Opinion
No. 61677-3-I.
March 9, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 03-3-08086-5, Patricia H. Clark, J., entered April 18, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henry Valentine appeals a superior court decision interpreting an earlier court order as requiring him to pay more money to his ex-wife, rather than less, after he lost his job. Henry contends that the earlier order modified both child support and maintenance, but the evidence does not support Henry's contention. We affirm.
FACTS
When Henry's marriage to Julie Valentine was dissolved in March 2004, Henry earned more than $8,400 per month and Julie earned approximately $1,500 per month. Under a parenting plan, the Valentines' two children were to spend approximately equal time with each parent. By extrapolating from the Washington State Child Support Schedule, the standard support calculation was $1,362.84 per month. The Valentines entered a separation contract in which Henry agreed to pay Julie $2,000 per month in maintenance from February 1, 2004, through August 31, 2006, and $1,350 per month in maintenance from September 1, 2006, through October 31, 2008. The order of child support required Henry to pay Julie a total of $2,001 each month, which was designated as $1 per month for child support and $2,000 per month for maintenance. The reason stated for deviating from the standard calculation was "[t]ax-planning and time spent by the children with each parent."
For clarity, we refer to the parties by their first names.
Henry was found in contempt of court in August 2003 for failing to pay family support as required. After that, the Division of Child Support (DCS) of the Department of Social and Health Services collected the support on Julie's behalf.
In May 2005, Henry petitioned for modification of child support because he had lost his job. The petition indicated that he paid $2,001 per month for child support. He asked the court to set "maintenance/child support" in the amount set by the state child support schedule using Julie's income of $1,476 per month and his unemployment compensation of $1,900 per month.
Julie was served with and answered the petition for modification, but she did not attend the hearing on the matter. A commissioner granted Henry's petition and ordered him to pay Julie $68.98 per month.
DCS interpreted the modification order as affecting only child support, not maintenance and, therefore, attempted to collect more money from Henry, not less, after the modification. Henry asked the DCS Conference Board to review the court orders to determine what amount he owed. In August 2006, the Board agreed with its field office that the modification order affected only child support.
Despite the Board's decision, Henry maintained that his entire child support and maintenance obligation was $68.98 per month. In July 2007, the DCS Conference Board issued another decision, confirming that it interpreted the modification order as affecting only child support.
The maintenance amount dropped from $2,000 per month to $1,350 per month after August 2006 in accordance with the decree and separation contract.
In January 2008, DCS asked a court commissioner to clarify whether the modification order affected child support only, or both child support and maintenance. Julie responded by asking the court to vacate the modification order. A commissioner held that the 2005 order modified only child support, but she denied Julie's motion to vacate the order because the motion was untimely.
Henry asked a judge to revise the commissioner's order, but the judge agreed with the commissioner. Henry asked the judge to reconsider, but she denied his motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Henry argues that the modification order is unambiguous and the commissioner obviously intended to modify both child support and maintenance. We disagree.
Interpretation of a child support order presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. If an order is unambiguous, there is nothing for the court to interpret. If the order is ambiguous, the reviewing court applies the general rules of construction applicable to statutes, contracts, and other writings to ascertain the intent of the court that entered the order. A writing is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two different, reasonable interpretations. Evidence of the circumstances surrounding the creation of an instrument may be admitted to ascertain the intent of the parties.
See Stokes v. Polley, 145 Wn.2d 341, 346, 37 P.3d 1211 (2001).
In re Marriage of Bocanegra, 58 Wn. App. 271, 275, 792 P.2d 1263 (1990).
In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699, 704-05, 629 P.2d 450 (1981).
McDonald v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 724, 733, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992).
See Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657, 669, 801 P.2d 222 (1990).
Because Henry obviously sought to reduce the amount he paid Julie, the modification order arguably is ambiguous. He reasons that: (1) the original order of child support and the separation contract were presented to the commissioner who entered the modification order; (2) courts may look at documents prepared as part of one transaction to determine the drafter's intent; (3) the original child support order and separation contract indicated that Henry's transfer payment to Julie included both child support and maintenance; (4) the transfer payment after modification was to be $69 per month; (5) the commissioner found that the original child support order imposed a severe economic hardship on Henry; and therefore (6) it would be irrational to conclude that the commissioner intended to increase Henry's child support from $1 to $69 without modifying the $2,000 maintenance obligation.
Henry's argument is not persuasive because it relies, in part, on the rule that when several instruments are made as part of one transaction, they will be read and construed with reference to each other. That rule does not apply here because the separation contract and the original child support order were not made as part of the same transaction as the order on modification.
Boyd v. Davis, 127 Wn.2d 256, 261, 897 P.2d 1239 (1995).
See Levinson v. Linderman, 51 Wn.2d 855, 859, 322 P.2d 863 (1958) (instruments executed at the same time as part of one transaction are read together and each is construed with reference to the other).
Henry's argument also is not persuasive because it omits two key facts: he petitioned to modify only child support, not maintenance, and he indicated in his petition that his existing child support payment was $2,001 per month. Henry did not inform the commissioner that the $2,001 per month included maintenance, and nothing in the record indicates that the commissioner recognized that fact. Consequently, ordering Henry to make a transfer payment of $69 does not clearly show that the commissioner intended to modify maintenance.
Furthermore, except for Henry's change in income, the commissioner did not consider any factors relevant to modifying a maintenance award. A court may modify maintenance if the circumstances of the obligor spouse changed substantially in relation to the needs of the other spouse after the dissolution decree was entered, and the change was not contemplated at the time of dissolution. Once a court finds that changed circumstances warrant a modification, the factors for determining the amount and duration of maintenance are the same as those considered in the original dissolution. Those factors include the financial resources and obligations of the parties, the duration of the marriage, and anything else relevant to a just award.
In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wn. App. 341, 346, 28 P.3d 769 (2001).
Spreen, 107 Wn. App. at 347.
See RCW 26.09.090.
Although the commissioner found that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred, he did not find that the circumstances had changed substantially in relation to Julie's needs. He did not have information about Julie's financial resources or obligations at the time of the modification. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the commissioner did not intend to modify maintenance.
A conclusion that there has been a substantial change in circumstances is relevant to modifying child support, as well as to modifying maintenance. See RCW 26.09.170.
Because we conclude that the lower court correctly held that the commissioner's orders did not modify maintenance, we need not address Henry's argument that DCS must promptly refund payments it wrongfully collected.
CONCLUSION
Although Henry wanted to have the amount he paid for child support and maintenance reduced, the modification order does not express that intention. The lower court correctly interpreted the order to modify only child support. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.