An appellate court must exercise its power to disqualify a judge under that statute sparingly, and only when the interests of justice require it. (Peracchi v. Superior Court (People ) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1256, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 639, 70 P.3d 1054 ; People v. Landau (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 31, 40, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 ; Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 303, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 883.)An appellate court need not find actual bias in order to invoke Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (c). (In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 148, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 201 ; Ng v. Superior Court (People ) (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1024, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, disapproved on another ground in Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1069, fn. 6, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 16 P.3d 166.) The court may order disqualification when necessary to dispel the appearance of bias, for example, when the record shows the trial judge became embroiled or personally invested in the outcome of the proceedings.
( Ng v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016, 1018 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 49], disapproved on another ground in Curie v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1069, fn. 6 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 16 P.3d 166].)" ( In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 148 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 201], italics added; see, e.g., Shipp v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 147, 149, 152 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 685] [respondent superior court opposed petition relating to whether family court assignment under local court policy was all-purpose assignment within meaning of ยง 170.6].) D.M.'s petition comes squarely within said exception.
We also note that Woodall has not raisedโeither below or before this courtโthat he was deprived of notice by the summary revocation procedure followed below on July 14, 2006. Woodall's reliance on In re Valrie (1974) 12 Cal.3d 139 and In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138 is misplaced. The former case predated People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d 867, which we find controlling; we also reject Woodall's arguments that People v. Coleman is not good law.
We therefore disregard the bulk of legal authority cited by plaintiff, as those cases were decided in response to a petition for writ of mandate. (See, e.g., Pacific Etc. v. Superior Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72; United Farm Workers of Am. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 97; Hollingsworth v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 22; Briggs v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 312; In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138.) Because plaintiff is not entitled to any relief on her statutory claim, we turn to her constitutional argument.
Lastly, the cases Innovation cites all involve far greater showings of actual or apparent bias, and are for that reason inapt. (See In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 147-148 [judge remanded defendant into custody without giving him any time to respond to the charges, and filed a brief to defend herself before the appellate court]; Alhusainy v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 385, 392-395 [judge accepted plea agreement that unlawfully banished a defendant from the state and thereby required him to violate a condition of probation in order to reappear in court]; Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1998) 19 Cal.4th 865, 885 [judge had personal views opposing the law he was to apply]; People v. Enriquez (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 230, 244 [same]; Betsworth v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 586, 596-600 [referee showed "personal indignation" at parties' remarks to her]; Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 13 Cal.3d 778, 797-802 [judge "flipped off" criminal defendant, cussed at the parties, appointed his friends as court-appointed attorneys]; see also People v. Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1369 [case r
"Whatever the sting of reversal, vindictive retaliation against a successful defendant cannot be presumed to be the judicial reaction." (People v. Gulbrandsen, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1562-1563; cf. Ng v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1023-1024 [disqualification warranted because trial judge showed "unusual personal interest in handling the case," record contained unidentified evidence of "potential bias towards petitioner and towards petitioner's appointed counsel," and judge made "derogatory and apparently unfounded statements" regarding defense counsel], overruled in part on other grounds in Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1069; In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 147-148 [bias found where comment reflected personal involvement and reliance on matters outside the record].) Here, however, appellant has failed to show a sufficient basis to substitute a new judge.
Ochoa argues that the trial court erred by revoking probation without conducting formal revocation proceedings, including a hearing at which he could confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. (See In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 146.) However, the trial court appears to have summarily revoked Ochoa's probation; the record before us does not reflect a formal revocation or imposition of sentence.
Appellant contends, and the People agree, that such a fine can be imposed only when a defendant is granted probation. We agree. (ยง 1203.097, subd. (a)(5); see In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 147.) Accordingly, the $400 fine imposed by the trial court is stricken.
Unless waived, probationers are also entitled to receive a written statement of the reasons for and evidence supporting the revocation of probation. [Citation.]" (In re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 146.) The trial court here did not issue a written statement of the reasons for and the evidence supporting the revocation of Chapa's probation.
Morrissey held that in parole revocation proceedings, due process requires that a court make an on-the-record inquiry of the specific relevant facts used to make findings of suitability or unsuitability for parole revocation. (Id. at p. 489; seeIn re Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 146.) However, a discretionary determination whether a convicted felon would benefit from a drug court is not equivalent to a determination whether a parolee must return to prison because he or she violated a specific parole condition.