Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. JJ15764, Robert Ambrose, Juvenile Court Referee.
David I. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Susan D. Martynec, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
Minor and appellant U.M. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error by summarily revoking his probationary status under section 725 without notice, a hearing, or opportunity to be heard. We agree and reverse.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
A petition filed pursuant to section 602 alleged appellant violated Penal Code section 626.10, subdivision (a), by possessing a knife on school grounds. On April 8, 2008, appellant admitted the allegation and was placed on six months’ probation without being declared a ward of the court pursuant to section 725.
The probation officer filed two reports indicating appellant failed to report as directed and could not be contacted. The matter was called for a hearing on October 7, 2008. At the beginning of the hearing, the juvenile court asked appellant’s father how appellant was doing. Through an interpreter, father told the court, “Fair. His temperament has been a little rude, a little temperamental.” The court asked if appellant were rude to his mother. Father answered, “Yes.” The court then asked if appellant were rude to father. Father said, “Also. That way, also.” The court immediately declared appellant a ward of the court, stating, “I am not going to let him be disrespectful to his parents.”
Counsel for appellant objected to termination of probation, telling the juvenile court appellant completed his community service requirement and had just been reassigned to a deputy probation officer with whom minor and his father had just met. Counsel argued that a rude temperament without anything specific is an insufficient basis to revoke section 725 probation. Counsel requested a formal hearing with testimony. The court denied the request.
DISCUSSION
Under section 725, subdivision (a), if the juvenile court finds that a minor is a person described in section “602, by reason of the commission of an offense other than any of the offenses set forth in Section 654.3, it may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court, place the minor on probation, under the supervision of the probation officer, for a period not to exceed six months.” “If the minor fails to comply with the conditions of probation imposed, the court may order and adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.” (Ibid.)
The opinion of our colleagues in In re Deon W. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 143 (Deon W.), points the way to the correct resolution of this appeal. In Deon W., a minor was placed on probation under section 725. The probation officer filed a report indicating the minor violated the conditions of probation. After a hearing which included input from the minor’s grandmother, the juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court under section 602 and ordered him suitably placed. The court denied a request by minor’s counsel for a hearing under section 777. (Id. at p. 146.)
Our colleagues in Division Seven held in Deon W. that minor was entitled to a hearing, but not pursuant to section 777. “Both parties agree that appellant was entitled to section 777 proceedings. We disagree. The court here was dealing with the reinstitution of the original wardship proceedings (§ 602) and not with an order changing or modifying a previous order removing a minor from custody of his parents and placing the minor (§ 777). Appellant’s entitlement to a contested disposition hearing and current social study was properly determined under sections 706, 725, 725.5, 726 and 727, and not section 777.” (Deon W., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.) “Section 725 authorizes the... court to put a halt to an adjudication before the order of wardship and disposition if it finds a minor will benefit from a prewardship grant of probation. Thereafter, if a court is dissatisfied with a minor’s performance on probation, the court may reinstitute the wardship proceedings. In this case, the court failed to afford appellant an evidentiary hearing before finding he violated the terms of his probation. Appellant did not request such a hearing however and, we conclude from the record, he had no interest in contesting the violation.” (Id. at. pp. 146-147.)
Although arguably dicta, we agree with the court’s statement in Deon W. that a minor is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before revocation of section 725 probation. While the minor in Deon W. did not request a hearing or desire one, that is not the situation here. Counsel for appellant expressly requested a hearing, which was denied by the court.
The circumstances here require the case be remanded for a hearing to determine if termination of section 725 probation was justified. Appellant had no notice that section 725 probation would be terminated on the ground of rudeness, as the only grounds for violation in the probation reports were failure to report and the probation officer’s inability to contact appellant. No sworn testimony was presented to support a revocation of section 725 probation, as the juvenile court ruled immediately after a brief colloquy with appellant’s father, who was not under oath. Appellant was given no opportunity to question what the father meant in stating that appellant was a little bit rude and temperamental. Finally, appellant was not provided with an opportunity to testify to explain the situation. The revocation of section 725 probation may not stand.
DISPOSITION
The order declaring appellant a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 602 is reversed. The cause is remanded to the court for a new hearing to determine if probation under section 725 was properly terminated.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., MOSK, J.