See U.S. Const., amend VI. Therefore, E.H. had a constitutional right to confront her accuser. In fact, the recent ruling in In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976 (2004), which applied Crawford, lends support to our ruling in its analysis of the admissibility of portions of an examining physician's testimony at trial. In In re T.T., the court allowed some "nontestimonial" statements made to the examining physician by the victim, but disallowed other "testimonial statements" as violative of the confrontation clause.

The First District recently applied Crawford in a case with nearly identical facts. In In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976 (2004), the nine-year-old sexual abuse victim testified about some background information, but refused to answer specific questions about the abuse. The trial court declared her unavailable.

" R.F., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 1000. However, in In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976 (2004), the First District specifically addressed a situation in which a statement made to nongovernmental personnel was testimonial and thus violated the confrontation clause. In In re T.T., the court deemed admissible some of the victim's "nontestimonial" statements made to the examining physician but excluded other "testimonial statements" for violating the confrontation clause.

Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 241, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. See also In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976, 992-93 (2004) (holding that child's statements to doctor for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment were nontestimonial, but identification of attacker in same interview was testimonial). It is clear, therefore, that when the statements under consideration are the product of questioning by the police (or those whose "acts [are] acts of the police" ( Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n. 2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 238 n. 2, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n. 2)), we must focus on the intent of the questioner in eliciting the statement.

Thus, " Crawford indicates that governmental involvement in some fashion in the creation of a formal statement is necessary to render the statement testimonial in nature." In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976, 988, 815 N.E.2d 789, 800 (2004); see also R.F., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 1000 (noting Crawford applies only to statements made to governmental officials, not those made to nongovernmental personnel such as family members or physicians). Here, Lydia questioned the child as a concerned and loving parent.

A trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion; however, evidentiary rulings involving questions of statutory interpretation or other questions of law are reviewed de novo. In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976, 984 (2004). Defendant first argues that K.O. did not testify at trial as required by section 115-10(b)(2)(A).

The defendant next contends that all of the statements M.M. made to Sibug and Dr. Labrador are testimonial in nature because they were obtained in anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution. A similar argument was made to this court in In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976, 815 N.E.2d 789 (2004). In In re T.T., the respondent raised a Crawford challenge to the admission at trial of the victim's hearsay statements to a doctor who had examined her.

Since the Supreme Court issued its decision in Crawford, courts have struggled with determining exactly which statements are testimonial in nature and which are nontestimonial. In re T.T., 351 Ill.App.3d 976, 815 N.E.2d 789 (2004) (vacated by supervisory order of the Illinois Supreme Court September 5, 2007.); People v. R.F., 355 Ill.App.3d 992, 292 Ill.Dec. 31, 825 N.E.2d 287 (2005) ; People v. West, 355 Ill.App.3d 28, 291 Ill.Dec. 72, 823 N.E.2d 82 (2005) ; People v. Purcell, 364 Ill.App.3d 283, 301 Ill.Dec. 241, 846 N.E.2d 203 (2006) . A review of recent case law in our appellate districts indicates that there exist two developing theories regarding how to determine if a statement is testimonial in nature.

See People v. R.F., 355 Ill.App.3d 992, 1000, 292 Ill.Dec. 31, 825 N.E.2d 287 (2005). However, in In re T.T., 351 Ill.App.3d 976, 287 Ill.Dec. 145, 815 N.E.2d 789 (2004), the First District also held that certain statements the victim made to nongovernmental personnel, an examining physician, were testimonial and thus their admission violated the confrontation clause. In re T.T., 351 Ill.App.3d at 992-93, 287 Ill.Dec. 145, 815 N.E.2d 789.

oses of diagnosis and treatment, without involvement of law enforcement, did not fit any Crawford formulation]; State v. Moses (2005) 129 Wn.App. 718 [ 119 P.3d 906, 911-912] [domestic abuse victim's statements to doctor during private exam were not testimonial; exam was for purpose of diagnosis and treatment, physician was not connected to criminal investigation, and record does not indicate declarant believed, or had reason to believe, statements would be used at trial]; but see, e.g., People v. West (2005) 355 Ill.App.3d 28 [291 Ill.Dec. 72, 823 N.E.2d 82, 90] [adult rape victim's statements to hospital emergency medical personnel were testimonial insofar as they alleged criminal conduct and identified a perpetrator]; compare, e.g., U.S. v.Bordeaux (8th Cir. 2005) 400 F.3d 548, 556 [child sex abuse victim's statements to "forensic interviewer" designated by law enforcement officers were testimonial, even if doctor observed interview and one purpose was medical treatment]; In reT.T. (2004) 351 Ill.App.3d 976 [287 Ill.Dec. 145, 815 N.E.2d 789, 803-804] [child sex abuse victim's accusatory statements to examining physician who was member of hospital child abuse protection unit and had testified as expert witness in child abuse cases were testimonial]; State v.Snowden (2005) 385 Md. 64 [ 867 A.2d 314, 322-330] [older child abuse victim's statements during formal interview by county "sexual abuse investigator" in conjunction with police investigation were testimonial]; State v. Blue (N.D. 2006) 2006 ND 134 [ 717 N.W.2d 558, 561-565] [post- Davis case; child sex abuse victim's statements to "forensic interviewer," with police involvement, were for purpose of collecting evidence, and were thus testimonial]; State v.Mack (2004) 337 Ore. 586 [ 101 P. 3d 349] [statements by three-year-old witness to department of health services social worker who was interviewing witness under direction of police in murder investigation were testimonial].) The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the