Opinion
W.C. No. 4-465-204
April 18, 2002
ORDER OF REMAND
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Coughlin (ALJ) dated December 27, 2001, which denied and dismissed the claim for workers' compensation benefits. The claimant's principal argument is that the ALJ's order contravenes our Order of Remand dated October 5, 2001. We reverse the ALJ's order and remand with directions.
Our Order of Remand contains a statement of facts detailing the findings of fact and conclusions contained in the ALJ's order of November 22, 2000, and that statement is incorporated herein. Of particular importance, our order noted the ALJ found as a matter of fact that the claimant "lost her footing while descending stairs at work in haste and fell." However, the ALJ concluded the claimant's injury was not compensable because she did not show the injury was the "direct result of a circumstance or special hazard peculiar to her work environment."
The claimant appealed the ALJ's November 22 order arguing the ALJ erroneously applied the special hazard doctrine, and the "facts, as found by the ALJ, establish the injury arose out of employment because it was connected with the circumstances associated with her employment." (Order of Remand pp. 1-2). We agreed with the claimant's argument and "reversed" the ALJ's order because it was not supported by applicable law. (Order of Remand p. 2). In support of this result we held the "special hazard" did not apply because the ALJ did not find the claimant's fall was precipitated by preexisting idiopathic disease or condition. We further found that, because the ALJ credited the claimant's testimony that she slipped on this stairs in the course of her employment, the findings compelled the conclusion the claimant suffered a compensable injury within the meaning of § 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 2001. We then set aside the ALJ's November 22 order and "remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein." (Emphasis added).
On December 27, 2001, the ALJ entered the Order After Remand. In this order, the ALJ significantly amended the findings of fact relevant to the compensability of the claim. Specifically, the ALJ discredited the claimant's testimony that she fell at work, and found that any symptoms the claimant experienced were probably the result of a preexisting condition unrelated to the employment. Consequently, the ALJ concluded the claimant failed to prove an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment as required by § 8-41-301(1).
On appeal from the December 27 order, the claimant argues the ALJ exceeded the scope of our remand by redetermining the facts pertinent to the issue of compensability. The respondents argue that our Order of Remand was a "general remand" which contemplated the ALJ would reconsider the record and enter new findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the issue of compensability. We agree with the claimant.
Generally, the court which enters an order remanding a case is in the best position to determine the scope of the remand. See Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986). Further, "conclusions of an appellate court on the issues presented to it as well as rulings logically necessary to sustain such conclusions become law of the case," and such rulings may not be contravened on remand. See Nelson v. Elway, 971 P.2d 245, 249 (Colo.App. 1998). The purpose of the law of the case doctrine is to protect "litigants from the expenditure of time and money involved in the reargument of settled issues and ensures that lower courts follow the decisions of higher courts in subsequent proceedings." Super Valu Stores, Inc., v. District Court, 906 P.2d 72, 79 (Colo. 1995).
Here, our Order of Remand did not expressly or impliedly direct the ALJ to reevaluate the evidence and reach new factual findings on the issue of compensability. To the contrary, we held the ALJ's existing findings compelled the legal conclusion that the claimant sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Thus, we determined the ALJ's application of the law to the facts was erroneous, and the claimant sustained a compensable injury as a matter of law. It is for this reason that we reversed the ALJ's conclusion regarding the compensability of the claim. Finally, the matter was remanded for proceedings consistent with the views expressed in our order. Because we held the claim is compensable, the "further proceedings" contemplated by the order involve determination of the claimant's entitlement to benefits, if any.
The respondents' reliance on Musgrave v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 762 P.2d 686 (Colo.App. 1988) ( Musgrave II), as authority for a contrary result, is misplaced. It is true that in Musgrave II, the court stated that "when a case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion, it is a general remand" which authorizes the "trial court to make new findings and conclusions so long as there is no conflict with the ruling of the appellate court." 762 P.2d at 688. However, that statement was made on review of an order which was entered pursuant to the Court of Appeals opinion in Musgrave v. Eden Ezer Lutheran Institute, 731 P.2d 142 (Colo.App. 1986) ( Musgrave I). In Musgrave I the court held a denial of unemployment compensation benefits based on a change in standard working conditions was improper because there had been no findings determining whether the claimant acquiesced in the new working conditions. The court in Musgrave I "then remanded to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office for further findings consistent with this opinion." (Emphasis added). 731 P.2d at 144. Consequently, in Musgrave II, the court found the Panel did not exceed the scope of the remand in Musgrave I by entering new factual findings and determining the claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because her resignation resulted from dissatisfaction with reasonable supervision.
Here, unlike the remand in Musgrave I, our Order of Remand did not hold there was any inadequacy in the ALJ's findings of fact, nor did we direct the ALJ to enter any new findings of fact on the issue of compensability. Rather, our order was based on the determination the ALJ erred in applying the law to the established facts. Consequently, the ALJ's entry of new findings of fact in the December 27 order was contrary to our ruling and not permissible.
We have also reviewed our prior decisions cited by the respondents. Eg. Struble v. Douglas County School District, W.C. No. 3-998-051 (October 27, 1995). In virtually all of these cases it is apparent that our order of remand was based on some deficiency in the fact-finding of the ALJ. Consequently, the subsequent entry of new findings of fact did not violate the order of remand. In contrast, we have reversed orders of ALJ's when they contain factual findings which contravene legal rulings established by a prior order of remand. Ventker v. Royal Gorge Flower Farms, W.C. No. 3-808-415 (April 7, 1994).
The ALJ's December 27 order must be reversed insofar as it determined the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury. Further, the matter is remanded to the ALJ with directions to determine the amount and type of benefits, if any, to which the claimant is entitled as a result of this injury.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated December 27, 2001, is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
Copies of this decision were mailed April 18, 2002 to the following parties:
Billie Warm, R. R. 4, Box 392, Ava, MO 65608
Safeway (Store 920), 451 W. Wonder View Ave., Estes Park, CO 80517
Safeway Stores, Inc., 5918 Stoneridge Mall Rd., Pleasanton, CA 94588
Gregory W. Heron, Esq., 1199 Bannock St., Denver, CO 80204 (For Claimant)
Richard A. Bovarnick, Esq. and Harvey D. Flewelling, Esq., 5353 W. Dartmouth Ave., #400, Denver, CO 80227 (For Respondent)
By: A. Hurtado