Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura H. Parsky, Judge, No. JCM215-314 04
McINTYRE, Acting P. J.
Victor R. was declared a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after admitting to residential burglary and possessing a firearm in violation of probation. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) After a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court committed Victor to the San Diego County Probation Youthful Offender Unit (YOU) Program for a period not to exceed 480 days. Victor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the YOU Program because the commitment was unnecessarily punitive. He also contends that a probationary commitment of up to 480 days violated his right to equal protection because adult probationers cannot serve more than 365 days. We reject his contentions and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2008, 17-year-old Victor and two cohorts went to a home in Escondido, California, planning to steal drugs. While one of his cohorts tried to enter the home, Victor stayed outside with a gun. When confronted by the residents of the home, Victor yelled "I'm Little Jawbreaker from Diablos" and threatened to "put a bullet" in the head of one of the victims. After police arrived, the three fled and were arrested a short time later.
The People filed a section 602 petition alleging ten counts and various enhancements arising out of the incident. Victor admitted that he committed a residential burglary and possessed a firearm in violation of probation, and that the crimes were gang related. The People dismissed the remaining counts and allegations. Over Victor's objection, the juvenile court committed him to the YOU Program for a term not to exceed 480 days. Victor timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Victor contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the YOU Program because it by-passed, based on his previous placement, the next level of supervision, Camp Barrett. He also asserts that the court failed to articulate sufficient reasons warranting the more severe and restrictive placement. We disagree.
We review the commitment order in light of the purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws, which is twofold: "'(1) to serve the "best interests" of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and "enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community," and (2) to "provide for the protection and safety of the public...."' [Citations.]" (In re Schmidt (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 694, 716.) The disposition should consider, among other things, the age of the minor, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, and the minor's previous delinquent history. (§ 725.5.) Additionally, the juvenile court can consider the efficacy of prior placements (In re Robert D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 767, 773), as well as recommendations in the probation reports (In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 55, 61). "We review a commitment decision only for abuse of discretion, and indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court." (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.)
Here, the probation officer's social study report revealed that Victor's disregard for the law started at age 15, when he took a vehicle without permission. About 16 months later, police arrested Victor on drug charges after they found him in a car with drugs, a concealed hand gun, and documented gang members. The juvenile court declared Victor a ward based on that incident. Nine months later, the juvenile court continued the wardship after police arrested Victor for possessing a stolen car.
Victor did well during a month stay in a juvenile ranch facility, but upon his release, repeatedly violated the terms of his probation by using marijuana and leaving his court ordered placement. Less than a month after his release from juvenile hall, he committed the instant offense. Victor admitted that he was under the influence of methamphetamine during the offense, and showed no remorse for his crimes. He also admitted to gang membership, and to the daily use of alcohol and marijuana.
These facts suggested to the probation officer that Victor needed rehabilitation in a secure setting because he was "entrenched in a lifestyle characterized by gang activity, significant drug use, and criminal behavior" and his crimes were of increasing seriousness. The probation officer recommended the YOU Program based on Victor's delinquent history and prior treatment failures. She expressly rejected commitment to Camp Barrett based on Victor's violent behavior and lack of remorse, noting that the YOU Program would deter his integration into the adult system by providing vocational training, educational services, and behavior and mental health treatment.
The juvenile court agreed with the recommendation that Victor be sent to the YOU Program, observing that he committed a planned and serious violent offense, but did not show any regret or think about the potential consequences of his actions. It also concluded that the YOU Program was a better placement than Camp Barrett because it provided continuing supervision when Victor was released from custody and more involvement from the probation department, "which I think will be helpful if we are going to keep Victor out of the adult criminal justice system." Although Victor argues Camp Barrett was a suitable placement, he fails to discuss why a less restrictive placement would be effective or appropriate. Significantly, juvenile placements need not follow any particular order. The juvenile court does not necessarily abuse its discretion by ordering a more restrictive placement before other options have been tried. (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.)
The court's comments reveal that it evaluated Victor's suggested alternative disposition and did not arbitrarily deny it. There is substantial evidence that Victor will receive a probable benefit from his commitment to the YOU Program, and that there are no alternative, less restrictive commitments that will be effective or appropriate. Accordingly, the juvenile court's decision to commit Victor to the YOU Program was not an abuse of discretion.
Victor also asserts that his commitment to the YOU Program for up to 480 days violated his right to equal protection. He points out that Penal Code section 19.2 limits confinement in county jail for an adult offender to one year, whether by penal sentence or as a condition of probation, unless consecutive sentences have been imposed for multiple offenses. He contends that, unlike an adult, he could not refuse probation and that his commitment to the YOU Program exceeded the one-year term authorized for an adult offender under Penal Code section 19.2.
"The constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws means simply that persons similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law must be similarly treated under the law. [Citations.] If persons are not similarly situated for purposes of the law, an equal protection claim fails at the threshold. [Citation.] The question is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but 'whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.' [Citation.]" (People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155.)
In In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522 (Eric J.), the minor complained that Penal Code section 726 "denie[d] him equal protection of the laws by providing that the maximum term of confinement for a juvenile is the longest term imposable upon an adult for the same offense, without the necessity of finding circumstances in aggravation of the crime justifying imposition of the upper term as is required in adult criminal procedure by Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)." (Id. at p. 528.) Our high court rejected this argument, observing that adults convicted in the criminal courts and youths adjudged wards of the juvenile courts are not similarly situated because "'[t]he liberty interest of a minor is qualitatively different than that of an adult, being subject both to reasonable regulation by the state to an extent not permissible with adults... [citations]....'" (Id. at p. 530.) Additionally, the legislative purpose of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation, whereas the objective in criminal courts is punishment. (Id. at p. 531.) Although our high court decided Eric J. before the 1984 amendment to section 202 placed an increased emphasis on punishment as a stated goal of juvenile law, the primary purpose of juvenile law remains rehabilitation and promoting the welfare of children. (In re Myresheia W. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 734, 740-741; In re Charles C. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 952, 960.)
Victor's equal protection argument fails because he has not shown that he is similarly situated to an adult sentenced to probation. As the Attorney General aptly noted, rehabilitation will likely take longer than punishment. Accordingly, Victor does not stand in the same posture as an adult who has committed the identical offense but who was convicted in the criminal courts and placed on probation. (See In re Harm R. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 438, 445 ["Until such time as we are to impose on the entire juvenile court system all the procedures prescribed in the adult criminal code, some distinctions between the juvenile court and the adult criminal court must exist"].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: AARON, J., IRION, J.