Plaintiffs' citation to In re Walker, 183 B.R. 47, 48–49 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1995) is misplaced. In that case, a borrower who was defending himself against a claim that he had filed a falsified loan application argued that he had not actually read the document, and thus lacked the requisite “intent to deceive.”

Plaintiffs' citation to In re Walker, 183 B.R. 47, 48-49 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) is misplaced. In that case, a borrower who was defending himself against a claim that he had filed a falsified loan application argued that he had not actually read the document, and thus lacked the requisite "intent to deceive."

This is roughly analogous to the case of a lender who prepares a materially inaccurate loan application and presents it to the applicant for his signature. See Unit No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Walker (In re Walker), 183 B.R. 47, 49-51 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). Yes, signing a materially inaccurate financial statement is generally grounds for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(B), but context matters and when the creditor is responsible for the inaccuracy, that can be a bar to recovery.

It is important to note that while a recklessly false statement can be evidence of an intent to deceive, "an inaccurate financial statement does not, by itself inexorably lead to a conclusion that the debtor intended to deceive the creditor. In re Walker, 183 B.R. 47 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). The Court had an opportunity to observe Schlenker. His testimony leads the Court to conclude that Schlenker is a remarkably unsophisticated person.