However, the cases upon which objectors rely all involve standing to bring a quo warranto action and, therefore, are inapposite. The present action was not brought in quo warranto, and we have already concluded that under the facts of this case, petitioners were not restricted to that remedy. • 3 Objector, village of Wheeling, also contends that Prospect Heights' annexation is barred by the pendency of a petition to disconnect involving the only boundary which can establish the contiguity of the proposed annexation territory to Prospect Heights. Wheeling argues that if the disconnection sought is granted, there will be no contiguity whatsoever between the subject territory and the city of Prospect Heights, and for the court to entertain this petition at this time would be a nugatory act. Wheeling cites In re Village of Willowbrook (1965), 62 Ill. App.2d 45, 210 N.E.2d 25. In that case the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of an annexation proceeding because an appeal was pending from a prior disconnection action " between the same parties concerning the same or similar subject mater."

Defendant stipulated that Murphy had registered to vote on April 28, 1976, and was a legal voter on May 5 but contends that the question of whether the conditions of the annexation statute have been met is determined as of the date it adopted its ordinance on April 13, 1976, or on April 20, 1976, when its petition for annexation was filed in the trial court. Defendant relies upon People ex rel. Cherry Valley Fire Protection District v. City of Rockford (1970), 120 Ill. App.2d 275, 256 N.E.2d 653, and In re Annexation to the Village of Willowbrook (1965), 62 Ill. App.2d 45, 210 N.E.2d 25, for its position that the date of the passage of an annexation ordinance by a municipality governs in this case. While holding as defendant suggests these cases are factually distinguishable from the instant case.

Several cases have upheld the dismissal of a complaint when the same claim was pending on appeal. ( Wheatley v. International Harvester Co. (1988), 166 Ill. App.3d 775, 520 N.E.2d 975; In re Ordinance Requesting the Annexation of Certain Territory to the Village of Willowbrook (1965), 62 Ill. App.2d 45, 46, 210 N.E.2d 25.) A recent Federal case in the seventh circuit analyzing Illinois law and section 2-619(a)(3) is applicable to this matter, as Locke v. Bonello (7th Cir. 1992), 965 F.2d 534, held that section 2-619(a)(3) would apply to a case pending on State appeal. With Miller still pending on appeal, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff did not state a meritorious claim.

As there is no language in the disclosure statute suggesting that nondisclosure voids any action taken on the application (see People ex rel. Armentrout v. City of Aurora (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 983, 986, 420 N.E.2d 833), we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the purpose of the statute is simply to give municipalities a tool to obtain disclosure, and that nondisclosure in this case did not invalidate the petition for annexation. • 8 Long Grove next contends that the petition for annexation is invalid for including within the description of property sought to be annexed certain highways which were already within the corporate boundaries of Long Grove. One of the requisites of a valid annexation is that the territory sought to be annexed be unincorporated. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 24, par. 7-1-1; In re Village of Willowbrook (1965), 62 Ill. App.2d 45, 46, 210 N.E.2d 25.) The erroneous inclusion of lands not properly subject to annexation is a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the petition, and such a petition is not entitled to priority over a subsequently filed petition to annex or incorporate the same territory. In re Organization of Byron Park District (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 61, 64, 385 N.E.2d 67.

( Haas v. Righeimer, 220 Ill. 193, 197, 77 N.E. 69; see Leonard v. Bye, 361 Ill. 185, 197 N.E. 546; compare International Printing Pressmen Assistants' Union of North America v. Rebenson, 350 Ill. App. 156, 112 N.E.2d 192.) These holdings conform to the rule that for a prior action to be pleaded in abatement of a later one, the two actions had to be substantially for the same cause of action, and had to be between the same, or at least substantially the same, parties, and conversely, if the parties in the two actions were not, at least substantially, the same, the pendency of the prior action could not be pleaded in abatement of the subsequent one. ( In re Annexation to Village of Willowbrook, 62 Ill. App.2d 45, 210 N.E.2d 25; McFadden v. St. Paul Coal Co., 183 Ill. App. 36; aff'd 263 Ill. 441, 105 N.E. 314; 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 56 (1936).) Thus, it appears that at the time the legislature adopted the statutory substitute for common-law abatement of suits, the word "same", as applied to parties, did not mean identical.