Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. HC6124
Premo, Acting P.J.
Petitioner Ut Chi Vo has been incarcerated since 1985 for the second degree murder of his girlfriend. In 2007, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found that Vo was unsuitable for parole and refused to grant him a parole date. Vo filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court challenging the decision. The superior court summarily denied relief. Vo then filed the instant, similar petition in this court. We issued an order to show cause, respondent Ben Curry, warden at the Correctional Training Facility, filed a return, and Vo filed a traverse. We agree with Vo and conclude that the Board’s determination that Vo was unsuitable for parole was not supported by some evidence. We therefore grant the petition and direct the Board to conduct a new hearing.
The superior court wrote a 13-page decision but did not solicit a reply to the petition by issuing an order to show cause.
Although the habeas petition concerns the action of the Board, the respondent is the warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated. (Pen. Code, § 1477.) The Attorney General appears on the warden’s behalf.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
“[T]he judicial branch is authorized to review the factual basis of a decision of the Board denying parole in order to ensure that the decision comports with the requirements of due process of law, but . . . in conducting such a review, the court may inquire only whether some evidence in the record before the Board supports the decision to deny parole, based upon the factors specified by statute and regulation. If the decision’s consideration of the specified factors is not supported by some evidence in the record and thus is devoid of a factual basis, the court should grant the prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and should order the Board to vacate its decision denying parole and thereafter to proceed in accordance with due process of law.” (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 658 (Rosenkrantz).)
“[A] life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (a).) “[C]ircumstances tending to establish unsuitability for parole are that the prisoner (1) committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; (2) possesses a previous record of violence; (3) has an unstable social history; (4) previously has sexually assaulted another individual in a sadistic manner; (5) has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and (6) has engaged in serious misconduct while in prison. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (c).)” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 653-654, fn. omitted.)
“Factors that support a finding that the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner include the following: (A) multiple victims were attacked, injured, or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder; (C) the victim was abused, defiled, or mutilated during or after the offense; (D) the offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering; and (E) the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (c)(1).)” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 653, fn. 11.)
Before its opinions in the cases of In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Lawrence), and In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241 (Shaputis), the California Supreme Court had held that, “[A] . . . decision granting or denying parole is subject to a limited judicial review to determine only whether the decision is supported by ‘some evidence.’ ” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 625.) “[T]he ‘some evidence’ standard is extremely deferential.” (Id. at p. 665.) “Only a modicum of evidence is required. Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are matters within the authority of the Governor [or Board] . . . [T]he precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole suitability are considered and balanced lies within the discretion of the Governor [or Board], but the decision must reflect an individualized consideration of the specified criteria and cannot be arbitrary or capricious. It is irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability for parole. As long as the [Board]’s decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the Governor’s [or Board’s] decision.” (Id. at p. 677.)
The court clarified, but did not overrule, this scope of review in Lawrence and Shaputis.
In Lawrence, the inmate’s commitment offense was a result of her having an affair with a dentist. When the dentist finally ended the affair and told the inmate that he was staying with his wife, the inmate armed herself with a gun and potato peeler. She then confronted the dentist’s wife, shot her, and repeatedly stabbed her with the potato peeler. The inmate fled and remained a fugitive for 11 years. After turning herself in and being sentenced to life in prison, the inmate became an exemplary prisoner, had no discipline violations, took numerous self-help classes, and had positive psychological examinations. The Board granted her parole three times, but the Governor reversed the decision each time. In 2005, the Board granted parole for the fourth time, and the Governor again reversed the decision. The Governor found that the inmate (1) remained an unreasonable safety risk due to the callous nature of the commitment offense, (2) had had some negative psychological evaluations when she was first incarcerated, and (3) had been counseled regarding discipline problems while in prison. The Court of Appeal reversed the Governor’s decision, finding that the Board had properly determined that defendant was suitable for parole. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the dispute in several appellate court cases as to the appropriate scope of review.
Some cases had interpreted Rosenkrantz to require that a parole denial must be upheld if “some evidence” supported one of the circumstances tending to establish unsuitability for parole such as that the commitment offense was particularly egregious. (See In re Bettencourt (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 780, 800; In re Andrade (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 807, 819; In re Burns (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1327-1328.) Other cases had interpreted Rosenkrantz to require that “some evidence” supported the ultimate determination that the inmate remained a current threat to public safety. (See In re Lee (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1409; In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 595; In re Elkins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 475, 499.)
Lawrence reasoned that “[i]f we are to give meaning to the statute’s directive that the Board shall normally set a parole release date ([Pen. Code,] § 3041, subd. (a)), a reviewing court’s inquiry must extend beyond searching the record for some evidence that the commitment offense was particularly egregious and for a mere acknowledgment by the Board or the Governor that evidence favoring suitability exists. Instead, under the statute and governing regulations, the circumstances of the commitment offense (or any of the other factors related to unsuitability) establish unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative to the determination that a prisoner remains a danger to the public. It is not the existence or nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; the significant circumstance is how those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the public. [¶] Accordingly, when a court reviews a decision of the Board or the Governor, the relevant inquiry is whether some evidence supports the decision of the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain factual findings.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1212.)
Lawrence also discussed the appropriate weight to be given to the commitment offense: in evaluating the crime, “it is not the circumstance that the crime is particularly egregious that makes a prisoner unsuitable for parole--it is the implication concerning future dangerousness that derives from the prisoner having committed that crime.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1213-1214.) Hence, it stated: “although the Board and the Governor may rely upon the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for a decision denying parole, the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense remain probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public safety.” (Id. at p. 1214.) It continued: “[a]bsent affirmative evidence of a change in the prisoner’s demeanor and mental state, the circumstances of the commitment offense may continue to be probative of the prisoner’s dangerousness for some time in the future. At some point, however, when there is affirmative evidence, based upon the prisoner’s subsequent behavior and current mental state, that the prisoner, if released, would not currently be dangerous, his or her past offense may no longer realistically constitute a reliable or accurate indicator of the prisoner’s current dangerousness.” (Id. at p. 1219.) It recognized that despite an egregious commitment offense, “it is evident that the Legislature considered the passage of time--and the attendant changes in a prisoner’s maturity, understanding, and mental state--to be highly probative to the determination of current dangerousness.” (Id. at pp. 1219-1220.) It concluded: “In sum, the Board or the Governor may base a denial-of-parole decision upon the circumstances of the offense, or upon other immutable facts such as an inmate’s criminal history, but some evidence will support such reliance only if those facts support the ultimate conclusion that an inmate continues to pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. [Citation.] Accordingly, the relevant inquiry for a reviewing court is not merely whether an inmate’s crime was especially callous, or shockingly vicious or lethal, but whether the identified facts are probative to the central issue of current dangerousness when consider in light of the full record before the Board or the Governor.” (Id. at p. 1221.) In applying this scope of review to the facts in Lawrence, the court concluded that, although the crime committed by the inmate was egregious, it rejected that other factors--prior poor psychological evaluations and being counseled eight times for misconduct such as being late to appointments--supported that the inmate was currently dangerous. It further concluded: “[E]ven as we acknowledge that some evidence in the record supports the Governor’s conclusion regarding the gravity of the commitment offense, we conclude there does not exist some evidence supporting the conclusion that petitioner continues to pose a threat to public safety.” (Id. at p. 1225.) “When, as here, all of the information in a postconviction record supports the determination that the inmate is rehabilitated and no longer poses a danger to public safety, and the Governor has neither disputed the petitioner’s rehabilitative gains nor, importantly, related the commitment offense to current circumstances or suggested that any further rehabilitation might change the ultimate decision that petitioner remains a danger, mere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense, absent articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness, fails to provide the required ‘modicum of evidence’ of unsuitability.” (Id. at pp. 1226-1227.)
In the companion Shaputis case, the court applied the scope of review set forth in Lawrence. There, the inmate had a long history of domestic violence and eventually shot and killed his second wife. The other factors of unsuitability and suitability were that the inmate had (1) a long criminal history (but the instant offense had resulted in his first felony conviction), (2) severe substance abuse problems, (3) little contact with his family throughout his incarceration, (4) participated in self-help programs, (5) been discipline free throughout his incarceration, and (6) positive psychological examinations. The Board initially denied parole, citing to the callous nature of the crime and the fact that the inmate had a history of domestic violence. The superior court upheld the Board’s ruling, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision after finding that the Board had erred in concluding that the inmate was not suitable for parole. The Court of Appeal ordered a new parole hearing, the Board thereafter granted parole, but the Governor reversed the Board. After the Court of Appeal reversed the Governor’s decision, the Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court, reiterating what it held in Lawrence, stated: “[T]he proper articulation of the standard of review is whether there exists ‘some evidence’ that an inmate poses a current threat to public safety, rather than merely some evidence of the existence of a statutory unsuitability factor.” (Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1254.) It then explicated the scope of review as, “[w]hen a court reviews the record for some evidence supporting the Governor’s conclusion that a petitioner currently poses an unreasonable risk to public safety, it will affirm the Governor’s interpretation of the evidence so long as that interpretation is reasonable and reflects due consideration of all relevant statutory factors.” (Id. at p. 1258.) In applying that standard to the facts in Shaputis, the court concluded that the inmate was not suitable for parole due to both the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense, and “ ‘his lack of insight into the murder and the abuse of his wife and family.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1255, 1259-1260.)
BACKGROUND
Vo was born in Vietnam in 1960 and fled that country in the 1970s. After staying in a Malaysian refugee camp, he arrived in this country in 1979 or 1980.
In January 1985, the 24-year-old Vo argued with his 18-year-old girlfriend of two years in her home because she had told him that she wished to end their relationship. He left the home and went to his brother’s house. There, he telephoned his girlfriend and continued the argument. After the phone conversation ended, he retrieved a gun, returned to his girlfriend’s house, continued the argument, and shot her in the head three to four times at close range. Vo told his girlfriend’s 11-year-old brother, who was in the room and witnessed the shooting, that he would shoot him too if he called the police. After Vo left, the victim’s brother called the police. Vo soon turned himself in, confessed to the police, and offered that he had shot his girlfriend because “she was no good.” In May 1985, a jury found Vo guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life in prison plus a two year enhancement for use of a firearm. At a parole suitability hearing in November 2007, the Board found that Vo was unsuitable for parole and issued a two-year denial.
The Board began the parole suitability hearing by considering letters both opposing and favoring a grant of parole. A Seaside police commander (who was not involved in the investigation of Vo’s offense) sent a letter opposing parole because “Vo’s actions were callous.” The victim’s brother also submitted a letter describing his family’s suffering and asking that Vo be kept “in jail forever.” A family friend of Vo’s, who is the general manager of an Oakland hotel, submitted a letter in favor of parole, writing that Vo is “remembered for all the assistance he gave to new arrivals immigrating from Vietnam as a support of our community. . . . I will personally provide for Mr. Vo’s room and board, employment, whatever emotional, moral and financial support he requires until he is financially stable, including his clothing and transportation expenses. I will assist him in obtaining his drivers [sic] license and other required documents. I have no problem with parole officials checking up on him at my home or place of business.”
This letter was dated September 25, 2005, by the author but the reference line denoted “11/5/2007 PAROLE CONSIDERATION HEARING.” The Board questioned whether the letter was current, and Vo offered that “It’s the same.” From the context of the discussion and physical appearance of the letter, it appears that the family friend simply copied a letter submitted for Vo’s hearing two years previously and typed in a reference line. In any event, the Board accepted that the dateline was likely a typographical error. Deputy Commissioner Armenta exclaimed after a brief discussion: “Probably a typo. It seems that way. They were referring, you’re right.” And the Board then questioned Vo in the present tense and Vo affirmed that he had a place to live and work with the family friend if paroled. And Vo later revealed that his brother lived near the family friend and would also support him if paroled. In respondent’s exhibits, there is another supporting letter from a second friend who offers to provide Vo housing and financial support upon parole. This letter is dated January 10, 2005, and stamped “received” by the Board of Prison Terms as of January 7, 2005. (The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1, 2005, and was replaced by the Board of Parole Hearings. (Pen. Code, § 5075, subd. (a)).) The Board, however, did not refer to this letter at the 2007 hearing.
The Board then discussed Vo’s prison file, which outlined Vo’s job training as a tailor, as a plumber, in the canteen, and in the print shop computer class. It acknowledged that Vo had very positive feedback for his work and “didn’t have what we call a criminal mind.” It commented: “Okay, well, for being 22 years, that’s very good. That’s very positive.” Answering questions, Vo related that (1) his formal education ended in junior high school and he had taken but failed the GED test, (2) he had taken anger management and life skills classes, and (3) he was participating in AA and its 12-step program. The Board acknowledged that Vo had but one “115” rules violation in prison--a 1998 citation for possession of pornographic magazines. It then reviewed Vo’s psychological evaluation, which reported the following.
Form 115 of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (formerly the California Department of Corrections) is used to report inmate misconduct that is either serious or in violation of the law. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3312, subd. (a).)
“In the 2003 evaluation, there was no evidence of mental illness in neither the inmate, nor any suggestion or documentation of a substance abuse disorder. He had no record of criminal behaviors before the commitment offense. Mr. Vo had remained disciplinary free for the previous four (4) years, and had received only one (1) CDC-115 during his then-18-year incarceration. He was not a management problem, and was seen as a responsible and dedicated worker in his job assignments, some with laudatory chronos. Diagnostic assessment and conclusions remain unchanged from the previous report submitted to the [Board] by Dr. Talbott in 2003. The previous report on the inmate suggested that risk assessment for involvement in violent behaviors was ‘low,’ and that estimate remains unchanged at present.”
“There are no current mental health concerns, and diagnostically there is no change from the previous psychological report to the [Board]. There is no evidence of severe mental illness in the inmate, nor is there any suggestion or documentation of a substance abuse disorder. He has no record of previous criminal behaviors before the commitment offense.”
The final two paragraphs of the psychological evaluation summarized the entire report as follows: “Overall, then, risk assessment estimates suggest that the inmate poses a low likelihood to become involved in a violent offense if released into the free community. This estimate takes into account the inmate’s cultural background, language issues, personal, social and criminal history, institutional programming, community/social support, release plans and current clinical presentation. In addition, there is the caveat that such an assessment is at least partially based on the likelihood of continued abstinence from any substance abuse. [¶] As was affirmed in the 2003 psychological evaluation by Dr. Talbott, the inmate’s insight was adequate and accessible, and this estimate is currently unchanged. The inmate has never denied full responsibility for the taking of a human life, and has readily and appropriately accepted his term of punishment for the past 22 years. Notably, Asians and Asian/Americans have certain cultural proscriptions against talking too much about themselves, and generally tend to respond better to concrete, tangible measures and treatment modalities. Inmate Vo’s overall level of risk for future behavioral violence in the community is in the ‘low’ range. The ‘low’ range is the lowest possible risk level in the current nomenclature for CDCR inmates. [¶] Inmate Vo presents as having appropriate understanding and insight into past stress and anger management difficulties [that] likely led to the commitment offense. Similarly, while in prison, he has not demonstrated any problems in this area and appears to have learned to adequately manage his feelings in an appropriate manner. As such, it is unlikely that a requirement for further exploration of the instant offense will produce more significant behavior changes of a positive or prosocial nature in this inmate. Greatest risk of violence appears confined to situations related to close intimate relationships.”
Again answering questions, Vo affirmed that he had learned to control anger in a Cage Your Rage anger course, was planning on the support of his family friend and brother, and was hoping to acquire a job in the electronics (a pre-incarceration skill) or printing field.
Towards the end of the hearing, a deputy district attorney argued that Vo should be denied parole because he had not sufficiently improved himself educationally while incarcerated, and because “he doesn’t have any relationships with women in the prison . . . [and] we can’t be comfortable, we can’t be assured I [sic] any way on any level that he won’t do it again when he gets out.” She added: “He was told by the Board two years ago that in order to be eligible for parole he had to get his GED. He hasn’t made one step toward that. He says six or seven years ago was when he attempted to pass his GED and failed to do so. He hasn’t tried again since, he hasn’t tried in the last two years, he’s failed to upgrade educationally, he’s failed to follow the recommendations of the Board.”
In closing, Vo stated the following: “I am accepting full responsibility for my actions on January 12, 1985. Even the (inaudible) right or wrong, I had no right to take a human being’s life. I feel very remorseful for causing the family of the victim and my own family so much pain for all these years. I wish I could take it back but I can’t. I’m not proud for what I have done. Today, I am a much different person than I was over 20 years ago. I would like to ask you to give me a second chance so I can be back with my family and start a new life.”
The Board found Vo unsuitable for parole based on the nature of his commitment offense, which, it said, was “carried out in a callous manner,” had “[m]ultiple victims [who] were injured in the same incident,” was “carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” was “carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, an execution style murder,” and had a motive that “was inexplicable in relationship to the offense.” It also remarked that the psychological report contradicted itself by noting that “the greatest risk of violence appears confined to situations related to close, intimate relationships,” and did not adequately “get[] into that male, female relationship situation.” It expressed concern that Vo “has not completely come to grips [with] the life crime” and “could be paroled and could have a problem in that area that has not been vetted to any degree.”
The Board also commented, “In regards to institutional behavior,” that Vo “has failed to upgrade educationally as previously recommended by the Board” and, “in regards to parole plans, there are no current letters on file or letters used today were verified in 2005.”
DISCUSSION
For purposes of analysis, we accept that some of the factors cited by the Board provide some evidence supporting that Vo committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. However, in light of the decisions in Lawrence and Shaputis, this finding alone does not always support that an inmate is currently dangerous and is unsuitable for parole. As discussed at length in Lawrence and Shaputis, the nature of Vo’s commitment offense was a valid basis for denying parole only if there was no affirmative evidence of a change in Vo’s demeanor and mental state since the time of the offense. The Board here was obligated to weigh the viciousness of Vo’s commitment offense against factors tending to show suitability for parole--such as the passage of time since Vo’s offense, Vo’s age, evidence of Vo’s rehabilitation, Vo’s realistic parole plans, Vo’s documented understanding and insight into his criminal behavior, Vo’s lack of juvenile or pre-commitment offense criminal history, the fact that Vo’s commitment offense was committed as the result of significant stress, and the extent to which Vo’s institutional behavior shows his ability to function within the law upon release (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (c))--to determine whether, on balance, Vo currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger if released.
There is nothing in the record to support the Board’s finding that the commitment offense was especially heinous, etc., due to that multiple victims were injured in the same incident. And the record contradicts that Vo had a motive that was inexplicable in relationship to the offense. As Vo succinctly puts it, he killed because he was a jilted lover. A jilted lover kills because of stress, anger, fear, panic, passion, or jealousy. (Cf. Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1225 [“petitioner had committed the murder while under the stress of an emotional love triangle”]; In re Burdan (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 18, 34 [“The very essence of the offense was one of passion”].)
Here, the record shows that Vo has insight into his behavior, has learned to control his anger, and is so psychologically stable that the psychologist concluded that there is no need “for further exploration of the instant offense” and Vo’s overall level of risk for further behavioral violence in the community is “the lowest possible risk level.” It further shows that Vo has adequate parole plans, no criminal history, and has not engaged in any acts of violence during the 23 years he has been in prison. It also shows that Vo has demonstrated “changes in attitude, acceptance of responsibility, and a commitment to living within the strictures of the law.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1219.)
In short, “the record is replete with evidence establishing [Vo’s] rehabilitation, insight, remorse, and psychological health, and devoid of any evidence supporting a finding that [Vo] continues to pose a threat to public safety.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) “[M]ere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense, absent articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness, fails to provide the required ‘modicum of evidence’ of unsuitability.” (Ibid.)
Respondent argues that “The Board concluded that there was no evidence reflecting that Vo had sufficient insight to the causative factors of his crime and therefore, remained an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if released.” If the Board did so conclude, however, such a conclusion is inconsistent with the psychological evaluation and not otherwise supported by the record.
In any event, respondent attempts to support a “no insight” conclusion by seizing upon the Board’s (1) observation that “the psychological report was contradictory” because the report concluded that Vo had “appropriate insight into the stress and anger management difficulties that led to the commitment offense, and simultaneously opined that Vo’s greatest risk of violence appears confined to situations related to close, intimate relationships,” and (2) desire for “a supplemental psychological evaluation [to address] the causes and factors [into why he committed the crime] as they relate to male/female relationships, and that Vo participate in self-help in the area of domestic violence.”
We disagree with this analysis.
The psychological evaluation can be interpreted as contradictory only if one interprets the final sentence (“[G]reatest risk of violence appears confined to situations related to close, intimate relationships”) to mean that “There is a risk of violence in situations related to close intimate relationships.” But this is an unreasonable interpretation. The evaluation as a whole states in several different ways that Vo’s overall risk for behavioral violence in the community is at the lowest possible risk level. In short, the evaluation concludes that Vo is rehabilitated and does not pose a threat to public safety. Thus, in context, the “greatest risk” comment can only be reasonably interpreted to mean that “Vo’s risk for violence is the lowest possible and probably limited to close intimate relationships.” The evaluation is not contradictory.
And, as we have previously mentioned (ante, fn. 6), there is no mystery why Vo committed the crime. He was a jilted lover acting under emotional stress. The psychological evaluation is clear that Vo has gained appropriate understanding and insight into past stress and anger-management difficulties and that no further requirement to explore those issues would be beneficial given that Vo could not achieve a more favorable risk-level evaluation. Thus, no evidence supports a conclusion that Vo lacks insight into his crime for which he requires further psychological treatment and examination.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The Board is directed to vacate the denial of parole, conduct a new parole suitability hearing for Vo, and proceed in accordance with due process of law.
WE CONCUR: Elia, J., Duffy, J.