Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. JW076434
Lambden, J.
Plaintiff Vincent W. seeks reversal of the juvenile court’s order committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice for a maximum term of five years. We affirm the court’s order.
BACKGROUND
Between June 2007 and November 2007, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed three petitions pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 602 containing nine separate counts against Vincent W. Vincent admitted committing second-degree burglary and felony vandalism, misdemeanor auto theft, and felony assault with force likely to result in great bodily injury, and the other counts were dismissed. He was declared a ward of the court, and received a maximum term commitment of five years.
Vincent’s probation officer prepared a November 2007 disposition report, which provided details about the three incidents referred to in the petitions. In the first, Vincent broke into a restaurant and took liquor bottles. In the second, he stole a car and drove without a license. In the third, he backed a car he was driving without a California driver’s license into a woman bicyclist who had followed him after observing he was going against traffic, knocking her over; the woman reported that he would have run over her if she had not scrambled out of the way and that he shouted obscenities at her. Police found marijuana in the car.
Vincent’s probation officer also reported that Vincent had dual United States and German citizenship via a German mother and American father who were recently separated, and had lived in California since he was nine. He was required to serve in the German Army when he turned 18, and had received a pre-draft notice. His father, enrolled in a master’s degree program at San Francisco State University, wanted to have “hands off,” thought it best for Vincent to stay away from his parents for awhile, and thought that Vincent could live with relatives in Germany who could afford to take care of him. His mother had a sister who was a nurse, and in-law doctors who “would know how to care for him.”
The probation officer further reported that Vincent’s mother wanted to convince Vincent to spend nine months in the German Army, rather than be placed in a facility in California, such as the Log Cabin Ranch. She said that her family in Germany had agreed to care for him. She also stated that she and her husband would not sign for Vincent to have medications, and that she did not believe he was really sick, but instead was acting out as a result of problems in their family.
The probation officer reported that Vincent was not taking medication. He expressed no remorse for assaulting the bicyclist or his other crimes. He had been disruptive in juvenile hall, appeared “very disturbed,” had “exhibited bizarre behavior” that his mother considered “appropriate,” and threatened a female counselor. The officer recommended that he be placed in a facility where he could be treated for his assaultive behavior, such as Log Cabin Ranch, for the maximum potential term of five years.
The court ordered Vincent to undergo psychological evaluation because he had exhibited “serious behavioral issues” and appeared to be very depressed. In late November 2007, the probation officer reported that one evaluating psychologist, Dr. Watts, was “very specific that the minor should not be returned home,” and that Vincent’s mother had refused to approve his case plan before leaving for Germany with her other son, a departure she felt was necessary so that she and her son were safe, and said she would let the father make the decisions about giving Vincent medications because otherwise the father would blame her if anything went wrong. The officer stated in her initial case plan that Vincent had “severe psychological issues that need to be dealt with prior to consideration for any kind of employment and/or independent living plans.”
In December 2007, the probation officer reported that after a visit with his father in juvenile hall, Vincent had broken a window and cut his arms on the glass. He denied being suicidal, saying he did not think the glass would break. His attorney later that month filed a motion to continue the contested dispositional hearing which stated, among other things, that Vincent had recently been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and started taking psychotropic medication.
In January 2008, another evaluating psychologist, Dr. Hajian, reported that Vincent’s psychiatric illness had improved significantly during the past month, that Vincent had stated that he no longer had hallucinations, such as hearing voices, or delusions, and that he did not experience thoughts of wanting to hurt himself or others.
Vincent’s counsel submitted an alternative case plan to the court shortly before the dispositional hearing. Counsel argued for placement in a therapeutic group home or, in the alternative, credit for time served and release home on probation into his mother’s care and custody in Germany. In support of this proposal, counsel submitted several letters from Germany, including letters from his mother, that nothing was more important to her than her son’s health and social rehabilitation, that her brother-in-law, a doctor, was prepared to be responsible for Vincent’s medical care, and that a specific psychotherapist and doctor of psychosomatic medicine would be responsible for his psychotherapeutic treatment; from this psychotherapist stating he was prepared to take Vincent on as a patient; from a pediatric nurse in the juvenile psychiatric unit of a Berlin hospital stating that she was prepared to recommend the necessary specialists and social workers who would take charge of Vincent’s care; from his uncle stating that he was a medical practitioner and would take charge of Vincent’s medical care, including organizing treatment with medical specialists; and from his aunt and grandmother stating their willingness to help.
On the day of the January 2008 dispositional hearing, the probation officer filed a report which stated that Vincent, although now taking medication, had recently violated several juvenile hall rules, yelled obscenities at a female counselor, and repeatedly kicked, and badly damaged, the door to his room. He was exhibiting the same out-of-control behavior he had exhibited before he started taking medication. The officer, having considered recommending sending Vincent to Germany, instead recommended, based on the recent juvenile hall incident and a conversation with the father, that Vincent be placed with the California Youth Authority for a period not to exceed three years in order to receive needed medical treatment, and because he posed a danger to others.
At the dispositional hearing, the parties stipulated that Vincent was not suitable for a Log Cabin Ranch placement because of his age and mental health issues. There was also discussion, not disputed between the parties, that funding for any out of home placement would end when he turned 18 in a few months, and that he was either ineligible for placement for lack of special educational needs, or unsuitable for facilities that were neither secure nor equipped to handle his mental illness diagnosis. A placement unit supervisor recommended that he be sent to Germany because of the indications that he could receive treatment and family support there.
A Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) representative, Anna Olivas, stated that Chatterjian Youth Correctional Facility (Chatterjian) in Stockton, California was the only available, suitable DJJ referral. Chatterjian had “a continuum of mental health treatment program services” to meet Vincent’s mental health needs, including an intensive treatment program that provided individual therapy, psycho-group therapy, and medication management, had 30 beds, two psychologists, mental health clinicians, a half-time psychiatrist, licensed psychiatric nurses, and other staff. Based on the diagnoses that Vincent suffered from schizophrenia and depression, the program administrator had found that Vincent was eligible for the intensive treatment program, but he would still need to undergo a 90-day clinic process to evaluate him. If accepted, the program would help him to develop coping skills, teach him how to properly express his emotions, and address his commitment offense, victim awareness, anger control, substance abuse, and other issues that arose during treatment. There was also a “specialized counseling program” staffed by “mental health staff.” Chatterjian used motivational techniques to encourage compliance with medication, but once accepted Vincent would remain in the intensive treatment program if he refused his medication. If he had a mental health crisis, he would be referred to a short-term, licensed acute program until he stabilized. Chatterjian was also affiliated with a local psychiatric hospital.
Olivas stated that she had recently visited Chatterjian. The facility currently housed 20 wards who had separate rooms, six hours of education daily, and group therapy. Vincent could obtain his high school diploma at Chatterjian, participate in vocational programs, obtain a job if he complied with school and therapy requirements, and take junior college courses. Vincent’s father could visit on weekends.
Olivas stated that Vincent’s earliest possible release would be in 18 months, and DJJ would retain jurisdiction until he was 25 years old. In response to the court’s questioning, Olivas stated that Vincent’s transition placement would be based on his team’s recommendations, based on his behavior and whether he was medically stabilized. He could receive a group placement that included continued mental health counseling and medication management, or family reunification. The DJJ parole officers had mental health placements and worked with doctors and psychiatrists to manage the caseloads.
Olivas also acknowledged that DJJ was involved in implementing consent decree requirements that were put in place via a lawsuit, which had resulted in changes to Chatterjian, which was now a mental health facility with more training and more mental health clinicians, and a change in the population. She said they were working on a multi-year plan to correct the identified problems in DJJ facilities.
Vincent’s probation officer recommended that he be committed to DJJ because it was the best placement for his rehabilitation and for the public’s safety. She acknowledged that she had changed from her previous recommendation because of the juvenile hall incidents, his psychiatric evaluations, her doubts about his mother’s promise of treatment in Germany, and because Log Cabin Ranch had indicated that they did not have any services for Vincent She stated that Dr. Hajian’s report had been made without knowing about his recent juvenile hall incident, that Vincent’s mother had recently indicated that the German child services agency would have to interview Vincent before determining what specific services it would be able to provide, that the mother was no longer living with her sister and brother-in-law, and that her sister had experienced mental health problems at one time and was no longer practicing as a nurse. In the probation officer’s view, “we don’t know what is going to happen once he gets off the airplane.”
Vincent’s father expressed doubts about returning Vincent to Germany, stating that it would “sweep our problem under the rug,” and that he felt Vincent “would be in an environment that would encourage the kind of behavior I have been struggling with for 18 years[.]” His father stated that if Vincent remained in California, his father could “work with the system to try to do whatever we can do to collectively try to help him.” He agreed with defense counsel’s recommendations that Vincent be committed to a group home rather than DJJ.
The prosecutor recommended that Vincent be committed to DJJ because of his escalating violent conduct and the danger he posed to the community, and because it alone provided the psychiatric residential treatment program, structure, and stability Dr. Watt recommended in his evaluation. He contended the German military would not accept Vincent due to his mental illness and history of violence.
Defense counsel read a letter by Vincent asking for a Bay Area group home placement. Counsel argued against a DJJ placement because Vincent had no prior commitments, had merely bumped the bicyclist, had a disturbed home environment, and had mental health problems that could be addressed in a therapeutic group home. Counsel argued that DJJ was a failure and that Germany had more resources to treat Vincent than did California.
The court committed Vincent to DJJ for a maximum term of five years. It found that DJJ offered the “best possibilities” of a program for him, would enable him to be close to his father, and was consistent with his preference to stay in California. The court intended that Vincent be evaluated and treated in DJJ, not warehoused, stated that it would not feel compelled to keep him there if that did not occur, and encouraged defense counsel to monitor his stay. The court stated that it had considered a number of factors, including the seriousness of his conduct, the need to protect society, the value of imposing discipline and accountability, the extent of Vincent’s need for a structured institutional setting, and the need for therapeutic intervention and treatment. It rejected less restrictive alternatives as inappropriate, and stated that it was “fully satisfied that the mental and physical conditions and the qualifications of the minor are such as to render it probable the minor . . . would benefit from the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the [DJJ].”
DISCUSSION
“A juvenile court's commitment order may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing the court abused its discretion. (In re Todd W. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 408, 416.) ‘ “We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them.” ’ ” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330; In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) In arriving at a disposition, the court considers the probation officer’s report and any other relevant and material evidence that may be offered. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (d); In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.)
The court may make a commitment to DJJ without first trying less restrictive placements. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) “[T]he 1984 amendments to the juvenile court law reflected an increased emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, and a concern for the safety of the public.” (Ibid.) “ ‘The purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws is twofold: (1) to serve the “best interests” of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and “enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,” and (2) to “provide for the protection and safety of the public . . . .” ’ ” (In re Schmidt (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 694, 716.) Thus, to support a commitment to the DJJ, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a DJJ commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. (In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555.) The court “must be ‘fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided’ ” by DJJ. (In re Jimmy P., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1684.)
Vincent claims there was no substantial evidence of probable benefit to him from the court-ordered DJJ commitment. This is not correct. The court carefully reviewed significant evidence prior to ordering Vincent’s disposition regarding his group home options, the merits of his return to his family in Germany on probation, and his treatment options at Chatterjian. The record indicates that there was no viable group home option because Vincent would turn 18 in a matter of months, had significant mental health issues, and likely would fare poorly at an unsecured facility based upon his disruptive and violent behavior at juvenile hall, including conduct after he began taking medication.
Furthermore, the court could reasonably conclude that Vincent would not benefit from a return to Germany, or that any probable benefits he might receive from such a return would be less than that he would receive via a DJJ commitment. While there may have been indications in the record that he could receive medical treatment in Germany, there remained serious questions that he could be effectively treated and rehabilitated outside a secure facility in light of his repeated out-of-control behavior, including violent behavior that occurred after he began his medication regimen. The court could also reasonably consider that his primary caregiver if he were returned to Germany, his mother, had resisted approving his case plan and proposed medication, expressed doubts about his mental health issues, and commented that some of his juvenile hall conduct was appropriate. While there were indications of family supportiveness, his probation officer reported that his mother was no longer living with her sister and brother-in-law, creating uncertainty about the appropriateness and stability of his living situation in Germany as well.
On the other hand, the court could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence presented about Chatterjian that Vincent would receive probable benefits from a DJJ commitment. Vincent argues that there was no guarantee that he would qualify for the intensive treatment program at Chatterjian and, therefore, no evidence that he would receive a probable benefit from placement there given his mental health issues. Although there was no guarantee, the court could reasonably rely on testimony that space was presently available in the program, and that the DJJ administrator thought that Vincent would qualify for it as substantial evidence that he would receive a probable benefit from a placement in Chatterjian. The court also could reasonably conclude from Olivas’s testimony that Vincent would receive other probable benefits as well, including because the program represented the best available mental health treatment program for Vincent, because of Chatterjian’s educational opportunities, because he could remain there for 18 months (versus just a few months for an out-of home placement, which funding would end at his 18th birthday), because of a treatment plan that would aid his transition upon release, and because his father could visit Chatterjian regularly. Thus, contrary to Vincent’s claim that his DJJ disposition did not take into sufficient account the need to provide him with rehabilitation opportunities, the record establishes that the court could reasonably conclude based upon substantial evidence that a commitment to DJJ was the best way to provide him with significant, long-term mental health treatment and assist his re-entering society upon release. Moreover, the court also made quite clear that it had considered the possibility that it would be willing to consider sending him to another placement if DJJ did not provide him with sufficient treatment at Chatterjian, upon a motion by his counsel.
Vincent also argues that there was no evidence that his family ties would be maintained or strengthened by a DJJ placement, contending that the only evidence was that his mother and her family in Germany, and not her father, was available to provide him with the support he needed. His argument amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do under our deferential standard of review. The record indicates that Vincent’s father visited him at juvenile hall, made statements indicating his willingness to help Vincent, and that Vincent himself preferred to stay in California. As we have already discussed, the court could also reasonably conclude his circumstances in Germany would be uncertain and problematic.
Vincent also incorrectly argues that a DJJ commitment should only be made as a last resort, relying on In re Todd W., supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at page 418. However, In re Todd was decided before the Legislature’s 1984 amendments to the juvenile court law. Our Supreme Court rejected this “last resort” approach in In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 184, which upheld a DJJ commitment for a first-time offender. (See also In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396 [stating that a DJJ commitment “may be considered . . . without previous resort to less restrictive placements”].) The juvenile court is only required to give proper consideration to less restrictive programs before committing a minor to DJJ. (In re Ricky H., supra, at p. 183.) The court below complied with this requirement, hearing evidence about alternative placements in group homes and Vincent’s return to Germany, as we have discussed.
Furthermore, the court could reasonably conclude that DJJ was the best placement to protect the public from Vincent's violent and dangerous conduct. He had admitted to committing an assault likely to commit great bodily injury, Dr. Watt had opined that he should not be returned home, and Vincent’s out of-control and sometimes violent conduct in juvenile hall, including after he began taking medication, were substantial evidence that he was a risk to himself and a threat to the community. The court indicated its consideration of such matters in its stated reasons for its dispositional order.
In short, Vincent’s argument that the court abused its discretion in ordering Vincent’s commitment to the DJJ lacks merit.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: Haerle, Acting P.J., Richman, J.