Opinion
CASE NO: 03-32158-BKC-PGH.
December 11, 2006
THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing on October 25, 2006 and on November 2, 2006 upon Mary Alice Gwynn, Esquire's ("Gwynn") Motion for Bankruptcy and Appellate Court Attorney's Fees and Costs as the Prevailing Party Under Rule 9011(c)(1)(A), Pursuant to Bankruptcy Local Rule 8014-1(F)(1) (sic) [C.P. 1462] ("Motion") and upon James F. Walker's ("Debtor") and Gary J. Rotella, Esquire's ("Rotella") Emergency Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss [Gwynn's Motion] [C.P. 1790] ("Motion to Dismiss").
On April 18, 2006, Gwynn filed both her Motion and a Summary of Fees and Costs [C.P. 1465] ("First Summary"). The Motion argues that as the prevailing party under Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c)(1)(A), Gwynn is entitled to attorney's fees and costs incurred in this Court, as well as attorney's fees and costs incurred in District Court for her appeal of this Court's award of sanctions pursuant to Debtor, Rotella, and Gary J. Rotella Associates, P.A.'s ("Rotella P.A.") (collectively the "Rule 9011 Movants") Motion for Sanctions Against Mary Alice Gwynn, Esquire and Creditor Eleanor C. Cole Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 [C.P. 360] ("Motion for Sanctions"). Gwynn's First Summary sought $99,721.98 in total fees and costs for both the proceedings in this Court and for her appeal to the District Court. Pursuant to the Court's Order Specially Resetting Hearing [C.P. 1757], on October 23, 2006 Gwynn filed an Amended Summary of Fees and Costs ("Second Summary") [C.P. 1795] in which the total fees and costs sought by Gwynn for the proceedings in this Court and in the District Court had increased to $104,981.84. On November 2, 2006, Gwynn filed an Updated and Revised Summary of Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Court's Ruling On October 25, 2006 ("Third Summary") [C.P. 1822]. Pursuant to the Court's oral ruling of October 25, 2006 which is discussed below, Gwynn's Third Summary deleted appellate attorney's fees from the amount sought. Thus, Gwynn's Third Summary sought $35,500.00 in paralegal and attorney's fees incurred in this Court, and $5,961.44 for appellate costs.
BACKGROUND
The Debtor filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on April 25, 2003. Eleanor C. Cole ("Cole") filed a claim against the Debtor's bankruptcy estate based upon a final judgment she received against the Debtor in State Court. The Court's docket reflects that Gwynn represented Cole in this case from July 17, 2003 until June 9, 2004. On April 21, 2004 Gwynn filed Cole's Emergency Motion to Disqualify the Law Firm of Gary J. Rotella Associates, P.A. From Representing the Debtor [C.P. 292] ("Motion to Disqualify"). Also on April 21, 2004, Rotella sent a Rule 9011 communication to Gwynn indicating that he would seek sanctions in connection with the Motion to Disqualify if it were not withdrawn. On April 26, 2004, Gwynn filed Cole's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of [the Motion to Disqualify] [C.P. 311] ("Supplemental Memorandum"). Also on April 26, 2004, Rotella filed the Rule 9011 Movants' Motion to Shorten 21 Day Notice Period For Filing Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 [C.P. 321] ("Motion to Shorten"). On April 27, 2004, the Rule 9011 Movants filed a Response to [Motion to Disqualify] [C.P. 318] ("First Response"). Also on April 27, 2004, the Rule 9011 Movants filed a Response to [the Supplemental Memorandum] [C.P. 317] ("Second Response"). On April 28, 2004, the Court heard oral argument and denied the Motion to Disqualify. Among other things, the Court found that as a creditor, Cole lacked standing to assert on behalf of members of Debtor's family, that Rotella had a potentially disqualifying conflict of interest. The Court also heard and denied the Motion to Shorten on April 28, 2004.
On May 18, 2004, Gwynn filed a Renewed Motion to Disqualify the Law Firm of Gary J. Rotella Assocates P.A. ("Renewed Motion to Disqualify") [C.P. 361]. Also on May 18, 2004, the Rule 9011 Movants filed the Motion for Sanctions which sought attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion to Disqualify. At a hearing held May 28, 2004, the Court orally denied the Renewed Motion to Disqualify. The Court found that the Renewed Motion to Disqualify was based upon the same grounds contained in the original Motion to Disqualify which the Court had already denied for lack of standing. The added grounds in the Renewed Motion to Disqualify, having been based on a dismissed adversary proceeding, were determined to be moot. The Court then orally granted the Motion for Sanctions against Gwynn which had been based upon the original Motion to Disqualify that the Court denied on April 28, 2004. The Court's ruling was memorialized in the Court's June 15, 2004, Order Granting Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 [C.P. 437] ("June 15, 2004 Order").
Ten months later, on April 6, 2005, Gwynn filed a Motion to Amend, Correct or Withdraw the Court's Order Granting Debtor's Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 9011 Dated June 15, 2004 and Rule 60 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [C.P. 793] ("Rule 60(b) Motion") which the Court denied on April 8, 2005. See Order Denying Gwynn's Motion to Amend, Correct or Withdraw the Court's Order Granting Debtor's Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 9011 Dated June 15, 2004 and Rule 60 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [C.P. 799] ("Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion"). Also on April 6, 2005 Gwynn filed a Motion to Strike or Dismiss Debtor's [Motion for Sanctions] for Failure to Abide by Rule 11 [C.P. 792] ("Motion to Dismiss"). On April 8, 2005 the Court entered an Order Denying Gwynn's [Motion to Dismiss] [C.P. 801]. On April 18, 2005, Gwynn filed Notice of Appeal No. 818 [C.P. 818] wherein she appealed both the Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion and the Order Denying Gwynn's Motion to Dismiss. A hearing was held on April 21, 2005 to liquidate the amount of sanctions awarded by the June 15, 2004 Order. On May 11, 2005, the Court entered a Final Judgment [C.P. 876] and an Order Awarding Sanctions Against Mary Alice Gwynn, Esquire Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 [C.P. 881] (collectively with the June 15, 2004 Order, the "Orders Awarding Rule 9011 Sanctions") which imposed sanctions against Gwynn in the amount of $80,572.50. Gwynn filed Notice of Appeal No. 911 [C.P. 911] on May 20, 2005 appealing the Orders Awarding Rule 9011 Sanctions.
Notices of Appeal Nos. 818 and 911 were both transmitted to U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on August 5, 2005. The District Court designated Notice of Appeal No. 818 as case no. 05-80714-Civ-Gold assigned to the Honorable Alan S. Gold. Notice of Appeal No. 911 was designated as case no. 05-80715-Civ-Altonaga assigned to the Honorable Cecilia M. Altonaga. These two cases were consolidated before Judge Gold under lead case no. 05-80714-CIV-GOLD.
On March 20, 2006, the Honorable Alan S. Gold, United States District Court Judge, entered an Order Vacating Final Judgment of Bankruptcy Court (the "District Court Order") in the appeal styled Mary Alice Gwynn v. James F. Walker (In re James F. Walker), in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Lead Case No. 05-80714-Civ-Gold/Turnoff consolidated with Case No. 05-80715-Civ-Gold/Turnoff. The District Court Order determined that imposition of Rule 9011 sanctions was inappropriate because the underlying Motion to Disqualify had been denied by this Court prior to the Rule 9011 Movants filing their Motion for Sanctions. See District Court Order [C.P. 1415].
Gwynn subsequently filed the instant Motion seeking prevailing party fees and costs pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 9011 and 8014.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Bankruptcy Court Fees and Costs
Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) states in pertinent part:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 7004. The motion for sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected, except that this limitation shall not apply if the conduct alleged is the filing of a petition in violation of subdivision (b). If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.
Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Gwynn's Motion argues that she is the prevailing party and as such is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in opposing the Motion for Sanctions. The Court notes at the outset that Gwynn did not prevail in this Court either in prosecuting the underlying Motion to Disqualify or in opposing the Motion for Sanctions. The two cases cited by Gwynn in support of her argument are readily distinguished from the facts of this matter. In Gulf Coast Orthopedic Center, 297 B.R. 861 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) the Rule 9011 motion against counsel was found to be without merit. However significantly and unlike this case, said counsel also prevailed on the underlying substantive motion. Id. at 865. In Kirk-Murphy Holding, Inc., 313 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2004) the Court awarded fees pursuant to Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) because of the subject Rule 9011 motion's procedural defects. The Kirk-Murphy court found that "[t]he alleged debtor's warning letter did not serve as a substitute for a motion, service of the motion is the requirement imposed by Bankruptcy Rule 9011." Id. at 923. Unlike Kirk-Murphy, in this case the Motion for Sanctions was served on Gwynn twenty-one days prior to its being filed with the Court. Indeed, Rotella filed Debtor's Motion to Shorten (the twenty-one day notice period under Rule 9011) which the Court denied. Although the motion for reconsideration upon which the Kirk-Murphy Rule 9011 motion had been based was denied, the opinion offers no hint of whether the underlying motion for reconsideration was frivolous or unwarranted.
In this case, the Motion for Sanctions was triggered by Gwynn's frivolous pleading. Gwynn's filing of Cole's Motion to Disqualify was unwarranted under existing law because Cole lacked standing to assert a conflict of interest on behalf of members of Debtor's family. Nevertheless after the Motion to Disqualify was denied, Gwynn filed a Renewed Motion to Disqualify which restated the same grounds and some additional grounds that were moot. The Debtor and Rotella were compelled to file two Responses and Rotella was compelled to appear in this Court to defend both the Motion to Disqualify and the Renewed Motion to Disqualify. In prosecuting the Motion to Disqualify and the Renewed Motion to Disqualify, Gwynn endeavored to prove, albeit unsuccessfully, that the motions were warranted and not frivolous. Gwynn's efforts prosecuting the Motion to Disqualify and the Renewed Motion to Disqualify were in essence the same effort required for her defense of the Motion for Sanctions. The Rule 9011 Movants on the other hand incurred unnecessary costs because they were compelled to respond to Gwynn's frivolous pleadings. The Court is mindful that "the central purpose of Rule [9011] is to deter baseless filings . . . any interpretation must give effect to the Rule's central goal of deterrence." Cooter Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990). Gwynn filed the baseless Motion to Disqualify and Renewed Motion to Disqualify in this case, the other side was compelled to respond and to make an appearance before the Court. An award of attorney's fees in favor of Gwynn would reward, not deter, Gwynn's baseless filings. Thus the Court finds that an award of attorney's fees and costs to Gwynn pursuant to Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) is unwarranted.
Courts may look to authorities applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 standards when determining matters under Bankruptcy Rule 9011, because Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and Bankruptcy Rule 9011 are substantially identical. See In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995).
Having determined that an award of fees and costs to Gwynn is not warranted pursuant to Rule 9011(c)(1)(A), the Court need not reach the issue of whether Gwynn as a pro se litigant can incur attorney's fees. See Massengale v. Ray, 267 F. 3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2001) (determining award of attorney's fees as a sanction to an attorney representing himself violates the language of Rule 11 because a pro se litigant cannot "incur" attorney's fees).
Even if an award of attorney's fees and costs to Gwynn were appropriate, the Court would not exercise its discretion to make such an award given Gwynn's unprofessional conduct in this case. See e.g., Memorandum Order [C.P. 1472]; Order: 1) Denying Mary Alice's Gwynn's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration of the Court's Sua Sponte Order Directing Mary Alice Gwynn, Esq., to Stop Filing Notices of Filing; 2) Imposing Sanctions; and 3) Striking Court Paper Nos. 1529 and 1530 [C.P. 1550]; Order Denying Requested Relief in Mary Alice Gwynn's Response to Debtor's Emergency Motion for Extension, Continuance and Modification of Ruling Dated May 26, 2006 [C.P. 1576]; Order: 1) Denying Mary Alice's Gwynn's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration of this Court's "Order Denying . . . Requested Relief in Mary Alice Gwynn's Amended Reply" (D.E.# 1602) Dated June 27, 2006 [C.P. 1633]; 2) Denying Relief Requested in Mary Alice Gwynn's Supplement to Her Motion for Rehearing . . . [C.P. 1642]; and 3) Denying Mary Alice Gwynn's Motion for Evidentiary (Sic) on All the Issues Raised . . . [C.P. 1641] [C.P. 1644]; and Order on Order to Show Cause [C.P. 1553].
Despite the Court's repeated admonitions to Gwynn regarding her need to become familiar with, and adhere to, the Court's procedures and rules, at the November 2, 2006 hearing Gwynn failed to produce a proper Local Form "Exhibit Register" as required by Local Rule 9040-1(A). See November 2, 2006 Hearing Transcript at 6-7 [C.P. 1834].
B. District Court Appellate Fees and Costs
1. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 Does Not Provide for Attorney's Fees Incurred on Appeal
On October 25, 2006, the Court heard Debtor and Rotella's Motion to Dismiss. Rotella argued that based upon the Order on Order to Show Cause having prohibited Gwynn from representing any parties before this Court until she completed the required qualifications to practice, Gwynn's prosecution of her Motion was tantamount to her unlicensed practice of law. See Order on Order to Show Cause [C.P. 1553]. The Court denied this portion of the Motion to Dismiss because the Court's prohibition was limited to Gwynn representing other parties, she was not prohibited from representing her own interests in this Court. The Motion to Dismiss also argued that Gwynn had presented no legal authority that would allow this Court to award attorney's fees incurred in connection with an appeal to District Court. The Court construed this portion of Debtor and Rotella's Motion to Dismiss as a motion in limine concerning evidence on appellate fees, and the Court agreed that the Bankruptcy Court is not the proper forum to consider Gwynn's request for an award of appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 9011. "Bankruptcy Rule 9011 governs only the initial proceeding in a bankruptcy court and not appeals pending in the district court." In re George Schumann Tire Battery Co., 106 B.R. 296, 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). As the Supreme Court explained, "Rule [9011] is not a fee-shifting statute, the policies for allowing district courts to require the losing party to pay appellate, as well as district court attorney's fees, are not applicable." Cooter Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. at 408. "On its face, Rule [9011] does not apply to appellate proceedings . . . Rule [9011] is more sensibly understood as permitting an award only of those expenses directly caused by the filing, logically, those at the trial level." Id. at 406. Thus, Bankruptcy Rule 9011 does not authorize this Court to award appellate attorney's fees incurred in proceedings before the District Court.
Gwynn opposed the Motion for Sanctions in this Court, she appealed this Court's Orders before the District Court. Appeals to the District Court in bankruptcy cases are governed by Part VIII of the Bankruptcy Rules. Part VIII of the Rules does not contain any version of Bankruptcy Rule 9011. George Schumann, 106 B.R. at 299. Therefore, the Court denies Gwynn's request for an award of appellate attorney's fee without prejudice to her seeking such relief in the proper tribunal.
2. Bankruptcy Rule 8014
While Bankruptcy Rule 9011 does not provide for appellate attorney's fees, Rule 8014 does provide for taxation of certain appellate costs. Rule 8014 states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, agreed to by the parties, or ordered by the district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel, costs shall be taxed against the losing party on an appeal. If a judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed only as ordered by the court.
B.R. 8014.
In this matter, the District Court vacated this Court's Orders Awarding Rule 9011 Sanctions. Therefore pursuant to Rule 8014, taxation of costs is allowed only as ordered by the Court. Rotella's Written Opening Statement for November 2, 2006 Hearing [C.P. 1820] ("Opening Statement") argues that Gwynn failed to file either a Bill of Costs or a Motion for Fees and Costs Not Taxable By Clerk within 30 days after entry of order of the District Court as required by Local Rule 8014-1(C) and (F). See Opening Statement ¶¶ 14-16. The District Court Order was entered on March 20, 2006. Gwynn filed both her Motion and her First Summary on April 18, 2006. Thus her filing was timely pursuant to Local Rule 8014-1. Although Gwynn once again failed to use the Local Form "Bill of Costs", the Local Rule requires only that her submission substantially conform to the Local Form. See Local Rule 8014-1(B). While Gwynn's submission does not contain the Local Form Bill of Costs' declaration, the Court finds that her Motion and First Summary were timely filed and that these submissions contain the substantive information required to be set forth in a Bill of Costs.
Gwynn's Third Summary of fees and costs seeks taxation of $5,961.44 in appellate costs. The Court finds it appropriate to tax only the appellate costs listed in Rule 8014 and in Part IX "Appellate Costs" of the Court's Guidelines for Taxation of Costs by the Clerk ("Guidelines") that were necessary for the prosecution of Gwynn's appeal. Gwynn's Third Summary lists the following costs.Consulting attorney's fees (Norman Schroeder, Esq.) $1,000
1. As discussed above the Court is without authority to award attorney's fees for proceedings before the District Court. In addition, Part IX of the Guidelines do not provide for taxation of consulting attorney's fees.Court Reporter fees for necessary transcripts $2,044.76 2. At the November 2, 2006 hearing, the Court directed Gwynn to file a written statement explaining why each transcript listed in her Third Summary was necessary for prosecution of her appeal. On November 13, 2006, Gwynn filed a Detailed List of Transcripts Ordered and Explanation of Necessity for Charge Pursuant to this Court's Instructions [C.P. 1827] ("Transcript List] with copies of the transcript invoices attached thereto. On November 24, 2006, Rotella filed Debtor's Response to [Transcript List] [C.P. 1836] in which Rotella maintained that none of the listed transcripts was necessary for the appeal. In reviewing the parties' submissions, the Court finds that the transcripts for the 4/16/04 hearing and for Rotella's 5/21/04 deposition were not necessary for Gwynn's appeal. As to the remaining transcripts, the Court notes that the Court heard several matters on each of the days indicated. Thus some portions, but not all, of the 4/28/04, 5/28/04, and 4/21/05 transcripts were relevant and necessary for the appeal. The Court finds that the portion of the 4/28/04 transcript dealing with Rotella's Motion to Shorten and that the portion of the 5/28/04 transcript dealing with Rotella's request for sanctions would be necessary for the appeal. However, the Court finds that the portion of the 5/28/04 transcript dealing with Gwynn's Renewed Motion to Disqualify was unnecessary despite Gwynn's argument that the transcript was needed to show the District Court that the Renewed Motion to Disqualify was not frivolous. See Transcript List ¶ 5. The District Court's Order was based upon the fact that the Motion for Sanctions was filed after the Court ruled upon the Motion to Disqualify. The District Court's Order did not consider the substantive merits of the Renewed Motion to Disqualify. Therefore it is not appropriate to tax the cost of that portion of the 5/28/04 transcript that deals with the Renewed Motion to Disqualify. In contrast, that portion of the 4/21/05 hearing dealing with liquidating the amount of sanctions would be taxable. The Court notes that the invoices supplied by Gwynn indicate that the transcripts were ordered on an expedited basis. The Court does not find that expedited processing of the transcripts was necessary for the appeal. Thus, based upon Gwynn's submissions, the Court is unable to determine the unexpedited cost of the allowable portions of the 4/28/04. 5/28/04 and 4/21/05 transcripts. Therefore the Court is denying without prejudice Gwynn's request for taxation of transcript costs.Copies by Judicial Research for Designation of Items $428.83 3. Copy costs for production of copies of items designated on appeal as required by Bankruptcy Rule 8006 are taxable appellate costs pursuant to the Guidelines. At the November 2, 2006 hearing Rotella requested, and Gwynn agreed to within ten days provide statements to Rotella that had not been provided to him previously. The Court, noting that Rotella has made no specific objection to this item, finds that this is an allowable taxable appellate cost in the amount of $428.83. Filing fee for 2 Notices of Appeal[818 911] 4. $510.00 The Court finds that these appellate filing fees are allowable taxable appellate costs in the amount of $510.00.Travel Expenses to Miami for Oral Argument $192.00 5. The Guidelines do no provide for taxation of these costs and therefore the Court finds that they are not taxable.Recording fees for removal of Judgment Lien $233.50 6. The Court finds this to be an appropriately taxable cost of $233.50 because it is a cost in the nature of discharging bond premiums which are provided for in the Guidelines.Copies of Initial Brief and Appendix and Reply $419.25 7. Copy costs for production of appellate briefs and appendices required are taxable appellate costs pursuant to the Guidelines. The Court, noting that Rotella has made no specific objection to this item, finds that it is an allowable taxable appellate cost in the amount of $419.25.PACER document retrieval and Westlaw fees $79.10 8. The Guidelines do no provide for taxation of these costs.Expert Witness Fee (Julianne Frank, Esq.) $1000.00 9. The Guidelines do no provide for taxation of these costs.As detailed above, the Court finds that appellate costs incurred by Gwynn in the amount of $1,591.58 are taxable against Rotella, Rotella, P.A., and the Debtor, jointly and severally, pursuant to Rule 8014 and Part IX of the Court's Guidelines for Taxation of Costs by the Clerk.
At the November 2, 2006 hearing Mr. Gleason argued on behalf of Rotella that Gwynn's Motion was deficient because, among other things, it failed to indicate from whom she sought payment for fees and costs. The Court notes that both sides have engaged in sloppy lawyering. The Court was compelled to research what parties brought which pleadings since movants seem to change without rhyme or reason from pleading to pleading. The Court notes that while Rotella, Rotella P.A. and the Debtor brought the Motion to Shorten and the Motion for Sanctions, it was only Rotella and the Debtor who filed the Motion to Dismiss. Yet at the November 2, 2006 hearing, Mr. Gleason appeared on behalf of Rotella P.A. and Rotella appeared on behalf of the Debtor. The Court finds it appropriate to tax the allowable appellate costs against Rotella, Rotella P.A. and the Debtor, jointly and severally. These are the parties that filed the Motion for Sanctions and these parties opposed Gwynn's Motion. The Court does not find that they are in any way unfairly surprised that Gwynn seeks fees and costs against them.
CONCLUSION
The Court does not find it warranted pursuant to Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) to award attorney's fees and costs to Gwynn for opposing the Motion for Sanctions in this Court. In addition, Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) does not provide authority for this Court to consider a request for appellate attorney's fees incurred before the District Court. The Court does, however, find it appropriate to tax appellate costs in the amount of $1,591.58 against Rotella, Rotella P.A., and the Debtor, jointly and severally, pursuant to Rule 8014.
ORDER
The Court, having reviewed the Motion and the applicable law, having taken judicial notice of the docket and proceedings in this case, having heard the argument of counsel and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
1. The Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
3. Gwynn's request pursuant to Rule 9011 for attorney's fees and costs incurred opposing the Motion for Sanctions in this Court is DENIED.
4. Rule 9011 does not authorize this Court to award appellate attorney's fees. Therefore Gwynn's request pursuant to Rule 9011 for attorney's fees incurred on appeal in District Court is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
5. Gwynn's request for appellate costs pursuant to Rule 8014 is GRANTED. Appellate costs in the amount of $1,591.58 are taxed against Rotella, Rotella, P.A., and Debtor, jointly and severally.ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida.