Opinion
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Desiree, Super. Ct. No. J209971
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
NARES, J.
Bruce-Lyle, Judge.
Affirmed.
The juvenile court declared T.S. a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601) after entering a true finding she was a habitual truant (§ 601, subd. (b)). The court placed T.S. on probation under the supervision of the probation department and included a probation condition that she be at home "between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless in the company of his/her parent, legal guardian, or other adult person having legal care or custody of the minor, subject to modification at the Probation Officer's discretion." T.S. contends the trial court was unauthorized to impose curfew earlier than 10 p.m.
All statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.
FACTS
During the school year 2004-2005, T.S. had 21 full-day unexcused absences from school. During September and October 2005, then 15-year-old T.S. was a student in the Sweetwater School District. She had 16 unexcused full-day absences. The truancy office reported 16 student/parent conferences regarding T.S.'s truancy. T.S.'s truancy problem escalated to the point where she and her mother were required to enter into a School Attendance Review Board contract requiring T.S. to provide a doctor's note for each absence from school in order to have the absence excused.
At the disposition hearing, the court adopted the probation department recommendations except for a requirement that T.S. provide an essay on the importance of education. Included in the conditions was curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. The court advised T.S. that "[t]he only exceptions are school, religious activities or when you are with your mother. You are to complete 20 hours of community service at a nonprofit organization." T.S. did not object.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the People argue that T.S. is precluded on appeal from challenging the curfew order because she did not object in the trial court. The only issue T.S. raises on appeal is whether the trial court had authority to extend T.S.'s curfew by four hours (starting at 6:00 p.m. rather than 10:00 p.m.). Because this is a question of law, T.S. can raise this issue on appeal. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 886-887.)
Section 729.2 provides in pertinent part:
"If a minor is found to be a person described in Section 601 or 602 and the court does not remove the minor from the physical custody of the parent or guardian, the court as a condition of probation, except in any case in which the court makes a finding and states on the record its reasons that that condition would be inappropriate, shall: [¶] . . .
"(c) Require the minor to be at his or her legal residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless the minor is accompanied by his or her parent or parents, legal guardian or other adult person having the legal care or custody of the minor."
T.S. argues that the juvenile court violated section 729.2, subdivision (c) when it ordered her curfew to last from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. rather than 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. T.S. has misconstrued the statute. Section 729.2, subdivision (c) does not set forth the maximum length of the curfew the juvenile court is authorized to impose; rather, the statute provides the court cannot impose a curfew for a shorter length of time unless it explicitly finds that the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew is inappropriate.
Furthermore, we review the juvenile court's imposition of probation conditions for an abuse of discretion. (In re Daniel R. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) "A juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for the purpose of rehabilitation." (In re Tanya B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, overruled on other grounds in In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 812-813.) The juvenile court has broader discretion in determining probation conditions for wards than the criminal court has in adult criminal cases. (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203.)
"This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed. The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents. And a parent may 'curtail a child's exercise of the constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent's own constitutionally protected "liberty" includes the right to "bring up children" and to "direct the upbringing and education of children." ’ " (In re Antonio (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.)
The juvenile court's exercise of discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases "will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse." (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.1, 5.)
In In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1502-1503, two juveniles were declared wards based on true findings they committed misdemeanors. The reviewing court upheld without question a curfew order requiring them to be home between 8 p.m. and 5 a.m.. The reviewing court found that the juvenile court "wisely tailored its order to provide them with the structure and discipline lacking in [their] environment." (Id. at p. 1502.)
Under section 730, subdivision (b), the juvenile court may "impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced."
T.S. contends, without citing direct authority, that section 730, subdivision (b) does not apply to a minor declared a ward as a result of truancy. She argues that extending curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. under section 730, subdivision (b) violates the legislative intent expressed in section 729.2. Further, T.S. argues that if section 730 applies to truants, then section 727.5, which permits the juvenile court to order limited community service, is surplusage, and surplusage is prohibited by the rules of statutory interpretation. (See People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 559-560.)
Section 727.5 is not before this court. T.S. challenges a curfew order that requires the minor to be home earlier (6 p.m. rather than 10 p.m.) than the curfew referred to in section 729.2. As explained above, the Legislature, in section 729.2, required the juvenile court to order a truant minor to be home between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. It is not surplusage nor is it inconsistent with the legislative intent behind section 729.2 to allow the trial court to extend the curfew and order the minor to be home earlier than expressed in section 729.2 should the court determine the longer curfew is proper in an attempt to reform and rehabilitate the minor, in light of the minor's severe truancy.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order setting T.S.'s curfew is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., McINTYRE, J.