Opinion
A101558.
10-29-2003
In re VERNON L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VERNON L., Defendant and Appellant.
The minor appeals from orders of the juvenile court, declaring him a ward and placing him on probation, in his mothers home, with designated conditions including drug and search terms. His primary contention is that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that he had committed receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) by riding as a passenger in a stolen vehicle.[] We agree and reverse the orders of the juvenile court.
The minor also contends that the courts "standard drug conditions" were vague, unconstitutional, and unreasonable.
I.
BACKGROUND
A petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed in Solano County, alleging that the minor committed a sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (d)(1)). At the jurisdictional hearing the minor admitted an amended allegation of simple battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and the sexual battery allegation was dismissed. The case was transferred to Alameda County, where the minor resided, for disposition. A supplemental petition was then filed in Solano County, alleging violations of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and felony receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd.(a)).[] A contested jurisdictional hearing was held in Solano County and the juvenile court sustained the receiving stolen property allegation, denying a defense motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The matter was transferred to Alameda County for disposition with the battery charge.
The section 10851 count was later dismissed by the District Attorney.
The minor was declared a ward of the court, placed on probation, and ordered to reside in his mothers home. Drug and search terms were included in his probationary conditions. This timely appeal followed.
II.
DISCUSSION
The minors primary contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence presented at the contested jurisdictional hearing to support the juvenile courts determination sustaining the receiving stolen property allegation. The evidence presented showed that Alfredo Arquilla left his Toyota van parked in the driveway of 407 Donegal Drive in Vallejo at 8:00 p.m. on November 25, 2002. The following morning, Arquilla discovered the van was missing and reported it stolen to the police.
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on November 30, 2002, a Vallejo police officer on patrol duty noticed a van turn slowly, on a green light, from Redwood onto Ascot Parkway. He thought the driver might be lost and followed the vehicle. He ran the vans license plate and discovered it had been reported stolen. The officer stopped the van and the driver, a 15-year-old juvenile, started to get out of the vehicle without turning off the car. He complied when the officer told him to turn off the ignition. As the driver exited the van, a pair of scissors fell from his lap and landed on the ground. The officer took both the driver, and his 14-year-old passenger, the minor here, into custody and asked for identifying information. The minor at first misspelled his last name, but as he gave the officer his correct address and birth date, the officer correctly identified him. No keys to the van were found at the scene.
After being transported to the police station, the minor was advised of, and waived, his Miranda[] rights. During the subsequent interview with the police, the minor said he was in the van because he was out for a ride, going to the movie theater with the driver. When asked if he knew the van was stolen, the minor at first denied such knowledge. Later, when confronted with the fact that the driver was only 15, the minor admitted that he had a "good idea" that the vehicle was stolen.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we of course "review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Here the minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the required element of possession of the vehicle.[] Both parties agree that the leading case on whether, and under what circumstances, a passenger in a stolen vehicle may be convicted of receiving stolen property is People v. Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 220.
In order to prove a charge of receiving stolen property, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that "(1) the property was stolen, (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen, and (3) the defendant had possession of the stolen property." (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223.)
The Land decision first recognizes that possession of stolen property may be actual or constructive, and that it need not be exclusive. It is sufficient to show constructive possession if a defendant acquires a measure of control or dominion over the stolen property. (People v. Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224.) "However, . . . mere presence near the stolen property, or access to the location where the stolen property is found is not sufficient evidence of possession, standing alone, to sustain a conviction of receiving stolen property." (Id. at p. 224.) The court concluded that the fact that a defendant is the passenger in a stolen vehicle does not necessarily preclude a conviction for possession of stolen property, although "additional factual circumstances are necessary to establish a passenger has possession or control of the stolen car." (Id. at p. 228, italics added.) This determination, the court concludes, "turns on the unique factual circumstances of each case." (Ibid.)
The Land court went on to find that, based upon the particular circumstances of that case, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the passenger was in a position to exert control over the vehicle sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. The court summarized the evidence supporting constructive possession: "The evidence established the driver and appellant were friends. They drank together, did drugs together, and presumably knew each other well. Appellant knew the car was stolen. The car was stolen near appellants residence and they drove in it within the hour of its theft. They used the vehicle for their own benefit and enjoyment. The car was instrumental in their joint criminal enterprise that evening. They first used the car to transport them to the Valley to commit the theft at the 7-Eleven store. Then they used the car in the robbery, assault and attempted murder of [victim]. [¶] From the facts of appellants close relationship to the driver, use of the vehicle for a common criminal mission, and stops along the way before abandoning it (during which appellant apparently made no effort to disassociate himself from his friend or the stolen vehicle) a reasonable juror could infer appellant, as the passenger, was in a position to exert control over the vehicle. This inference, in turn, would support a finding of constructive possession." (People v. Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.)
Respondent here points to only one area where the evidence might similarly support a finding of constructive possession by the minor: that the evidence demonstrated that the minor was "more than a mere passenger in the vehicle," because a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the minor and driver were friends and "engaged in a joint excursion in the stolen vehicle," based upon the minors statement that he was out for a ride with the driver and that they were going to the movie theater.
However, as the minor responds, in all other areas the evidence in the present case falls short of the factual circumstances in Land that were found to support a finding of constructive possession: (1) here the minor was found to be the passenger in the stolen vehicle some five days after it was taken, rather than within an hour after the theft, as in Land; there was no evidence here that the minor was involved in the theft of the car nor that he had ridden in it before the night of November 30th;[] (2) it was not clear from the record that the driver and the minor were close friends; the evidence only supports a reasonable inference that they were acquainted; (3) there was no direct evidence that the minor knew that the van was stolen, but rather only that the had "a good idea" that it was, and there was no evidence that he suspected it was stolen before getting into the car; (4) there was no evidence that the minor and driver used the vehicle to engage in criminal activity; and (5) there was no evidence that the minor had an opportunity to take control of the vehicle, or to leave the vehicle.
There was no evidence, of course, that the minor actually drove the vehicle—the minor was not observed driving, no prints were found on the steering column, and the minors prints were not found on the scissors that were presumed to have been used to start the van.
As respondent notes, these facts supporting a finding that the minor did not have constructive possession do not necessarily mean that there is insufficient evidence that he did; we cannot reweigh the circumstantial evidence presented below. However, we must evaluate the evidence that was presented to support the finding of constructive possession, and comparing that evidence to the evidence in Land is instructive in that it shows just how lacking the evidence here is. Even if the evidence here supports the conclusion, as respondent argues, that the minor "was more than a mere passenger in the vehicle," it is not sufficient to demonstrate his constructive possession of that vehicle. Unlike the evidence in Land, which supported the conclusion that the defendant had a "measure of control or dominion over the stolen property" sufficient to demonstrate constructive possession, the evidence here does not support such a conclusion.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence here at most supports a reasonable conclusion that the minor accepted a ride to the movies with another minor with whom he was acquainted, and that he suspected the vehicle was stolen. This conclusion does not mean that the minor had the dominion or control over the vehicle necessary to a finding of constructive possession to support a finding that the allegation of possession of stolen property was true.
III.
DISPOSITION
The Solano County jurisdictional order of December 24, 2002, and the Alameda County Juvenile Courts dispositional order of January 17, 2003 are reversed.[]
The minor does not challenge the Solano County Juvenile Courts November 13, 2002 jurisdictional order finding that he committed simple battery. However, as the Alameda County Juvenile Courts dispositional order was based in part on the allegation of receiving stolen property, it must be reversed.
We concur: Reardon, Acting P.J. and Rivera, J.