Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Super.Ct.No. RIJ109053 & Orange County Super.Ct.No. DL025228 Charles Koosed, Temporary Judge (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21) and Joy Markman, Judge.
Transferred from the Superior Court of Orange County for disposition.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Deana L. Bohenek, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER J.
Defendant and appellant Vanessa R. (minor) appeals after she was adjudicated a ward of the court and placed at the Riverside County Youth Academy. She argues that the juvenile court erred in excluding her father from the jurisdictional hearing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 30, 2004, Riverside police officers made a traffic stop on a car with no license plates. The minor, then age 15, was driving. The minor did not have a driver’s license, and a check revealed that the vehicle had been reported stolen approximately one week earlier. The minor initially lied to police officers, claiming that the car belonged to her sister and that she had taken it that morning without her sister’s permission. The minor’s mother told police that the sister had lived in another state for over a year, and the mother had never seen the vehicle before. The minor was arrested and taken to juvenile hall; a petition to declare the minor a ward of the juvenile court (case No. RIJ109053) was filed on December 2, 2004. The minor was charged with the offense of taking and driving the vehicle of another in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The minor failed to appear at the detention hearing and a warrant was issued for her arrest on December 27, 2004.
In February 2005, the minor was arrested when she and a companion tried to pass a $600 stolen check. Upon her arrest, the warrant for the failure to appear at her juvenile detention hearing was discovered, and the minor was again taken into custody.
On March 16, 2005, the minor appeared at a dispositional hearing. As part of a negotiated plea, the charges of a February 2005 petition (alleging receipt of stolen property) were dismissed, and the minor admitted the allegations of the December 2004 petition (i.e., violation of Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The court adjudged her a ward of the court. At a dispositional hearing on March 30, 2005, the court did not place the minor with the parents; both dependency and probation reports indicated that the minor was outside her parents’ control. When the minor was released from juvenile hall, she was placed at the Van Horn Youth Center.
In a report prepared for a 12-month review, the probation officer noted that the minor had made fair progress at the Van Horn Youth Center. She was originally scheduled to graduate from the program in January 2006, but her completion date was extended to March. In March, however, while the minor was on a furlough home visit, she ran away. On March 13, 2006, a subsequent petition was filed alleging the offense of escape. The minor remained at large until she was arrested several months later.
A subsequent petition was filed in Orange County (case No. DL 025228) on August 24, 2006, resulting from the minor’s latest arrest. The minor was riding in a car stopped by police for failure to have a valid license plate. During the contact, the minor gave police a false name. The lie was discovered and the minor was detained on the outstanding arrest warrant from Riverside County. The Orange County petition alleged a violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), resisting or obstructing a police officer.
The Orange County Juvenile Court found true the allegation and ordered the matter transferred to Riverside County for disposition on the misdemeanor obstructing-an-officer offense. At a hearing on October 5, 2006, the minor also admitted the escape allegation in case No. RIJ109053.
The disposition hearing was held October 20, 2006, and the court ordered the minor placed at the Riverside County Youth Academy.
The minor has filed a notice of appeal, pursuant to a writ granting permission to file a late notice.
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excluding the Minor’s Father From the Courtroom
A. Background
On September 25, 2006, the Juvenile Court of Orange County was holding a hearing concerning the allegation that the minor had obstructed an officer by giving false information. During courtroom testimony, the proceedings were interrupted by a ringing sound. Apparently, the minor’s father’s mobile telephone was ringing. The reporter’s transcript then reflects the following occurrences:
“THE COURT: Please step out until that ringing stops, sir. I don’t want that noise in the courtroom.
“THE BAILIFF: Sit.
“[THE FATHER]: Yes, I will sit.
“THE COURT: All right. Now you’re out of here for those remarks. Now you leave. You don’t talk back to the bailiff. You can remain outside. Thank you. You may proceed, Mr. Vining.”
At the conclusion of the court session, defense counsel asked whether the father could have an after-court visit with the minor. The court responded, “Not because of his conduct in the courtroom. The answer is no. We had to have him leave. He was almost in contempt.”
The minor contends that her statutory and constitutional rights were violated when the court excluded her father from the courtroom.
B. The Court Properly Excluded the Father From the Courtroom
Welfare and Institutions Code section 679 provides that, “A minor who is the subject of a juvenile court hearing and any person entitled to notice of the hearing under the provisions of Section 658, is entitled to be present at such hearing. Any such minor and any such person has the right to be represented at such hearing by counsel of his own choice or, if unable to afford counsel, has the right to be represented by counsel appointed by the court.” A parent is a “person entitled to notice of the hearing.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 656, 658.)
The minor argues that excluding her father from the hearing violated her rights and is reversible per se, as affecting the father’s fundamental constitutional right to parent, and her right to have full assistance and participation of her father at the hearing, citing In re Byron S. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 822, 826.
An accused juvenile defendant does not have an absolute right to the attendance of a parent or guardian, however. (In re Eric J. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 624, 629.) The hearing may proceed in the parent’s absence unless the minor is dependent upon the parent for preparation of the defense. (Id. at p. 630.)
Moreover, “[t]rial courts possess broad power to control the[] courtrooms and [to] maintain order and security.” (People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 385.) Maintaining decorum and controlling the conduct of proceedings free from disruption are part and parcel of the court’s inherent power to control the courtroom. (Cf. People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 452 [criminal defendant’s mother properly removed from courtroom for crying volubly during proceedings, to the point where she was unable to control herself].)
The minor points to the black-and-white words printed on the transcript page to argue that the father’s conduct was not shown to be improper. The cold transcript does not, however, convey the entire context of what occurred. As the Attorney General points out, the incident began with the ringing of father’s cellular telephone in the middle of testimony. This was itself a violation of courtroom rules. The father was asked to step outside as a result of the interruption. The father’s physical actions, gestures or mannerisms, and the tone of his voice are not capable of direct transcription. It is nevertheless plain from the court’s comments that the father spoke to the bailiff in at least a rude or disrespectful manner. Trial courts are not required to tolerate rude, disruptive behavior from anyone present in the courtroom. The father was properly removed from the courtroom during the balance of the session.
To the extent the minor relies on In re Erik J., supra, 199 Cal.App.3d 624, her reliance is misplaced. That case is distinguishable. There, the minor’s mother was ill, and defense counsel requested a continuance on the basis that counsel was unable to prepare a proper defense without the mother’s presence. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had erred in not granting a continuance. The reversal was predicated not upon the mother’s right to attend the proceedings, but on the juvenile defendant’s due process right to a fair hearing. (Id. at p. 630.) Neither the minor here nor her counsel indicated any need to consult with the father in order to present a proper defense.
There was no error here in excluding the minor’s father from the courtroom.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., RICHLI J.