Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD227214.
BUTZ, J.
Appellant D.F., the father of the three-and-a-half-year-old minor V.F., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that V.F. was specifically adoptable. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
V.F. was born in October 2007 to appellant and her mother J.M. She was placed in protective custody in March 2008 when police, while responding to a domestic disturbance call, found the mother intoxicated with a blood-alcohol level of 0.28 percent. Appellant was incarcerated in the Placer County Jail at the time.
The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a dependency petition (§ 300) in March 2008, alleging the mother had a substance abuse problem which impaired her judgment and ability to care for V.F. The minor was detained later that month.
The jurisdiction/disposition report noted appellant had been incarcerated since mid-January 2008. Appellant and the mother agreed that his incarceration was the stressor that led to the mother’s intoxication. Then seven-month-old V.F. was developmentally on target and in a foster home.
Appellant was released from custody in July 2008. He made his first appearance at the July 2008 jurisdictional hearing, where the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition. At the August 2008 dispositional hearing, the juvenile court placed the minor with her maternal cousin J.B. and ordered reunification services for appellant and the mother.
DHHS removed V.F. from J.B.’s home in September 2008 because he was no longer able or willing to care for her. The juvenile court sustained a supplemental petition (§ 387) and placed V.F. in foster care.
A November 2008 report noted V.F. appeared to be meeting or exceeding the developmental milestones for her age group. She was extremely active, walked on her own, was verbal but not understandable, and was extremely aware of her surroundings.
The mother gave birth to D.M. in December 2008.
D.M. is not a party to this appeal.
In January 2009 the juvenile court granted DHHS’s petition for modification to place V.F. with the maternal cousin C.O. The juvenile court continued services for appellant and the mother.
DHHS recommended returning V.F. to the parents in a May 2009 report. Appellant and the mother were consistently cooperative, tested negative for alcohol and illicit substances, and completed individual counseling. The parents had progressed to unsupervised overnight and weekend visits with V.F.
According to the social worker, V.F. appeared to be meeting all developmental milestones, but a routine physical examination indicated she needed a developmental assessment. The examining physician was concerned about V.F.’s unstable gait, vocalization, and ability to form understandable words, as well as her passivity. Another doctor found her cognitive development was average, her motor development and speech development were delayed, and was both impressed and distressed by her passivity. V.F. was referred for speech and physical evaluation at the Alta California Regional Center, and her doctor recommended a referral to the U.C. Davis Medical Center infant mental health program.
In May 2009 the juvenile court placed V.F. with appellant and the mother and continued the dependency.
Appellant filed a section 388 petition in June 2009, seeking termination of the dependency with joint custody to appellant and the mother. The juvenile court denied the petition in August 2009, citing the mother’s June 2009 arrest for domestic violence.
DHHS recommended continued services for the parents in an October 2009 report. V.F. was reassessed by her doctor, who found she was a far different child than at the first assessment. She had developed significantly since the last assessment, with motor development improved to average, language improved to the borderline area, and her cognitive development was now in the low to average range. The infant mental health program assessed V.F. and determined there were no concerns and she did not meet Medi-Cal’s requirements for medical necessity.
Appellant and the mother were arrested on theft charges at the courthouse just before a scheduled juvenile court hearing in December 2009. In March 2010, the juvenile court continued the dependency and placed V.F. with the mother. Appellant was in custody at the time of the hearing.
V.F. and D.M were placed in protective custody in May 2010 after the mother was found on the floor of her bedroom naked, unresponsive, and intoxicated at about 3:00 a.m. Two-year-old V.F. was awake on the couch unsupervised, while one-year-old D.M. was asleep in the crib. The mother had a blood-alcohol level of 0.421 percent and tested positive for amphetamines.
DHHS filed a supplemental petition (§ 387) in May 2010 alleging the most recent incident with the mother and her substance abuse problem. V.F. was detained later that month.
DHHS filed a report on the supplemental petition in June 2010. V.F. was outgoing and friendly and appeared to be meeting all of her developmental milestones. She verbalized, but was not easily understood.
In August 2010 the juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition, terminated reunification services, and placed V.F. and D.M. with the maternal cousin C.O.
In a November 2010 section 366.26 report, DHHS related that V.F.’s right eye wandered inward. V.F.’s doctor noted she was much more active and impulsive than most children her age, determining she had a hyperactive problem rather than a disorder. The doctor further suggested an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) diagnosis may need to be considered when V.F. approached school age.
The report described V.F. as an active child who seemed to run everywhere. Her fine and gross motor skills were progressing, she could ride a bicycle with training wheels, could feed herself, and was potty trained.
V.F. was a very active child who needed attention, and would scream and cry when she did not get her way. Her caretaker related that she is aggressive to her brother, and has to be closely supervised as she would choke or hit him. V.F. has emotional breakdowns where she would cry and scream, and does not like it when the caretaker leaves her sight. The caretaker reported that since V.F. started attending Sunday school and playing with other children, she has improved and was not upset when the caretaker left.
The report stated that the maternal cousin C.O. expressed an interest in adoption. C.O. was a single mother with an adult son who attended college and may soon move out of the home. C.O. worked full time for the State of California and lived in a two-bedroom home in a nice neighborhood close to parks and schools. She cleared her criminal and child welfare history, accepted the legal and financial responsibilities of adoption, and had been referred to an adoption home study.
The report stated V.F. had developmental delays and low cognitive development, while her brother had a speech delay and behavioral challenges. V.F. was considered specifically adoptable because of her special needs and she was part of a sibling set with her brother. Her prospects for adoption were good because the maternal cousin was committed to adoption. The report concluded termination of parental rights was in V.F.’s best interests.
Appellant and the mother entered general objections to termination of parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that V.F. and her brother were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that V.F. was likely to be adopted. We disagree.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child.... The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption.’” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368, italics omitted.) “In order for the court to select and implement adoption as the permanent plan, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the minor will likely be adopted if parental rights are terminated.” (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
Generally, “[t]he issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) “[T]he fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (Id. at pp. 1649-1650, italics omitted.) When a child is specifically adoptable, inquiry into the existence of a legal impediment to adoption by the prospective adoptive parents may be relevant at the section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at p. 1650; Fam. Code, § 8600 et seq.) In the case of a child who will need specialized care for an extended period of time, it may also be appropriate for the juvenile court to inquire whether the prospective adoptive parents can meet the child’s ongoing needs. (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1062.)
We review a finding of adoptability for substantial evidence. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
Appellant asserts V.F. presented significant developmental delays and behavioral problems that influenced her adoptability. He notes the June 2009 examination in which the doctor stated V.F.’s language was in the borderline area and her cognitive development was in the low to average range. V.F. was much more active than children her age; the doctor believed she might have a hyperactive problem and an ADHD diagnosis may have to be considered as she approached school age. At one point, DHHS indicated she would need services to address her developmental delays.
Regarding V.F.’s alleged behavioral problems, appellant points out her aggression towards her brother D.M.—whom she would hit or choke without close supervision. Also, V.F. demanded attention, would have emotional breakdowns, screamed and cried when she did not get her way, and did not like it when the maternal cousin left her. Asserting the maternal cousin made equivocal statements about adoption and DHHS did not establish how she could care for V.F. and her brother, appellant concludes the juvenile court did not have sufficient evidence to find the maternal cousin would meet V.F.’s needs.
V.F.’s problems did not present a significant hurdle to adoption. The doctor’s diagnosis upon which appellant relies was made in June 2009, over a year before the section 366.26 hearing. The doctor noted V.F. had made significant improvement since her first assessment in December 2008. The main diagnosis—average motor development, borderline language development, and low to average cognitive development—are not significant developmental delays. Although the doctor indicated ADHD might be a problem in the future, this was no more than a potential problem, and thus presented no impediment to adoption. In addition, the infant mental health program reported no concerns with V.F. and she did not qualify for Medi-Cal’s requirements for medical necessity.
Appellant overstates V.F.’s behavioral problems. The maternal cousin reported the problems noted by appellant, but also said V.F.’s behavior improved once she attended Sunday school and played with other children. As with her development, V.F.’s behavior was not so severe as to constitute a significant barrier to adoption.
There was substantial evidence showing the maternal cousin C.O. was capable of caring for V.F. and committed to adopting her with her sibling. C.O. had cared for V.F. for 10 months at the time of the November 2010 termination hearing and her interest in adopting was clear and unequivocal. Appellant’s argument to the contrary relies on a single sentence in the section 366.26 report: “The current caretaker is the maternal cousin and has expressed an interest in adoption.” This statement raises little, if any, doubt about C.O.’s commitment to adoption. Any doubt about C.O.’s commitment is dispelled by statements in the report that C.O. was “committed” to adopting V.F. and her brother, understood and accepted the financial and legal responsibilities of adoption, and had been referred for the adoption home study.
In In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205, cited by appellant, the adoptability finding was based on the willingness of the mother’s former boyfriend to adopt the minor. The adoption assessment in Jerome D. did not include the potential adoptive parent’s criminal or child welfare history, the minor’s health problems, or his close relationship with his mother. (Id. at p. 1205.) This differs from the case before us, where the maternal cousin cleared her criminal and child welfare history, and the juvenile court was apprised of the minor’s health, development, and relationship with the parents.
In any event, the lack of an adoptive home does not preclude a finding that the minor was likely to be adopted. (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649.) The prospect that the minor may have some continuing behavioral problems also did not foreclose a finding of adoptability. (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 224-225.)
The obstacles to adoption presented by V.F. are nowhere near as severe as those cited by appellant in In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1062-1063, In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 510-512, and In re Jerome D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1203, 1205-1208. V.F. made psychological and behavioral progress, is comparatively young, and her maternal cousin was committed to adopting her. Substantial evidence supports the finding of adoptability.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.
We concur: RAYE, P. J., HOCH, J.