Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Super. Ct. Nos. J31069, J31070
SIMS , Acting P.J.
Appellant Cass E., mother of the minors, appeals from the dispositional orders of the juvenile court entered on February 8, 2006. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) She contends that, prior to disposition, the juvenile court improperly issued a temporary restraining order against her which required she move out of the family home. She also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not ordering she be provided reunification services. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
We provide an abbreviated recitation of the background of this case, summarizing only those portions that are relevant to the resolution of the issues on appeal.
The minors, then ages three and five, were detained from appellant in March 2004. The court sustained section 300 petitions on behalf of the minors and adjudged the minors dependent children. The allegations surrounded appellant’s psychological issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence arrest. The minors’ father was incarcerated at the time. Reunification services were provided.
The minors were returned to appellant in December 2004, with family maintenance services. Dependency was terminated on May 23, 2005.
New section 300 petitions were filed on December 12, 2005, alleging appellant was arrested and incarcerated for being too intoxicated to care for herself or her children. The petitions also alleged that, in September 2005, appellant had taken prescription drugs with alcohol in an attempt at suicide; a day later, she had been arrested for public intoxication at which time she was found to be driving with the children in the car; there was ongoing domestic violence between the parents; father would leave the house when appellant was intoxicated and violent, without taking and protecting the children. The father was staying at a friend’s house. The minors requested they be placed back in their former foster home.
The minors were detained at the December 13, 2005, detention hearing. Appellant did not appear at the hearing. The juvenile court indicated it would re-appoint appellant’s former attorney to represent her if she appeared. The juvenile court stated it would authorize placement with the father if there were assurances he would not leave the minors with appellant. A jurisdictional hearing was scheduled for December 22, 2005.
Butte County Department of Employment and Social Services (DESS) applied for a temporary restraining order at the December 22, 2005, hearing. The requested order required appellant to move out of the family apartment so the father would be able to have unsupervised visits with the minors. Appellant did not appear at the hearing. The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petitions, issued the temporary restraining order, and authorized placement with the father. The disposition hearing was set for January 26, 2006. The court also set a review hearing for the restraining order for January 9, 2006.
Appellant appeared at the January 9, 2006, restraining order review hearing. Her previous attorney, Myra Bailey, was present and re-appointed as her counsel. After a brief recess, the attorneys indicated they wanted a contested hearing on the restraining order so the hearing was scheduled for January 25, 2006. The court moved the disposition hearing to the same date so the hearings could be held together. The court kept all orders, including the temporary restraining order, in place.
On January 25, 2006, appellant’s counsel requested a continuance of one week to allow her more time to prepare. The juvenile court granted her request and scheduled the hearing for February 1, 2006. Again, the court kept the temporary restraining order in place. On February 1, 2006, appellant’s counsel requested a one-day continuance because she had received some information that would help her prepare. The juvenile court granted her request, keeping the temporary restraining order in place.
At the February 2, 2006, hearing, DESS withdrew its request for the restraining order. Appellant did not oppose the withdrawal and the juvenile court lifted the restraining order.
The juvenile court issued a general no contact order at this time. The no contact order is not at issue in this appeal.
The contested disposition hearing was held on February 8, 2006. The juvenile court adjudged the minors dependent children and placed the minors with the father with family maintenance services. The court did not order services for appellant beyond visitation. On March 7, 2006, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the February 8, 2006, disposition order.
DISCUSSION
I
Temporary Restraining Order
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred when it entered a temporary restraining order against her because it was not based on substantial evidence.
We agree with appellant that the matter of the propriety of a restraining order issued during a dependency proceeding pursuant to section 213.5 is not mooted by the fact that the order has since been lifted. The reason for our conclusion is that, in possible future dependency proceedings, the juvenile court must consider any previous restraining order when determining whether to issue another such order. (§ 213.5, subd. (k)(2).) This consequence of the restraining order means a challenge to issuance of a restraining order is not moot. (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209-210.)
Finding the issue not moot does not end our appealability analysis. The timeliness of a notice of appeal goes to our jurisdiction. (Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 864.) Appellant concedes that, as the temporary restraining order was immediately appealable, the notice of appeal was filed too late to challenge the December 22, 2005, order. (In re Cassandra B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208-209; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.400(d).) She contends, however, that we may address the propriety of the juvenile court’s continuances of the temporary restraining order because there were orders continuing it during the 60 days prior to her notice of appeal.
“‘It is elementary that an appeal from a portion of a judgment brings up for review only that portion designated in the notice of appeal.’” (Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, 625.) The rules of court, however, require liberal construction of a notice of appeal and the notice is sufficient if it identifies the judgment or order appealed from. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) There is a strong public policy in hearing appeals on the merits, and the right to appeal should not be taken away because of noncompliance with a technical requirement. (Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 497.) Thus, “notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.” (Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 59.)
Here, the notice of appeal identified by date the order appealed from and specifically indicated that appellant was appealing the “2-8-06 Disposition ordering family maintenance to the father/denial of reunification services for the mother (appellant).” The notice did not encompass any order affecting the imposition or continuance of the temporary restraining order, which had been lifted by February 8, 2006. We conclude appellant’s notice of appeal did not include any orders continuing the temporary restraining order.
Yet, even if we construe appellant’s notice of appeal as liberally as possible, our review of appellant’s contention is limited. Appellant claims that issuance of the restraining order was not supported by substantial evidence. According to appellant, there was no evidence she had threatened to assault the father or the minors, or that physical or emotional harm would result to any of them. She also argues there was no evidence the father had “any more right to the house than [she] did.” But while appellant argues about the evidence supporting the issuance of the restraining order, we are limited to reviewing the propriety of the continuances of the hearing on the temporary restraining order that occurred within the 60 days prior to the filing of her notice of appeal.
Section 213.5, provides in relevant part:
Section 352 is the primary statute governing continuances in dependency cases. It states in part: “(a) Upon request of counsel for the parent, guardian, minor, or petitioner, the court may continue any hearing under this chapter beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held, provided that no continuance shall be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. . . . [¶] Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance. Neither a stipulation between counsel nor the convenience of the parties is in and of itself a good cause. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (c) In any case in which the parent, guardian, or minor is represented by counsel and no objection is made to an order continuing any such hearing beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held, the absence of such an objection shall be deemed a consent to the continuance. The consent does not affect the requirements of subdivision (a).”
In determining whether to grant a continuance, the juvenile court is accorded broad discretion. (In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1186-1187.) As a reviewing court, we can reverse an order denying a continuance “only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 1187; see also In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 179-180.)
We conclude that, on the record before it, the juvenile court acted well within its discretion when continuing the hearing on the restraining order. The first continuance occurred immediately after appellant’s counsel was appointed and requested a contested hearing on the restraining order. The contested hearing was set to coincide with the disposition hearing. On that date, however, appellant’s counsel requested a continuance of one additional week to better prepare. Appellant’s counsel then requested one more day because she had received some information that would help her prepare. The total time the hearing on the restraining order was continued was less than a month, and it was all done at the request, or with the acquiescence, of counsel. There was no abuse of discretion.
Finally, even if the juvenile court was not provided sufficient good cause to grant the continuances, any error was invited and cannot be raised by appellant on appeal. (See § 352, subd. (c); see also Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1685-1686 [appellant waives right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the ruling or procedure objected to on appeal].)
II
Reunification Services
In her opening brief, appellant contended the juvenile court abused its discretion by not ordering she be provided reunification services.
After the filing of appellate briefs, this court obtained a certified copy of an order of the juvenile court, dated May 3, 2007, indicating the minors had been placed with appellant and the father with family maintenance services. In accordance with Evidence Code section 455, subdivision (a), the parties were afforded the opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the juvenile court’s May 3, 2007, order, and on the tenor of the matter to be noticed. We take judicial notice of this order. (Evid. Code, § 459.)
The parties appropriately concede that the juvenile court’s May 3, 2007, order placing the minors with appellant and the father with family maintenance services renders moot appellant’s contention that the juvenile court erred by not granting her reunification services. Because she has already received the relief she seeks, there is nothing more that this court can do since any ruling would have no practical effect. (See In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1317.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders and judgment are affirmed.
We concur:
BUTZ, J.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
“(e)(1) The juvenile court may issue an order made pursuant to subdivision (a), (c), or (d) excluding a person from a residence or dwelling. This order may be issued for the time and on the conditions that the court determines, regardless of which party holds legal or equitable title or is the lessee of the residence or dwelling.
“(2) The court may issue an order under paragraph (1) only on a showing of all of the following:
“(A) Facts sufficient for the court to ascertain that the party who will stay in the dwelling has a right under color of law to possession of the premises.
“(B) That the party to be excluded has assaulted or threatens to assault the other party or any other person under the care, custody, and control of the other party, or any minor child of the parties or of the other party.
“(C) That physical or emotional harm would otherwise result to the other party, to any person under the care, custody, and control of the other party, or to any minor child of the parties or of the other party.”