D.C.C., but he may not modify a revocation arising out of Sections 39-06-31 and 39-06-43, N.D.C.C.