Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County No. PJ40356 of Los Angeles, Fred Fujioka, Judge. Affirmed.
Kiana Sloan-Hillier, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed a petition alleging that defendant and appellant Ul. S. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because he committed the felony offense of driving or taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The juvenile court found the allegation true and placed Ul. S. on home probation. The juvenile court did not award Ul. S. any predisposition credit. The minute order for the adjudication hearing states that the juvenile court set a maximum period of physical confinement at three years.
On appeal, Ul. S. contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination that he drove or took a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and that the juvenile court erred in failing to award him one day of predisposition credit for the day he was arrested. We asked the parties for supplemental briefing addressing the issue of whether that part of the minute order placing Ul. S. on home probation that set a maximum period of physical confinement was error. We hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Ul. S. violated Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). We also hold that Ul. S. is not subject to a maximum period of physical confinement because he was placed on home probation, and the order imposing the three year maximum period of physical confinement is of no legal effect. In his supplemental brief, Ul. S. withdrew his claim for predisposition credit. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At 8:00 p.m. on January 29, 2007, Amador Tovar returned home from work and parked his truck, a 1996 Toyota T100 truck, rolled up all the windows and locked the doors. Around 4:30 a.m. the next morning, Tovar returned to his truck to go to work. Tovar’s truck was not where he had parked it. Tovar had both keys to the truck. He had not given anyone permission to take his truck and had not given Ul. S. permission to drive it. Tovar called the police and filed a report.
On February 2, 2007, at around 7:35 a.m., Los Angeles Unified School District Police Officer Brian Wright was parked at Kennedy High School in Granada Hills. Officer Wright saw a 1996 Toyota T100 truck driving erratically in excess of the speed limit. Officer Wright did not see the driver’s face. Officer Wright did not recall if there was anyone in the passenger seat. Officer Wright followed the truck. The truck parked on a street adjacent to the high school. Officer Wright saw Ul. S. walking from truck towards the high school. Officer Wright parked behind the truck.
The truck’s license plate was covered with a piece of paper. Officer Wright removed the paper and ran the license plate number. Officer Wright determined from his mobile data computer that the truck was stolen, which determination he confirmed with his dispatcher.
Assuming Ul. S. would return to the truck, Officer Wright contacted several other officers to take Ul. S. into custody when Ul. S. returned. Officer Wright went onto the campus to search for Ul. S. Officer Wright later saw the truck and Ul. S. on San Fernando Mission. Ul. S. was still in the driver’s seat. As many as eight other officers were present. Officer Wright participated in a felony traffic stop. There were no passengers in the truck.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficient Evidence Supports The Juvenile Court’s Determination That Ul. S. Violated Vehicle Code Section 10851, Subdivision (a)
Ul. S. contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that he drove or took a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) because there is no evidence that he knew the truck was stolen or that he had the specific intent to temporarily or permanently deprive Tovar of possession of the truck. Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination.
A. Standard of Review
We review claims of insufficient evidence to sustain a criminal allegation in a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 using the same standard as in a criminal case. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) “‘In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question we ask is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”’ ([People v.] Rowland [(1992) ] 4 Cal.4th [238,] 269, quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) We apply an identical standard under the California Constitution. (Ibid.) ‘In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’ (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738].)” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175.)
B. Application of Relevant Legal Principles
Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) provides, “(a) Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment.”
“‘The elements necessary to establish a violation of section 10851 of the Vehicle Code are the defendant’s driving or taking of a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owner’s consent, and with specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. [Citations.]’ (People v. Windham (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1580, 1590 [240 Cal.Rptr. 378].) Accordingly, knowledge that the vehicle was stolen is not an element of the offense. Such knowledge is merely one of various alternative factors evidencing an intent to deprive the owner of title and possession. (People v. Hallman (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 638, 641 [110 Cal.Rptr. 891].)” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180.)
The evidence shows that Ul. S. was seen and later apprehended driving a stolen truck. While Ul. S. was driving the truck, the truck had a piece of paper covering and hiding the license plate. Ul. S. obviously knew the truck was not his. The owner testified that he had not given Ul. S. permission to drive the truck. Such evidence is sufficient to establish that Ul. S. specifically intended to permanently or temporarily deprive Tovar of possession of the truck. Evidence that Ul. S. knew the truck was stolen is not an element of a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). (People v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.) Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that Ul. S. violated Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). (People v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)
II. The Three Year Maximum Period Of Physical Confinement
We asked the parties to address in supplemental briefing whether that part of the minute order placing Ul. S. on home probation that set a three year maximum period of physical confinement was error. The parties agree that the minute order erroneously contained a maximum period of physical confinement.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) provides, in pertinent part, “If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Italics added.) “‘Physical confinement’ means placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority.” (Ibid.) A maximum period of physical confinement may not be set when a juvenile is placed on home probation in his parents’ custody. (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573-574) [holding that a maximum period of confinement in a dispositional order was of no legal effect because the ward was not removed from his parents’ custody].) Because the juvenile court placed Ul. S. on home probation, the three year maximum period of physical confinement reflected in the minute order placing Ul. S. on probation is error. However, because that part of the probation order that set a maximum period of physical confinement is without legal effect, Ul. S. is not prejudiced by its presence in the probation order, and we need not reverse or remand in this case. (Id. at p. 574.)
III. Predisposition Credit
In his opening brief, Ul. S. contended that the juvenile court erred in failing to award him one day of predisposition credit for the day he was arrested. In his supplemental brief, Ul. S. withdraws this contention.
DISPOSITION
The order placing Ul. S. on probation is affirmed.
We concur:
TURNER, P. J., KRIEGLER, J.