Opinion
W.C. No. 4-398-418
June 8, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of the Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation (Director) which ordered them to reinstate the claimant's temporary total disability benefits. The respondents contend the Director erred because they properly filed a general admission of liability for a "closed" period of temporary disability benefits. We affirm.
The claimant sustained a compensable injury on September 28, 1998. On October 30, 1998, the respondents filed a general admission of liability admitting for temporary total disability benefits from September 29, 1998, through October 15, 1998. In the "General Remarks" section of the admission, the respondents stated that the temporary disability benefits were ended on October 15 because the claimant engaged in "seasonal employment" and "returned to Texas were she does not work in the winter."
The Claims Management section of the Division of Workers' Compensation requested the respondents to provide documentation supporting the termination of temporary disability benefits under Rule of Procedure IX, 7 Code Colo. Reg., 1101-3 at 32-36.01, or reinstate the benefits. However, the respondents refused and the matter was submitted to the Director for resolution.
In a Supplemental Order dated February 8, 1999, the Director ordered the respondents retroactively to reinstate the claimant's temporary disability benefits, and to continue paying such benefits until properly "terminated in accordance with Rule IX, or until hearing is held and further order entered." In support, the Director determined that under section 8-42-105(3), C.R.S. 1998, temporary disability benefits must continue until the occurrence of one of the specified events. The Director noted that none of those events occurred in this case. Moreover, the Director held that once liability is admitted, payment must continue according to the admission until a hearing is held to resolve any disputed issue. The Director recognized that there is an exception to this rule, but only where the provisions of Rule IX authorize a unilateral termination of benefits. The Director found that no circumstances existed which permitted unilateral termination of the claimant's temporary disability benefits.
On review, the respondents contend they have no statutory obligation to admit liability for "ongoing" temporary total disability benefits, but may file admissions of liability for "closed periods"of time. In support of this proposition, the respondents cite Allison v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 623 (Colo.App. 1995). The respondents also assert that section 8-43-203(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 1998, concerning the content of admissions of liability, authorizes the filing of admissions for closed periods. We disagree with these arguments.
In Childers v. Noah's Ark Whitewater Rafting, W.C. No. 4-392-209 (April 7, 1999), we considered the same arguments in an identical fact pattern. First, we determined that "seasonal employment" is not grounds for terminating temporary disability benefits under § 8-42-105(3). Moreover, we ruled that section 8-43-203(2)(d), C.R.S. 1998, prohibits the filing of an admission of liability for a "closed period" of temporary disability benefits unless the respondents satisfy the requirements of Rule XI. Section 8-43-203(2)(d) provides that "if any liability is admitted, payments shall continue according to admitted liability." An admission for a "closed period" of temporary disability benefits is tantamount to a unilateral termination of admitted benefits, and the statute precludes the unilateral termination of benefits unless the respondents comply with Rule XI. See Monfort Transportation v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1358 (Colo.App. 1997); Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App. 1997); A R Concrete Construction v. Lightner, 759 P.2d 831 (Colo.App. 1988).
Childers also rejected the argument that Allison v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra, is authority to the contrary. Rather, Allison concerns the respondents' initial responsibility for the filing of an admission of liability, and it does not address the issue of termination of benefits once liability has been admitted. Further, Childers held that section 8-43-203(2)(b) should be read as consistent with section 8-43-203 (2)(d) and Rule XI. Therefore, the requirement that admissions of liability specify "the period for which compensation will be paid" does not negate the general principle prohibiting the unilateral termination of benefits except in circumstances specified by the statute and Rule XI. Monfort Transportation v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra.
The respondents' arguments do not persuade us to depart from our holding in Childers. Thus, our statements in Childers are incorporated here as if fully set forth. Consequently, we conclude that the Director's Supplemental Order correctly applies the law and must be affirmed. Section 8-43-301 (8), C.R.S. 1998.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Director's Supplemental Order dated February 8, 1999, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed June 8, 1999 to the following parties:
Amalia Valdez, HCR 4 Box 1300, Eagle Pass, TX 78852
Patricia Medige, Esq., Colorado Rural Legal Services, Inc., Migrant Farm Worker Division, 655 Broadway, Ste. 450, Denver, CO 80203 (For Claimant)
Michael Steiner, Esq., Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority — (Interagency Mail) (For Respondents)
By: A. Pendroy