Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sup.Ct. No. JV123035
MORRISON , J.
While driving unlicensed and uninsured, Victor V., aged 17 (hereafter the minor), rear-ended a vehicle being driven by a woman accompanied by her five children which was stopped at a red light. Based upon the accident, the minor admitted charges of driving while unlicensed (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and speeding (Veh. Code, § 22350). He was declared a ward of the court, placed on probation and ordered, among other things, to pay victim restitution of $5,578.34.
On appeal, the minor contends juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to place him on informal probation without a declaration of wardship as provided by Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a)), rather than, as it did, declaring him a ward under section 725, subdivision (b). We find no abuse of discretion.
Hereafter, references to undesignated sections are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
DISCUSSION
Section 725, subdivision (a), permits the juvenile court to place a section 602 minor, i.e., one who has committed a criminal act, on probation for six months without declaring the minor a ward of the court. Subdivision (b) of section 725 permits the court to declare such a minor a ward of the court, a condition which generally may continue to the minor’s 21st birthday. (See § 607, subd. (a).)
For any section-602 minor who has caused economic loss to a victim due to the minor’s conduct, section 730.6 requires the court to impose restitution to that victim as a condition of the minor’s probation. (§ 730.6, subds. (a)(2)(B), (l).)
A juvenile court’s order regarding disposition will be reversed on appeal only upon showing the court abused its discretion in making the order. (In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911, 922.) An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court has exceeded its limit of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd order. (In re Leticia S. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 378, 381.)
Here, in declaring wardship, the court stated: “Court is going to agree with probation’s recommendation. Restitution amount is significant. It was significant damage caused to the car. He was violating the law. In addition to the infraction, violating the law by driving without a license. Has not done well in school. It indicates in here (probation officer’s report) that he has a GPA of 1.84. Has unexcused absences in school. For those reasons, I think supervision, informal supervision, is warranted.”
The minor argues that the above stated reasons, either singly or in combination, are not sufficient cause to declare him a ward of the court. We disagree.
Initially, the minor points out that “the fact [he] broke the law is of little moment . . . [because] if he had not broken the law, he would not be before the court on a section 602 petition.” While this, of course, is true, it misses the point. Immediately after making the foregoing statement, the court described how the minor broke the law, to wit, by driving without a license and going to fast for the road conditions (street was wet). Although not mentioned by the court, but admitted by the minor, was the fact he was driving without insurance. These are highly irresponsible actions showing a disregard for the safety of both persons and their property. Consequently, the manner in which the minor broke the law was a proper consideration in determining wardship.
Citing In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, the minor claims that the court’s consideration of his school performance was inappropriate in the absence of evidence that he was able to do better. He argues: “On the current record then, it would be improper to even order as a probation term that [he] get anything above a ‘D’ grade. There was no showing he had the ability to do better.”
In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 1, is not on point because the record in that case showed compliance with the court’s order that the minor maintain a “B” average was “beyond [the minor’s] capacity[.]” (P. 7.) Here, however, the record shows no such limitation. The minor’s GPA was 1.84, he was in the 11th grade, his latest report card reflected two “B”s, one “C” and four “F”s, and he had amassed over 16 unexcused absences. The minor and his counsel were clearly present when the court voiced its concern with his school performance, and both the minor and his counsel were aware of his school performance. Yet neither the minor nor his counsel voiced any claim that the minor was incapable of performing at least average, which one would reasonably expect to have occurred if the minor was so limited. On this record, we do not find the minor’s argument well taken.
The minor also points out that he was 18 years old at the time of disposition and that it was unclear whether he would continue in school. Again, if the minor had no intention of going to school he had every opportunity to so inform the court. However, since the minor was only in the 11th grade and said nothing about not continuing school, it was completely reasonable for the court to consider this extremely important aspect of his maturing.
Finally, the minor claims the court was basing its determination to declare him a ward primarily on the significant amount of restitution involved. This was inappropriate, he argues, because the restitution amount would turn into a civil judgment at the termination of his wardship and that “should take care of the problem.” Declaring him a ward based mainly on the amount of restitution, he concludes would be “punishing” him because of “the need to pay a fine.”
The minor misses two points. First, while he is correct that a termination of jurisdiction transforms any unpaid amount of restitution into a civil judgment (§ 730.6, subds. (i), (r)), nothing in the court’s comments suggested it was relying anymore on this factor than on the other factors determining whether to declare wardship. Indeed, the court stated it was basing its declaration of wardship “[for] the reasons cited,” only one of which was the significant amount of restitution. Nor do we see anything inappropriate in the court’s rejecting a shorter term for payment of restitution (six months under section 725, subd. (a)) simply because it would convert into a civil judgment rather than opting to oversee such payment for the longer term provided by wardship under section 725, subdivision (b).
Second, the minor has not offered any authority or reason for supporting his position that a declaration of wardship constitutes “punishment.” Since wardship is for the minor’s rehabilitation and the safety of the public (§ 202), it can hardly be considered punishment.
In sum, the court’s declaration of wardship was based upon the minor’s irresponsible and dangerous conduct in driving unlicensed, uninsured, and in excess of the safe conditions for the road; his poor school performance, which needed monitoring; and the significant amount of restitution based upon his damaging the victim’s automobile and injuring two of her children.
Since the minor has failed to demonstrate that any of these factors, let alone a combination thereof, is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion by the court in declaring him a court ward.
DISPOSITION
The order declaring wardship is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE , Acting P.J. CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.