Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ44699, Shep. A. Zebberman Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
The minor, V.M., appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring her a ward of the court after finding she committed second degree robbery and ordering her into suitable placement in a closed facility. The minor contends her mere presence at the scene is insufficient to show she aided and abetted the commission of the robbery. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Delinquency Petition
On January 8, 2009, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed alleging the minor, then 15 years old, had committed second degree robbery. An allegation she personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the robbery was dismissed on the People’s motion.
2. The Jurisdiction Hearing
According to the evidence at the jurisdiction hearing, on the evening of January 6, 2009, Elicio Pantuj was riding his bicycle in Los Angeles. Pantuj pedaled to the corner and stopped to wait for the traffic light to change. In front of Pantuj stood the minor and two male companions, who all turned to face him. One male, M.H., was a juvenile, and the other male was an adult.
The minor and M.H. were adjudicated jointly. The court sustained the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition filed against M.H. He is not a party to this appeal.
The adult approached Pantuj and asked him repeatedly where he was from. Each time Pantuj said he did not understand English. During this exchange, the minor was standing in front of Pantuj, about a hand’s width away. The male juvenile was standing at Pantuj’s right side. The adult then asked Pantuj in Spanish if he had any tattoos and raised Pantuj’s shirt. Pantuj said he had no tattoos and raised his shirt higher. The adult was able to see Pantuj’s earplugs attached to his cellular telephone, and he yanked them off of Pantuj. The adult asked Pantuj if he had any money; and Pantuj denied having any. After being told by the adult, the male juvenile produced a large knife, similar to a machete, and pointed it at Pantuj, who then surrendered $20. Throughout the encounter, the male juvenile did not speak, while the minor did speak and stood close to and in front of Pantuj. She also said, “Hey, look at the Cortez tennis shoes he’s got on.” A little later, the minor said, “Hey look at that nice bike he has.” At some point, she told the male juvenile to put away the knife.
When the traffic light changed, Pantuj rode his bicycle across the street and into a gas station. Someone notified police. Officers arrived and drove Pantuj around until he saw the minor and her companions together on the street and identified them to the officers. The male juvenile was found in possession of a large knife; the adult was discovered to have money and headphones on his person.
The minor did not testify or present other evidence in her defense.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. (In re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605; In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 726.) In either case we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence— that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
2. The Juvenile Court’s Finding the Minor Aided and Abetted the Second Degree Robbery Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
A person aids and abets the commission of an offense “when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v.Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561; see People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.)
The elements of aiding and abetting may be determined from a variety of factors, including presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, conduct before and after the offense and flight. (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5; People v.Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409; In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.) Although proof of only one of these factors, standing alone, may be insufficient to establish the defendant aided and abetted the commission of a charged offense (see Campbell, at p. 409 [presence or prevention]; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521 [flight]), in combination these factors can certainly constitute sufficient evidence to support such a finding.
For example, in Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 1 this court held the juvenile court had reasonably inferred the minor knew of, and shared, the perpetrator’s criminal intent and aided and abetted the commission of a robbery, rejecting the minor’s claim he was “‘simply an “innocent, passive, and unwitting bystander’” during the robbery.” (Id. at p. 5.) The victim had been approached by the minor and perpetrator together. (Id. at p. 3.) When the perpetrator demanded money from the victim at knifepoint, the minor was beside him. The victim was afraid of being stabbed by the perpetrator, but also felt threatened by the presence of the minor, who was standing one foot away. (Ibid.) Following the robbery, the perpetrator and the minor fled and were found and arrested together. (Id. at p. 4.) We determined, because the minor “was present at the robbery, standing with [the perpetrator] and the victim[,]... [and] in the company of [the perpetrator] immediately prior to the [attempted] robbery and during the attempted escape[,]” the finding the minor had aided and abetted commission of the robbery was supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 5-6.)
The same conclusion is inescapable here. The minor was standing with the adult and male juvenile on the street corner, shortly before the robbery, and she turned with her two confederates to face Pantuj. When the adult approached Pantuj to question him and demand his property and money, the minor placed herself in front of Pantuj, standing about a hand’s width away. She remained in that position, close enough to intimidate Pantuj, while the adult took his property and money, and the male juvenile threatened him with a knife. Significantly, unlike the minor in Juan G. who apparently did not speak, the minor spoke during the robbery, twice directing her confederates to other items of value belonging to Pantuj. Following the robbery, the minor remained with her confederates; the three of them resumed walking together on the street. The evidence amply supports the finding the minor committed second degree robbery as an aider and abettor. (See Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5; see also In re Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1092-1093, 1095.)
DISPOSITION
The order under review is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., ZELON, J.