The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment on the ground that Section 362(b)(6) allowed Shearson to liquidate Weisberg's securities without obtaining relief from the automatic stay. In re Weisberg, 193 B.R. 916, 925 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996). The BAP also concluded that even if Section 362(b)(6) did not apply, it would affirm the grant of summary judgment because the trustee was estopped from alleging damages for the violation of the automatic stay.
CIV. A. 00-192-T, 2002 WL 32157516, at *5 (D.R.I., March 7, 2002), aff'd, 316 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003); Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245, 249 (N.D. Ill. 2000),aff'd, 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001); Salem v. Paroli, 260 B.R. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 79 Fed. Appx. 455, No. 02-7090, 2003 WL 22440245 (2nd Cir., Oct. 28, 2003) (unpublished opinion); Lucabaugh v. United States (In re Lucabaugh), 262 B.R. 900, 905 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Miller v. Blatstein (In re Main, Inc.), No. CIV. A. 98-5947, 1999 WL 424296, at *5 (E.D. Pa., June 23, 1999); Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. Of New York v. Bozzuto, 227 B.R. 466, 473 n. 18 (E.D. Va. 1998); Phillips v. Smith (In re Ayscue), No. CIV. A. 3:94CV730, 1995 WL 908383, at *3 (E.D. Va., May 4, 1995); United States v. Academy Answering Service, Inc. (Academy Answering Service, Inc.), 100 B.R. 327, 330 (N.D. Ohio 1989); H.T. Bowling, Inc. v. Bain (In re Bain), 64 B.R. 581 (W.D. Va. 1986);Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Weisberg (In re Weisberg), 193 B.R. 916, 927 (9th Cir. BAP 1996), aff'd, 136 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998); McHenry v. Key Bank (In re McHenry), 179 B.R. 165 (9th Cir. BAP 1995); In re Haas, No. 04-11534-SSM, 2004 WL 3132027 (Bankr. E.D. Va., Dec. 22, 2004); In re Wiley, 315 B.R. 682, 690 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2004); In re Coley, No. 03-13234C-7G, 2004 WL 229519 (Bankr. M.D.N.C., Jan. 2, 2004); In re Peterson, 297 B.R. 467, 470 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2003); Clement v. GF Winnelson Co. (In re Clement), No. 02-30096, 2002 WL 31342411, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.D., Aug. 6, 2002); Adams v. Peterson (In re Adams), No. 01-9226, 2002 WL 844350, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa, April 19, 2002); In re Martinez, 281 B.R. 883, 886 n. 4 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2002) (dicta); Garland v. Lawton (in re Garland), No. 99-1076, 2001 WL 34798966, at *7 (Bankr. D. Vt., Aug. 1, 2001);Moodie v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car System, Inc. (In re Moodie), Nos. 00-10501, 00-01056 CAB, 2001 WL 34050728, at *3 (Bankr. D. Vt., July 16, 2001); Felder v. American General Finance (In re Felder
However, the requisite claim of actual damages is lacking. See Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re Weisberg), 193 B.R. 916, 927-28 (9th Cir. BAP 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 136 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 72, 142 L.Ed.2d 56 (1998) (despite violation of the stay, § 362(h) cannot offer relief from damages where none have occurred); see also In re McHenry, 179 B.R. 165, 168-69 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (no punitive damages absent actual damages). If consideration as a 12(b)(6) dismissal was proper, we must affirm.
One equitable principle that applies to the present dispute is that parties who sleep on their rights are barred from seeking relief under the doctrine of laches. See id. at 922-923 (applying laches to § 523(a)(3)(B) claim); Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re Weisberg), 193 B.R. 916, 925 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (declining to hear debtor's belated § 362 claim because "[p]ursuant to the equitable principle that equity aids the vigilant, the doctrine of laches would be applicable"), rev'd in part on other grounds, 136 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 1998). The Winters' delay also disposes of their argument that the Debtor's statement of intention improperly proposes "ride through," which is not available to debtors under Ninth Circuit law—while this argument may be legally correct, it comes too late. Finally, the Motion to Compel must fail because the relief sought cannot be granted by this court.
470, 477 (3rd Cir.1995); Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc., 930 F.2d 625, 628 (8th Cir.1991); Archer v. Macomb County Bank, 853 F.2d 497, 500 (6th Cir.1988); Salem v. Paroli, 260 B.R. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y.2001), aff'd, 79 Fed.Appx. 455 (2nd Cir.2003); Mann v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2002 WL 32157516, *5 (D.R.I., March 7, 2002), aff'd, 316 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2003); Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245, 249 (N.D.Ill.2000), aff'd, 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir.2001); Lucabaugh v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Lucabaugh ), 262 B.R. 900, 905 (E.D.Pa.2000); Miller v. Blatstein ( In re Main, Inc.), 1999 WL 424296, *5 (E.D.Pa., June 23, 1999); Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. Of New York v. Bozzuto, 227 B.R. 466, 473 n. 18 (E.D.Va.1998); United States v. Academy Answering Service, Inc. (In re Academy Answering Service, Inc.), 100 B.R. 327, 330 (N.D.Ohio 1989); In re Bain, 64 B.R. 581, 584 (W.D.Va.1986); In re Marino, 437 B.R. 676, 678 (8th Cir. BAP 2010); Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. (In re Weisberg ), 193 B.R. 916, 927 (9th Cir. BAP 1996), aff'd, 136 F.3d 655 (9th Cir.1998), cert. denied,525 U.S. 826, 119 S.Ct. 72, 142 L.Ed.2d 56 (1998); In re Beckett, 455 B.R. 9, 14 (Bankr.D.Mass.2011); In re Newcomer, 438 B.R. 527, 540 (Bankr.D.Md.
Without cognizable damages, there can be no recovery for violation of the automatic stay. In re Weisberg, 193 B.R. 916, 927 (9th Cir.BAP 1996); In re Tarone, 434 B.R. 41, 53 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Haan , 93 B.R. 439, 441 (Bankr.W.D. N.C. 1988). The mere innocent sending of a bill after the filing rarely results in a valid claim for violation of the automatic stay because it is a "no harm" violation and generates no actual damages.
Without cognizable damages, there can be no recovery for violation of the automatic stay. In re Weisberg, 193 B.R. 916, 927 (9th Cir.BAP 1996); In re Tarone, 434 B.R. 41, 53 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Haan, 93 B.R. 439, 441 (Bankr.W.D.N.C. 1988). The mere innocent sending of a bill after the filing rarely results in a valid claim for violation of the automatic stay because it is a "no harm" violation and generates no actual damages.
However, the rule regarding post-dismissal jurisdiction over stay violations is tempered by equitable considerations. See Matthews v. Rosene, 739 F.2d 249, 251 (7th Cir. 1984) (suspension of § 362 provisions may be appropriate when equitable considerations weigh heavily in favor of creditor and the debtor bears some responsibility for creating the problems); Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re Weisberg), 193 B.R. 916, 925 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (" The injunction aspect of § 362 calls into play equitable principles."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 136 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 1998); see also, Lonestar Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Gurrola (In re Gurrola), 328 B.R. 158, 172 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) (noting that balance of equities test applied under § 362(d) for annulment of stay). Therefore, although the order granting Lenders' relief from the stay was deficient as to the Vail Lots, the bankruptcy court could decline to exercise its jurisdiction over Financing's post-dismissal stay violation damage claim based on equitable considerations.
Laches can be applied "when equitable considerations weigh heavily in favor of the offending creditor and the debtor bears some responsibility for creating the problems." Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re Weisberg), 193 B.R. 916, 926 (9th Cir. BAP 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 136 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 1998). The possible prejudice to third parties if relief is not retroactively granted is something on which the Court can only guess.
Generally, an injury that is incurred due to the debtor's own action or failure to act is not a compensable damage item for the stay violation. See Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re Weisberg), 193 B.R. 916, 928 (9th Cir. BAP 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 136 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 1998) (debtor did not incur damage or loss by virtue of the purported stay violation because any damage was attributable to the debtor's or trustee's own failure to act). Upon being served with the complaint, Debtor immediately sought legal advice, which was her right. Her decision to drive to her attorney's office was reasonable under the circumstances, and her actual expense for travel was slight, a fact Appellant should appreciate.