Opinion
No. 09–P–2302.
2013-09-9
Kathleen WALCZAK'S CASE.
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, BERRY & AGNES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The employee appeals from a decision of the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents (board) summarily affirming an administrative judge's denial of disability benefits, which denial was based on the administrative judge's finding that the employee's emotional disability, while total and permanent, was a result of her predisposition to mental illness, not her work environment. We affirm.
1. Background. The events underlying this appeal span over twenty-six years. The employee worked for the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission from 1974 until 1987, when she initiated this claim for benefits based on an asserted emotional injury arising from stress in the workplace. The employee cited various causes of this stress, including an increased work load, a change in supervisors resulting in more scrutiny of the employee's work, and a specific incident involving a client threatening to strangle the employee. In 1989, the claim was initially denied by the administrative judge, but the decision was later vacated and the matter remanded for further findings by the board. Following the submission of additional evidence on remand, the administrative judge reversed his prior decision and awarded temporary benefits to the employee in 1992. The employer appealed, and for reasons not apparent on the record, the appeal lingered before the board until 1996, when the matter was again reversed and remanded to the administrative judge.
The matter again lingered before the administrative judge until 2005, when a hearing was held. Another two years passed, an additional hearing was held, and new medical evidence was submitted.
While awaiting the board's decision, the employee filed and was awarded permanent and total disability benefits, pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 34A. The awards of temporary and permanent disability were consolidated for consideration by the board.
Finally, in 2008, the administrative judge denied the employee's claim. He found that although the employee was totally and permanently disabled, her disability was not related to her work, but was the result of her genetic predisposition for schizophrenia. The employee appealed to the board, which summarily affirmed. This appeal resulted.
2. Discussion. There is no dispute that the employee is permanently and totally disabled. However, the employee argues that the administrative judge's decision that the employee's emotional injuries were not a direct result of work-related incidents was arbitrary and capricious.
The precise issue is whether “an event or series of events occurring within [her] employment” were “a significant contributing cause” of her mental or emotional disability. G.L. c. 152, § 1(7A), as amended through St.1986, c. 662, § 6. This is an earlier version of the statute that controlled at the time of the relevant proceeding. The current version reads: “Personal injuries shall include mental or emotional disabilities only where the predominant contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of events occurring within any employment.” Essentially, the standard changed from “a significant contributing cause” to “the predominant contributing cause.” There is no allegation the administrative judge applied the incorrect standard.
Where, as here, the board summarily affirms, “we review the findings and conclusions of the administrative judge.” Eady's Case, 72 Mass.App.Ct. 724, 725–726 (2008). “We review a board's decision regarding workers' compensation benefits under the usual standard for appeal from a final decision of an administrative agency set forth in G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7), except that we do not review whether the board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.” Wadsworth's Case, 461 Mass. 675, 679 (2012). The test is “whether the decision is factually warranted and not ‘[a]rbitrary or capricious,’ in the sense of having adequate evidentiary and factual support and disclosing reasoned decision making within the particular requirements governing a workers' compensation dispute.” Scheffler's Case, 419 Mass. 251, 258 (1994). “The board's decision ‘is not to be reversed unless it is lacking in evidentiary support or a different conclusion is required as a matter of law.’ “ Bisazza's Case, 452 Mass. 593, 596 (2008), quoting from Corraro's Case, 380 Mass. 357, 359 (1980).
In his written decision, the administrative judge expressly adopted the findings of Dr. Melvyn Lurie, Dr. Alfred Jonas, and Dr. Arnold Robbins, who each concluded that the employee's injuries had little, if any, direct causal connection to her work environment. “It is for the agency, not the courts, to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to resolve factual disputes. ‘A court may not displace an administrative board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.’ “ School Comm. of Wellesley v. Labor Relations Commn., 376 Mass. 112, 120 (1978), quoting from Labor Relations Commn. v. University Hosp., Inc., 359 Mass. 516, 521 (1971). We see no reason to displace the administrative judge's view in this case.
Furthermore, as the administrative judge noted, the employee's own treating physician, Dr. Eric Dessain, testified that he could not determine with any degree of medical certainty that the employee's injuries were caused by her work environment, as opposed to external factors. See Cornetta's Case, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 107, 116 (2007) (employee must demonstrate a causal relationship between one or more workplace events and her emotional condition). See also Bisazza's Case, 452 Mass. at 599 (compensation under G .L. c. 152, § 1(7)(A), limited to “those emotional and mental injuries that arose from specific traumatic events”). The administrative judge expressly credited this portion of Dr. Dessain's testimony—which, of course, he was entitled to do. See, e.g., Pilon's Case, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 167, 169 (2007) (“Findings of fact, assessments of credibility, and determinations of the weight to be given the evidence are the exclusive function of the administrative judge”). In sum, the administrative judge's findings are amply supported by the record, and his decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, the employee argues, and the employer concedes, that the administrative judge improperly shifted to the employee the burden of proving that her disability did not arise principally out of a “bona fide personnel action.” G.L. c. 152, § 1(7A), as amended through St.1986, c. 662, § 6. See Catalana v. First Essex Sav. Bank, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 377, 379 (1994). However, this error is of no consequence, as the basis for the administrative judge's ultimate decision was that the employee had failed to establish causation. Accordingly, there was no need to address the “bona fide personnel action” issue.
Decision of the reviewing board affirmed.