In another case involving a petition filed under the Mental Health Code, the circuit court stated that it did " ‘not intend to substitute [its] judgment for that of the physician's.’ " In re Val Q. , 396 Ill. App. 3d 155, 163, 336 Ill.Dec. 51, 919 N.E.2d 976 (2009), rev'd on other grounds byIn re Rita P. , 2014 IL 115798, 381 Ill.Dec. 445, 10 N.E.3d 854. The appellate court concluded
¶ 23 In another case involving a petition filed under the Mental Health Code, the circuit court stated that it did" 'not intend to substitute [its] judgment for that of the physician's [sic].' " In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 163 (2009), rev'd on other grounds by In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798. The appellate court concluded that this comment revealed that the circuit court "improperly delegated its duty of assessing the risks and benefits of the medication to respondent's treating physicians."
In our view, it would be untenable to hold that this type of evidence may not be factored into a trial court's consideration of the benefits and harm of psychotropic medication.¶ 24 We find guidance on this issue from In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 336 Ill.Dec. 51, 919 N.E.2d 976 (2009). The respondent in that case had an abnormal "QT" interval, meaning her heart took an abnormal amount of time to reset itself between beats.
” Id. The trial court may not “delegate[ ] its duty of assessing the risks and benefits of the medication to respondent's treating physicians.” In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 163, 336 Ill.Dec. 51, 919 N.E.2d 976 (2009). The same logic applies to the administration of tests.
This means that the present action and a potential future action must have a substantial enough relation that the resolution of the issue in the present case would have some bearing on a similar issue presented in a future case involving the respondent." In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 160, 336 Ill.Dec. 51, 919 N.E.2d 976 (2009), citing Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 360, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74. First, the challenged action was obviously too short to be fully litigated during the pendency of the order.
¶ 22 It is reasonably likely that the resolution of each of these issues of statutory compliance will affect future cases involving Cathleen, because she will likely again be subject to involuntary admission and medication and the court will likely again commit the same alleged errors. See In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 161 (2009) (overruled on other grounds by In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶¶ 33-34); In re Jonathan P., 399 Ill.App.3d 396, 401 (2010). The errors committed in this case recur continually in cases involving involuntary commitment and medication under the Code.
¶ 20 It is reasonably likely that the resolution of each of these issues of statutory compliance will affect future cases involving Angela, because she will likely again be subject to involuntary admission and medication and the court will likely again commit the same alleged errors. See In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 161 (2009) (overruled on other grounds by In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶¶ 33-34); In re Jonathan P., 399 Ill.App.3d 396, 401 (2010). The errors committed in this case recur continually in mental health cases.
It is reasonably likely that the resolution of these issues will affect future cases involving Marcus because he will likely again be subject to involuntary commitment and medication, the trial court will likely again commit the same statutory compliance issues, and counsel for both parties will likely commit the same errors. See Wilma T., 2018 IL App (3d) 170155, ¶ 14 ("[t]he fact that the same problem has affected respondent twice shows that this issue could affect her again in future proceedings"); In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 161 (2009) (applying the "capable of repetition" exception and finding it reasonably likely that the resolution of an issue "would affect future cases involving respondent, because respondent will likely again be subject to involuntary treatment and the court will likely again commit the same alleged error"), overruled on other grounds by In re Rita P'., 2014 IL 115798, ¶¶ 33-34; Tara S., 2017 IL App (3d) 160357, ¶ 17 (applying the "capable of repetition" exception to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in proceedings under the Code). In fact, that is exactly what happened merely weeks later in the La Salle County case.
It is reasonably likely that the resolution of these issues will affect future cases involving Marcus because he will likely again be subject to involuntary commitment and medication, the trial court will likely again commit the same statutory compliance issues, and counsel for both parties will likely commit the same errors. See Wilma T. , 2018 IL App (3d) 170155, ¶ 14, 422 Ill.Dec. 227, 103 N.E.3d 359 ("[t]he fact that the same problem has affected respondent twice shows that this issue could affect her again in future proceedings"); In re Val Q. , 396 Ill. App. 3d 155, 161, 336 Ill.Dec. 51, 919 N.E.2d 976 (2009) (applying the "capable of repetition" exception and finding it reasonably likely that the resolution of an issue "would affect future cases involving respondent, because respondent will likely again be subject to involuntary treatment and the court will likely again commit the same alleged error"), overruled on other grounds,In re Rita P. , 2014 IL 115798, ¶¶ 33-34, 381 Ill.Dec. 445, 10 N.E.3d 854 ; Tara S. , 2017 IL App (3d) 160357, ¶ 17, 416 Ill.Dec. 30, 83 N.E.3d 528 (applying the "capable of repetition" exception to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in proceedings under the Code).
It is reasonably likely that the resolution of these issues will affect future cases involving Marcus, because he will likely again be subject to involuntary commitment and medication and the court will likely again commit the same alleged errors. See In re Val Q., 396 Ill.App.3d 155, 161 (2009), overruled on other grounds by In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶¶ 33-34. As noted above, the Peoria County case against Marcus involved many of the same statutory compliance issues and the same errors by counsel.