Opinion
No. M08-CP02-009044-A
July 21, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On April 22, 2005, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, ("DCF"), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112, et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Jaime C. and Hector F. to their child, Turquoise L. Respondent father failed to appear for trial on June 5, 2006. Respondent mother contests termination of her parental rights. Trial of this matter took place before this court on June 5 and 20, 2006 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
Although counsel was appointed for father, father failed to take advantage of counsel's services and did not make himself available to meet with counsel.
The statutory ground alleged against respondents was that the child, Turquoise, was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)). The petition also alleges as to father abandonment, in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)) and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)).
When Turquoise L. was approximately six months old, her mother, Jaime C., voluntarily transferred guardianship of the child to Maria and Nathan L. as mother could not care for her daughter. Approximately eight months later, Turquoise's guardians appeared in Probate Court and informed the court that they could no longer care for the child. The Probate Court issued an Order of Temporary Custody and Turquoise was placed in DCF care. On March 14, 2002, DCF filed a neglect petition on behalf of Turquoise and on June 27, 2002, Turquoise was adjudicated uncared for and committed to the care and custody of DCF (Baldwin, J.). On April 17, 2003 and on July 29, 2004, commitment was maintained until further order of the court (Baldwin, J.). Also on April 17, 2003, the court (Baldwin, J.) found that it was no longer appropriate to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father. On April 22, 2005, the petition for termination of parental rights was filed.
The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a wound alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence, In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited, to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
I. FACTS
At trial, the petitioner introduced the social study, service provider records, a psychological evaluation, and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social workers Mary Berrios, Janeen DeFeo and Karen Weiss; Darlene Quintiliani of the Rushford Center; Margaret Borelli of the Meriden Child Guidance Clinic; and Logan Green, Ph.D. Respondent mother did not call witnesses or introduce any documentary evidence. The child's attorney did not introduce exhibits or testimony. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
Turquoise L. was born November 13, 2000. In April 2001, mother transferred guardianship to Maria and Nathan L. because she was unable to care for her daughter. In December 2001, due to a death in the family and Maria's own emotional difficulties, she informed the Probate Court that she could no longer care for Turquoise who was placed in DCF care.
A. Respondent Mother — Jaime C.
Respondent mother, Jaime C., was born on June 27, 1977 in Rhode Island and raised in Maine as the only child of John and Diane C. Her parents were divorced when she was five years old and she lived with her father and stepmother in a dysfunctional home. Her stepmother abused her physically and emotionally and her father failed to protect her. After graduating from high school, mother relocated to Meriden, CT, where she resided with her grandmother. In 1998, mother began a relationship with Hector F. and ultimately became pregnant with Turquoise. Hector left mother before the child was born and mother began a relationship with Efrain L. When Turquoise was born in November 2000, Efrain L. was in and out of jail and mother's relationship with him was on and off. DCF made an unannounced visit to mother's home in March 2001. Mother was not home, but her roommate let the worker into the home. In mother and Turquoise's bedroom, the worker found a crib with a plastic cover over the mattress, but no sheet and at least fifteen stuffed animals in the crib, one of which had a metal rod sticking out posing a danger to a four-month-old baby. Under the crib, the worker found a bag of garbage, dirty diapers, rotting food, paper and ashes. The worker located the child at the home of Maria L. who stated that mother was "hanging out" at the mall. Turquoise appeared dirty and Maria L. made statements regarding mother's inability to appropriately care for the baby including that mother did not bathe the baby regularly and yelled at the baby when she cried. Another unannounced visit took place three days later at which time the conditions of the apartment were marginally improved and mother blamed the conditions on her roommate. Nine days later, a babysitter reported noticing a bruise on Turquoise's buttocks. When DCF questioned mother about it, she flew into a rage, began screaming and punched a table stating that her roommate knew it was a birthmark. The next day, DCF took mother and child to Midstate Medical Center where mother underwent a urinalysis and a physician examined Turquoise. The physician confirmed that the mark was a birthmark, but upon asking mother why DCF was involved in her life, mother began ranting and raving about her roommate. When the physician asked the DCF investigator why DCF was involved, mother, who was on one side of the examination table, pushed the baby across the table to the other edge. If the worker had not been standing in a position to catch the child, she would have fallen off. Mother then grabbed the baby and ran out, narrowly missing hitting the baby's head on the doorframe. The physician ran after mother, and spoke with her. The physician told mother that he felt the baby was at risk in mother's care and mother agreed to place the child with Maria and Nathan L.
On July 5, 2001, mother petitioned to be reinstated as guardian of Turquoise, but she was incarcerated on August 3, 2001. On December 20, 2001, mother remained incarcerated and Maria L. was no longer able to care for Turquoise who was therefore placed in DCF care. Mother was released to a halfway house in September 2002. Mother was discharged from the halfway house in February 2003. For a short time, mother was successfully taking parenting classes, going to school and working. By March 2003, however, mother had lost her job, stopped attending parenting classes and had begun living with Richie V., an individual who was violent and who was the subject of a restraining order protecting the mother of his children. Mother stated that she was pregnant with Richie V.'s child. Mother's probation officer required that Richie V. move out of mother's home. In April 2003, mother informed DCF that Efrain L. was the father of the child she was expecting. On October 19, 2003, mother had a second child, Ja-renia L. Mother reported that she continued to have a conflicted relationship with Efrain L. who was verbally abusive. Mother played two threatening voice mail messages for DCF social worker DeFeo. Mother had another child on January 6, 2006.
Mother has a criminal record including convictions in February 2900 for burglary in the second degree (two counts) for which she received a sentence of ten years, suspended after time served, and five years probation. In August 2001, she was sentenced on a violation of her probation to four years, concurrent. In September 2001, she was sentenced on charges of larceny in the second degree to three years, and for filing a false report to one year, both sentences concurrent to the sentence she was serving.
Mother has a lengthy history of transience and housing issues and continually lived under the threat of eviction. Mother's history of substance abuse includes some use of marijuana beginning at age eighteen and alcohol use beginning at age seventeen. Mother denied any recent use.
B. Respondent father — Hector F.
Respondent father, Hector F., was whereabouts unknown until he was located by DCF on April 13, 2005 after mother told DCF where he was employed. DCF worker Weiss spoke with him by telephone on that date. After initially denying that he had a child named Turquoise, he did acknowledge that his former girlfriend Jaime had a child and he believed he was the father. He stated that he had four other children and could not care for Turquoise. He stated that he had concerns about mother's parenting skills and was adamant that the child not be returned to mother. He stated that he was glad Turquoise was in a good home and would be adopted if termination were granted. He provided his address and phone number to DCF, but asked that it not be provided to mother whom he stated has continued to harass him at work and on the street. Father stated that he is in agreement with termination, but was unwilling to attend court as he did not want to see mother or her boyfriend.
A paternity test performed in July 2005 confirmed that Hector F. was the child's father.
Father had almost no contact with Turquoise around the time of her birth and has had no contact with her since she was placed in DCF care four and a half years ago. He has not sent cards, gifts or letters to Turquoise and has not contacted DCF to inquire about her well-being. When father was contacted by DCF on April 13, 2005, he did not ask to see his daughter. He has not been a resource for his child and he failed to appear for trial.
C. Specific Steps
Specific steps were issued by the court (Baldwin, J.) as to mother on April 17, 2003 and on July 29, 2004. The specific steps required her to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; keep the child's whereabouts and her own whereabouts known to DCF, her attorney and the attorney for the child; participate in counseling, parenting and individual, and make progress toward identified treatment goals; accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF; submit to random drug testing; cooperate with Catholic Family Services, Mid State Behavioral Center and Child Guidance for in-home support services; cooperate with court ordered evaluations or testing; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs; make all necessary child care arrangements; immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of her household; maintain the child within the state of Connecticut; and visit the child as often as DCF permits.
Mother has failed to comply with many of the specific steps. She did not attend an administrative case review even though it was rescheduled twice to accommodate her. On January 21, 2004, mother refused to let DCF worker DeFeo into her home. On July 29, 2004, mother failed to attend a permanency planning hearing despite DCF's offer to provide round trip transportation. Mother has not fully complied with recommendations for counseling and treatment. Mother was evaluated by Logan Green, Ph.D. In his report of May 25, 2004, Dr. Green recommended that mother attend group therapy preferably oriented toward people with personality disorders. He recommended a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether psychopharmacological treatment was indicated. He further recommended that mother complete twenty group therapy sessions and a full course of parenting education prior to any increase in visitation. Although mother underwent a psychiatric evaluation, she failed to comply with Green's other recommendations and failed to comply with the recommendations of Edward Rabe, M.D., Ph.D., following the psychiatric evaluation. She was referred to Midstate Behavioral Health in Meriden, but reported she was unable to attend due to a conflict in scheduling. She was next referred to Family Services in Meriden but failed to attend the intake appointment. She failed to attend her second scheduled appointment and her case was closed due to noncompliance. Following her psychiatric evaluation, Rabe concluded that mother could benefit from individual psychotherapy along with structured group therapy to address issues with regard to her relationships with others and to develop the elements of trusting relationships. Rabe found that treatment with certain drugs has been shown to help individuals with personality disorders and stated that such treatment could help mother improve her judgment and manage her maladaptive behaviors. Mother did not follow through with these recommendations.
Mother was referred to the Turning Point program at the Rushford Center for mental health and substance abuse issues. She attended an intake appointment on April 14, 2005 at which time group therapy and a hair test were recommended. Although mother attended five group therapy sessions, she then dropped out against medical advice.
Mother has not maintained consistent employment. She has worked for short periods of time at McDonalds, Dunkin Donuts, The Leather Company in the Buckland Hills Mall, a gas station, and Bath and Body Works in the Meriden Mall, The Avenue, and Sally and John Leather in the Meriden Mall. Mother was fired from most of these jobs and told Rabe that she does not work at one place for long.
With regard to housing, mother has moved frequently. After her release from custody in February 2003, mother moved twice within Hartford and in May 2004, she moved to Meriden after being evicted from her Hartford apartment. She was evicted again in November 2004 and moved into an apartment in Meriden.
Mother was offered an in-home parent aide to assist her with bonding with her baby when Ja-renia was born. However, mother and Ja-renia's biological father did not like the parent aide and told her not to come to the house again or they would call the police. The case was closed with an unsuccessful discharge. The Burgdorf Clinic, which had supplied the parent aide, reported that it would not accept another referral for services from DCF for mother who was rude and noncompliant.
Mother failed to inform DCF of any changes in the composition of her household when she allowed a roommate who had unaddressed mental health issues and an open case with DCF to move in with her. Mother has had a series of people, male and female, in her home routinely while workers and case aides have been at mother's apartment for supervised visits. Mother did not provide full names for these people.
Since the issuance of the specific steps, mother has not had further involvement with the criminal justice system. With regard to visitation, mother has attended most of her visits. However, during the visitation, interaction between mother and daughter has been minimal. Mother often allowed Turquoise to play by herself or watch TV while mother sat in another room, did her nails, and spoke on the phone or with others present in the home. Mother did not typically engage Turquoise in play. Turquoise was reluctant to enter mother's apartment each week and was anxious to leave. There were other people present in the home most of the time and mother failed to comply with DCF's request that there be no extraneous people present during visitation. Mother requested unsupervised visitation and her visitation was increased to four hours, two supervised and two unsupervised. However, due to the presence of others in the home and Turquoise's reluctance to have the worker leave for the unsupervised portion of the visit, two-hour supervised visits were resumed. Every week for months, mother made Turquoise macaroni and cheese for a morning meal. When Turquoise complained of stomachaches after the visits, DCF was concerned that Turquoise might be lactose intolerant and suggested that mother offer a different option. Mother continued to offer only macaroni and cheese.
With regard to father, specific steps were issued by the court on June 27, 2002. Respondent father's specific steps required him to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; keep the child's whereabouts and his own whereabouts known to DCF, his attorney and the attorney for the child; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; engage in no substance abuse; and come forward and articulate a plan for the child.
Father has not complied with any of the specific steps. He was whereabouts unknown until DCF located him in April 2005 at which time he informed DCF that he was not a resource for the child and did not wish to have a role in her life.
D. The Child — Turquoise L.
Turquoise L. was born November 13, 2000. She was placed with guardians when she was approximately six months old and then placed in DCF care on December 20, 2001 at the age of one. Turquoise was placed in her current foster home at that time and has remained there. She has adjusted well at this foster home and foster parents are ably meeting all of her physical, medical, educational, and emotional needs. Turquoise is developmentally on target, however, some of her behaviors are of concern to the foster family. She is a bright child who has difficulty accepting limits. Turquoise is up to date medically, but is prone to common illnesses and viruses. She has stated that she wishes to stay with her foster family. The foster family has provided Turquoise with a sense of security and she would like to stay there and be adopted by foster parents. She refers to foster parents as Mom and Dad and seeks comfort from them. Foster parents have expressed their desire to adopt Turquoise if she is available for adoption.
Turquoise's therapist, Margaret Borelli of the Meriden Child Guidance Clinic, testified that she began therapy with Turquoise in June 2005 to assist in addressing behavioral issues as well as issues of confusion over her birth family and foster family. Borelli sees Turquoise once a week for forty-five minutes. Borelli testified that Turquoise did not understand why she was visiting Jaime every week. She calls her "Mommy Jaime," and views her as a woman she visits. Turquoise views her foster mother as her mother. Borelli testified that at approximately six years of age, Turquoise does not understand the concept that she was born to one mother and has been raised by another, particularly since she did not live with her biological mother for more than a few months. Borelli will continue to work on behavioral issues with Turquoise, including acting out and checking for foster parents whenever they are not in sight. Turquoise's behavioral issues were observed to increase following visits with mother.
E. Psychological Evaluation
A psychological evaluation of mother and an interactional evaluation of mother and Turquoise were performed by Logan Green, Ph.D., in May 2004. Green found that mother had a diagnosis of anxiety, minor depressive illness, and personality dysfunction which resulted in difficulties in relationships. He found that mother had impulsiveness and that anger was a key component. He found that with increased stress, mother became emotionally labile or unstable. He cited as an example the incident in which mother shoved and pushed the child in the emergency room toward the DCF worker.
With regard to mother's diagnosis, Green found that: CT Page 13309
In addition to her anxiety and depression, [mother] is symptomatic for Borderline Personality Disorder. She has changeable moods, fears and expects abandonment and rejection, displays a desultory energy level with sudden and unexpected impulsive outbursts and entertains contrasting emotions and conflicting thoughts about herself and others . . . She is likely to have marked shifts from normality to depression to excitement as well as having periods of dejection and apathy. She is also likely to exhibit episodes of inappropriate and intense anger as well as brief spells of anxiety. Ex. 7 at 23.
Green found that mother had symptoms of personality disorders including avoidance, dependence and borderline personality disorder. He found that she may also be suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder but was unable to determine that without further analysis and observation. Id. at 11. Green also noted concerns as a result of the Child Abuse Potential Inventory (CAP) testing performed during the evaluation. He found that mother's results:
indicate that she may engage in physically abusive forms of discipline. While she has many values that indicated that she understands that there are alternatives to physical force and that enable the utilization of those alternatives, there were also strong indications that when placed in a position of stress, she might not adhere to those values. The results of the MCMI and the Rorschach were consistent with the need for caution suggested by the CAP results. Id. at 23.
Green further found that:
mother has serious emotional characteristics that impair both her ability to develop appropriate relationships and to discharge child care responsibilities in a consistent and timely [manner]. She has difficulties in relating to people, a problem that she readily admits. She is a demanding person who is somewhat rigid in outlook and readily exhibits anger. She is not interpersonally adept. In fact, she lacks many social skills. Id. at 24.
During the interactional evaluation with mother, Green found that she was angry, that she asked irrelevant questions, insinuated herself into Turquoise's actions and forced Turquoise to say she loved mother. Green concluded that mother was not sufficiently rehabilitated to care for Turquoise and that she would need a minimum of a year and a half in services before she could undertake a responsible position in the life of her child. He concluded that mother was not able to parent Turquoise and made recommendations regarding therapy and treatment. He recommended an initial thirty sessions of group therapy directed toward individuals with personality disorders, and then a transfer to individual therapy. Green testified that such therapy could reduce mother's self-centeredness and strengthen her ability to maintain her sense of self without depending on a partner or a baby. Green stated that mother required a year to a year and a half of therapy directed toward remediation of her personality disorder. Green testified that mother's chances of spontaneous remission with no treatment were very small. He stated that young children and infants are easier for an individual with a personality disorder to care for and that the difficulty increases as the child ages and begins to talk back or disobey rules.
II. ADJUDICATION
The ground alleged in the petition as to both respondents was that the child Turquoise was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)). The petition also alleges as to father abandonment in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)) and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)).
A. Location and Reunification § 117a-112(j)(1) In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). On April 17, 2003, the court (Baldwin, J.) found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father were no longer appropriate. Under the statute, a finding that reasonable efforts were made is not required if the court has determined, as in this case, that reasonable efforts are no longer appropriate. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001). DCF also made reasonable efforts to locate father and did locate him in April 2005, at which time he stated he did not wish to play any role in the child's life. The court finds that DCF made substantial efforts to reunify with mother in this case. Throughout DCF's involvement, numerous referrals were made to service providers who could help mother address mental health issues as well as substance abuse and parenting concerns. Mother failed to participate in most of the services offered. Although mother did participate in some services, she did not benefit from the services provided and failed to follow the recommendations of the psychologist and psychiatrist. Mother attended an intake appointment and some group sessions at Rushford, but dropped out of the program and was discharged against medical advice. Visitation was provided throughout the case.Father has not played any role in the life of the child and has not presented himself as a resource for the child. Father did not appear for trial in this matter and indicated that he agreed with termination of his parental rights. Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify both father and mother with the child and that as of the filing of the petition, the parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
B. Parental Failure to Rehabilitate § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondent mother's and father's parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Turquoise was found to be uncared for on June 27, 2002, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the child. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Section § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent. [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that [within a reasonable time] she can assume a responsible position in her child's life. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 706 . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted). In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]. In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 269 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent mother nor father has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. "The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.). In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, CT Page 13313 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). The psychological evidence in this case clearly establishes that mother has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. As Green found, "mother has serious emotional characteristics that impair both her ability to develop appropriate relationships and to discharge child care responsibilities in a consistent and timely [manner]." Ex. 7 at 24. He found that she "is also likely to exhibit episodes of inappropriate and intense anger as well as brief spells of anxiety." Id., at 23. He recommended that mother's visitation with the child not be increased until she had appropriate counseling and a psychiatric evaluation and treatment. Mother did not comply with Green's recommendation for therapy. Although mother did undergo the psychiatric evaluation, she did not comply with the treatment recommended by the psychiatrist.
Although specific steps were issued with regard to mother and father, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that they failed to fulfill them. As described above, respondent mother failed to attend meetings with DCF, refused to allow DCF into her home on one occasion, did not comply with individual counseling, and failed to attend counseling at Family Services in Meriden such that her case was closed due to noncompliance. Mother also failed to comply with the recommendations of Dr. Green and Dr. Rabe. Moreover, as of the filing of the petition, she had not maintained consistent employment or stable housing. Mother failed to cooperate with her parent aide and the Burgdorf Clinic refused to provide any additional services because mother was rude and noncompliant. Mother failed to inform DCF of changes in the composition of her household, and indeed had a roommate with an open DCF case and unaddressed mental health issues. While mother did visit regularly with Turquoise, there were often unidentified people in the home and mother frequently left Turquoise to watch TV or play on her own during visits.
The evidence showed that respondent father failed to rehabilitate in that he did not comply with any specific steps and indicated to DCF that he could not be a resource for the child. Indeed, he expressed his agreement with termination of his parental rights and failed to appear in connection with these proceedings.
The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of April 22, 2005, respondents had not brought themselves into a position in which they could provide adequate care for the child. Father was not a resource for the child and mother did not engage in necessary counseling and other services. Thus respondents did not demonstrate an ability to provide day-to-day care for the child.
The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 230; In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. at 749-50 (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). There was no change in father's circumstances after the adjudicatory date and he continued to be uninvolved in the child's life. Mother's conduct after the adjudicatory date does show some limited improvement in that she has been able to care for Ja-renia and the child born in January 2006 and has maintained her housing in Meriden. However, although she began treatment at Rushford just prior to the filing of the petition, attending an intake appointment on April 14, 2005, she only briefly attended and was discharged on June 16, 2005 against medical advice when she dropped out of treatment. Mother also failed to follow up with referrals made to MidState and Catholic Charities in May 2005.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Green testified at trial that if mother were to begin the therapy and treatment required, she would require approximately a year and a half to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation such that she could undertake a responsible position in the life of Turquoise. He also concluded that mother is not likely without treatment to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time she could undertake a responsible position in Turquoise's life. As of the last day of trial, mother had not begun any meaningful treatment.
Turquoise is in great need of permanency. Given mother's current inability to have the child placed with her, additional time would be unreasonable and detrimental to the child. Turquoise has been out of mother's care since she was six months old. She has been in DCF care since December 2001 and for most of her life. Here, for a child who has only really known her foster parents who would like to adopt her and who are committed to her and her development, any additional time for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable.
Mother has been able to manage caring for Ja-renia and the new baby. However, she has not maintained steady employment or engaged in necessary recommended therapy. Thus mother remains unable to care for Turquoise.
The court finds that the parents are not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the child or to assume a useful role in her life and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the child.
In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. at 261; accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. at 292; In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. at 384-85. The issue is not whether respondent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. at 180; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. Turquoise has specialized needs to the extent that she requires continued therapy with Margaret Borelli. Although Turquoise is making progress in treatment, she continues to need to address behavioral issues as well as issues of confusion regarding her birth mother and foster mother. Mother's history of relationship problems and anger raises significant concerns about her ability to provide a stable home for this child, particularly since she now has two other children in the home and, as Green testified, her personality disorder makes it more difficult to parent-children as they get older.
Turquoise desperately needs and deserves a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "[t]erminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, respondent parents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate and remain unable to provide the day-to-day care this child needs within a reasonable time. The child now has a foster family with whom she has thoroughly bonded.
The family is committed to the child and would like to adopt her.
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondent mother and father remain unable to successfully parent the child and lack the ability to assume a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonably foreseeable time. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proven respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
C. Abandonment: C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
Petitioner has alleged as to respondent father that he has abandoned Turquoise.
"Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare. In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9489), 183 Conn. 11, 14, 438 A.2d 801 (1981)." In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993); In re Terrance C., 58 Conn.App. 389, 394, 755 A.2d 232 (2000). This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. In re Roshawn P., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112. Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights cases is not whether a parent has shown "some interest" in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).
Respondent father has never had a role in Turquoise's life. Indeed, when DCF located him, he initially denied he had a daughter named Turquoise. He did acknowledge that his former girlfriend Jaime had a child and he believed he was the father which paternity testing confirmed. Although he provided his address and phone number to DCF, father stated that he had four other children and could not care for Turquoise. He stated that he was glad Turquoise was in a good home and would be adopted if termination were granted. Father stated that he is in agreement with termination, but was unwilling to attend court as he did not want to see mother or her boyfriend.
Respondent father never sought visitation or contact of any kind with the child and the child has not visited with father since shortly after her birth. See In re Deana E., et al., 61 Conn.App. 185, 194, 763 A.2d 37 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 941, 768 A.2d 949 (2001). Respondent father has not sent any cards, letters or gifts to or for the child and has informed DCF that he is not a resource for the child and does not wish to have contact with her.
Respondent father has made no effort at any time to contact the child. He has not maintained any interest in his child, let alone a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of his child. The court therefore concludes that this ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence as to respondent father.
D. No Ongoing Parent-child Relationship § 17A-112(j)(3)(D)
This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.
No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent or no relationship has ever developed between them, or that the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. at 22. In any case, "the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). The mere recognition of an individual as a parent will not defeat this ground. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 708-09, 438 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985). The presence or absence of positive feelings on the part of the child is determinative. In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 240, 754 A.2d 169 (2000).
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to respondent (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the child Turquoise and respondent father. Turquoise considers her foster parents to be her psychological parents. Father has not provided day-to-day care for Turquoise at any time in her life. She has not visited with father and would not recognize him. Because she does not know who he is, Turquoise has no present positive memories of father. Thus the evidence establishes to a clear and convincing standard that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between father and Turquoise.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow respondent father additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship with the child who is in a stable, nurturing foster home would be detrimental to the best interest of the, child. Turquoise is now five and a half years old. She has been in DCF care in her pre-adoptive home since December 2001. Indeed, father stated that he was pleased that Turquoise would be adopted and expressed no desire to maintain a connection to Turquoise or to be part of her life. Thus, the court finds that the petitioner has proven this statutory ground for termination as to respondent Hector F. by clear and convincing evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including June 20, 2006, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed. "`If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 103. "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered services including parenting education; substance abuse evaluation, testing, and treatment; mental health evaluation, counseling and treatment; and visitation. Respondent mother engaged in some services, but failed to engage in others. Father did not engage in any services.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency. and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent mother and father.
As set forth above in detail, respondent mother failed to comply with many specific steps and father did not comply with any specific steps. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does not have any emotional bond with father and does not have a strong emotional bond with her biological mother. Turquoise has known mother only through visitation for approximately four and a half years. She has often resisted visitation and has been reluctant to enter mother's apartment. As Turquoise's therapist stated, Turquoise did not understand why she had to continue to visit "Mommy Jaime." The child has a strong emotional bond with the foster parents with whom she has lived since December 2001. The foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the child needs. The foster parents are committed to the child and would like to adopt her.
(5) As to the age of the child, the court finds that Turquoise, born November 13, 2000, is five and a half years old. The court further finds that this child requires stability of placement and continuity of care and that the child's attorney recommends termination.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994.)
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; the court finds that respondent mother has maintained only a visiting relationship with the child and father has maintained no relationship with the child. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the child's life. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by either parent, the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. Further, while mother's financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing, contact with the child.
With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Jaime C. and Hector F. to Turquoise L. is in the best interest of the child. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Turquoise. She has been out of mother's care since she was approximately six months old and has been in foster care for four and a half years, almost all of her young life. The child is now in a foster home where she is very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to her. Mother and father are unable to assume a responsible parental role for the child. Although mother loves the child and would like to care for her, she has failed to engage in the services necessary for her to appropriately care for Turquoise.
In view of the fact that respondent father failed to appear for trial, has not been involved in the child's life, is not a resource for the child, and does not wish to maintain communication with the child, termination of his parental rights is in the child's best interest. In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; her length of stay in foster care; the nature of her relationship with foster parents and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with her biological parents; and her genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the child's best interest.
With regard to permanency, the court considers the testimony that the foster parents are committed to adopting the child. This child is entitled to a resolution, with out delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as her parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the child supports termination.
After considering the child's sense of time, her need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and father is in the child's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Jaime C. and Hector F. to the child Turquoise L. are hereby terminated. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children.
With regard to the permanency plan, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child. The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan. A permanency plan shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.