Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. DP015107 Carolyn Kirkwood, Judge.
Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Paula A. Whaley, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
Alana L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order declining to declare Tyler R., now age 11, a dependent of the court, instead ordering continued conjoint therapy, counseling services, and informal supervision of the child by Orange County Social Service Agency (SSA) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360, subdivision (b) (all further statutory references are to this code). Mother does not attack the juvenile court’s decision to leave Tyler in the home of William R. (father) and his fiancée, Rachel, a policewoman who left marks on Tyler after spanking him over his jeans with a belt. Rachel and father impressed the juvenile court with their remorse and full cooperation with SSA. Mother acknowledges father and Rachel’s agreement that father would assume sole responsibility for disciplining Tyler “sounds like it could work.” But she argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to declare dependency (§ 360, subd. (d)) so the court, rather than SSA, could formally supervise Tyler in father and Rachel’s home. As mother phrases it, “Given the severity of the physical abuse and . . . that Tyler was left with the very person who physical[ly] abused him, Tyler’s best interest required the court to declare dependency and have formal supervision in this matter.”
We note the juvenile court altered neither the family court’s existing custody order placing Tyler with father, nor did the juvenile court disturb mother’s ongoing visitation schedule. In light of the status quo concerning custody and visitation, plus SSA’s authority to detain Tyler and immediately bring him under the juvenile court’s protection if necessary (§§ 301; 305; 309; 332; 360, subd. (c)), mother fails to offer any legally meaningful distinction, as to her interests, between the formal court supervision she asserts was necessary and the informal, SSA-managed supervision the court ordered. In short, because mother was not aggrieved by the juvenile court’s dispositional order, she lacks standing to appeal the order, and we therefore dismiss the appeal. (In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 734 (Carissa G.).)
As we explained in Carissa G.: “Generally, a parent can appeal the judgment in a juvenile dependency matter. [Citations.] But as in any appeal the parent must also establish he or she is a ‘party aggrieved’ to obtain a review of a ruling on its merits. [Citations.] To be aggrieved, a party must have a legally cognizable immediate and substantial interest which is injuriously affected by the court’s decision. A nominal interest or remote consequence of the ruling does not satisfy this requirement.” (Carissa G., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 734.) Mother has not met that standard here.
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., BEDSWORTH, J.