Opinion
No. 08-1321.
Filed March 17, 2009.
Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 14 August 2008 by Judge G. Galen Braddy in Pitt County (Juvenile) District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 February 2009.
Nikki Reason Walker and Elizabeth Myrick Boone for petitioner-appellee Pitt County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell Williams for appellee Guardian ad Litem. Frederick Whitehurst for Erica Moore. Peter Wood for respondent-appellant.
Appeal from the Pitt (01JT116).
Respondent-father ("respondent") appeals the order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, T.S. After careful review, we affirm.
On 13 July 2001, Pitt County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a juvenile petition alleging that T.S. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. Specifically, DSS alleged that "[b]ased upon the domestic violence and substance abuse issues, illegal drug activity, respondent mother's anger and the risks associated with the [child's] care and environment, it is submitted that this juvenile is neglected and dependent." DSS obtained nonsecure custody of T.S. on 13 July 2001. The trial court adjudicated T.S. a neglected juvenile on 22 January 2002. On 22 March 2007, DSS filed a petition to terminate parental rights. A termination hearing was held on 16 July and 17 July 2008. On 13 August 2008, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights. Respondent further argues that the trial court erred when it found grounds to terminate his parental rights when the findings of fact and conclusions of law were not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
We first address respondent's contention that the trial court erred when it found grounds to terminate his parental rights.
Termination of parental rights cases involve two separate components. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001) (citation omitted). "In the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exists." In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citing Blackburn). This Court reviews the adjudicatory stage to determine "whether the trial court's findings of fact are based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether those findings support the trial court's conclusion that grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111." In re C.W. J.W., 182 N.C. App. 214, 219, 641 S.E.2d 725, 729 (2007) (citation omitted). Where, as here, a respondent has not assigned error to any specific finding of fact made by the trial court, the findings are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
In the present case, the trial court found grounds for terminating respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1111(a)(1) (neglect), (a)(2) (failure to make reasonable progress), and (a)(7) (abandonment).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2007) provides for termination of parental rights where "[t]he parent has abused or neglected the juvenile. The juvenile shall be deemed to be . . . neglected if the court finds the juvenile to be . . . a neglected juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101." A neglected juvenile is defined as follows:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2007).
"Neglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing, or if the parent has been separated from the child for an extended period of time, the petitioner must show that the parent has neglected the child in the past and that the parent is likely to neglect the child in the future." C.W. at 220, 641 S.E.2d at 729 (citation omitted). This Court has stated that, "[a]n individual's'lack of parental concern for his child' is simply an alternate way of stating that the individual has failed to exercise proper care, supervision, and discipline as to that child." In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 675, 373 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1988). Moreover, "on the question of neglect, the trial judge may consider . . . a parent's complete failure to provide the personal contact, love, and affection that inheres in the parental relationship." In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 324, 296 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1982).
Here, the trial court made the following pertinent finding:
90. Since 2001 until the filing [of] the verified petition for termination of parental rights on March 22, 2007, even though he knew that this juvenile was in foster care, the respondent father has not inquired from DSS about the welfare of this juvenile; has not sent cards, written letters or sent gifts for the juvenile; has not provided any care or supervision for the juvenile; has not made his whereabouts known to the juvenile or DSS; has not done anything to show his love, care or concern for the juvenile; has not acted as a parent to the juvenile; has not supported the juvenile in any way, financially or emotionally; and has continued to engage in criminal activity, culminating in his most recent arrest in Pitt County on June 28, 2005 related to the distribution of cocaine, for which he was convicted and sentenced to 96 months in federal prison.
It is undisputed that after July 2001, respondent made no attempts to contact DSS or T.S., until the petition to terminate his parental rights was filed. Respondent did not send letters, gifts, birthday cards, or have friends and family inquire about T.S. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that grounds exist to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). "[W]here wedetermine the trial court properly concluded that one ground exists to support the termination of parental rights, we need not address the remaining grounds." In re Clark, 159 N.C. App. 75, 84, 582 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2003).
Respondent further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights. We disagree.
Once statutory grounds for termination have been established, the trial court is required to "determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2007). In making this determination, the trial court is required to consider the following factors:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
Id. The standard for appellate review of the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is abuse of discretion. In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 745, 535 S.E.2d 367, 373-74 (2000). "A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are `manifestly unsupported by reason.'" Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006)( quoting Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)).
The trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to its best interests determination:
113. That the juvenile is now 7 years old.
114. That the juvenile was disconnected from a family setting with his biological parents from the early age of 10 months old.
. . .
117. That the juvenile has been placed with his sister for that last seven years and that has contributed to his sense of security.
118. That the juvenile is likely to be adopted and is absolutely adoptable.
119. The juvenile has been in the same foster placement for the last seven years and the foster parents desire to adopt this juvenile and his sibling as soon as possible.
. . .
122. That the permanent plan in the best interest for this juvenile is adoption, and that termination of parental rights will allow this plan to be accomplished. This plan will allow the juvenile to achieve permanence, security and comfort.
123. That the juvenile had little to no bond with the respondent parents, having been removed from their care at 10 months old. The juvenile has not seen the respondent father in 7 years. The juvenile last saw the respondent mother in April, 2004.
124. The foster home is the only home that this juvenile has ever known.
. . .
127. The juvenile calls his foster parents mom and dad.
128. That the current placement of the juvenile is an excellent match for him and the juvenile and his foster family have an excellent relationship.
In light of these findings, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The record on appeal contains additional assignments of error not addressed by respondent in his brief. By rule, we deem them to be abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).