In re Train Collision at Gary, Indiana

12 Citing cases

  1. Lorincie v. S.E. Penn. Transp. Auth.

    34 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Pa. 1998)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that BIA does not apply to manufacturers

    One could plausibly draw a line between locomotive equipment related and unrelated to railroad safety, and correctly claim that state law dealing with railroad safety has been the subject of almost every suit since Napier in which a court has found BIA preemption. See e.g. Law v. General Motors Corp., 114 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1997) (brakes and engines); Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1983) (warning lights and equipment); Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 863 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.Ohio 1994) (warning devices); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 536 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.Pa. 1982) (speed recorders and indicators); In re: Train Collision at Gary, Indiana on January 18, 1993, 670 N.E.2d 902 (Ind.App. 1996) (crash prevention equipment). But Napier itself forbids drawing such a line.

  2. Scheiding v. General Motors Corp.

    22 Cal.4th 471 (Cal. 2000)   Cited 37 times
    Finding FLIA preempts employees products liability claim against locomotive manufacture

    E.g., Oglesby v. Delawares&sHudson Railway Co. (2d Cir. 1999) 180 F.3d 458, 460-462; Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (6th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 241, 244-245; Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Railroad Com'n of Texas (5th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 264, 268; Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (9th Cir. 1983) 720 F.2d 1149, 1151-1152; Consol. Rail Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. (E.D.Pa. 1982) 536 F.Supp. 653, affirmed (3d Cir. 1982) 696 F.2d 981, affirmed sub nom. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com. v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (1983) 461 U.S. 912 [103 S.Ct. 1888, 77 L.Ed.2d 280]; Key v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. (1997) 228 Ga.App. 305 [491 S.E.2d 511]; In re Train Collision at Gary, Indiana (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) 670 N.E.2d 902, 910-911; Carter v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1998) 126 Ohio App.3d 177 [709 N.E.2d 1235].         The United States Supreme Court has, moreover, impliedly affirmed that Napier remains viable.

  3. Good Host, LLC v. Advanced Interventional Pain Ctr. LLC

    No. 49A05-1105-PL-217 (Ind. App. Dec. 15, 2011)

    When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint. In re Train Collision (Dillon v. Chicago Southshore & South Bend R.R. Co.), 670 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997). But a court need not accept as true allegations that are contradicted by other allegations or exhibits attached to or incorporated in the pleading.

  4. Frastaci v. Vapor Corp.

    158 Cal.App.4th 1389 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 9 times

    d 1205, 1209-1210 [BIA preempts nonemployee product liability action against manufacturer of locomotive crane]; Oglesby v. Delaware Hudson Railway Co. (2d Cir. 1999) 180 F.3d 458, 460-461 [BIA preempts common law claims against locomotive seat manufacturer], cert. den. sub nom. Oglesby v. General Motors Corp. (1999) 528 U.S. 1004 [ 145 L.Ed.2d 384, 120 S.Ct. 498]; Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (6th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 241, 244-245 [BIA preempts state tort claims for inadequate warning devices brought by motorist struck by train], cert. den. (1998) 523 U.S. 1094 [ 140 L.Ed.2d 792, 118 S.Ct. 1560]; First Sec. Bank v. Union Pacific R. Co. (8th Cir. 1998) 152 F.3d 877, 880 [BIA preempts state common law claims against locomotive manufacturers for injuries arising out of alleged design defects]; Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (9th Cir. 1983) 720 F.2d 1149, 1151-1154 [BIA preempts state tort claims for inadequate on-train warning devices brought by motorist struck by train]; In re Train Collision at Gary, Indiana (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) 670 N.E.2d 902, 910-911 [BIA preempts claims regarding design and structure of train cars], cert. den. sub nom. Dillon v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District (1997) 522 U.S. 914 [ 139 L.Ed.2d 230, 118 S.Ct. 299].

  5. Irish v. Woods

    864 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 12 times
    Analyzing Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guar. §§ 53, 57, 59

    When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint. In re Train Collision (Dillon v. Chicago Southshore South Bend RR. Co.), 670 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), trans. denied, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 230 (1997). But a court need not accept as true allegations that are contradicted by other allegations or exhibits attached to or incorporated in the pleading.

  6. Rainey v. National Check Bureau, Inc.

    849 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 2 times

    When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint. In re Train Collision at Gary, Ind., 670 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), trans. denied, cert. denied 522 U.S. 914, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 230 (1997). A court need not accept as true allegations that are contradicted by other allegations or exhibits attached to or incorporated in the pleading.

  7. Union Pacific Railrord Co. v. Motive Equipment, Inc.

    2006 WI App. 58 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 12 times
    Rejecting Union Pacific's assertion that the manufacturer was liable for negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranties

    the status of federal preemption in this area, the majority of courts across the nation hold firm to the Napier principle that federal law preempts all state claims, leaving no area within which states may act. See, e.g., Darby v. A-Best Prods. Co., 811 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2004); In re W. Virginia Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d 818 (W.Va. 2003); General Motors Corp. v. Kilgore, 853 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 2002); Forrester v. American Dieselelectric, Inc., 255 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2001); Furlough v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 766 So. 2d 751 (La.App. 2000); Seaman v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2000); Scheiding v. General Motors Corp., 993 P.2d 996 (Cal. 2000); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Denson, 114 So. 2d 549 (Ala. 2000); Oglesby v. Delaware Hudson Ry. Co., 180 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 1999); Carter v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 709 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio App. 1998); Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 130 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 1997); Key v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 491 S.E.2d 511 (Ga.App. 1997); In re Train Collision at Gary, Indiana, 670 N.E.2d 902 (Ind.App. 1996); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 9 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1993); Burlington N.R.R. v. City of Connell, 811 F. Supp. 1459 (E.D. Wash. 1993); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. State of Montana, 805 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Mont. 1992); Smith v. Norfolk W. Ry. Co., 776 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 850 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1988); King v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 855 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1985); Marshall v. Burlington N, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1983); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 536 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 696 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 461 U.S. 912 (1983); New York, C. ST. L.R.R. Co. v. Van Dorp, 173 N.E. 445 (Ohio App. 1930); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Pelsor, 168 N.E. 249 (Ind.App. 1929). ¶ 10. Union Pacific argues that the holdings in these cases do not apply to the facts and

  8. Rogers v. Cosco

    737 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 2 times

    The historic police powers of the states are not to be superseded by federal law unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Train Collision at Gary, Ind. on Jan. 18, 1993, 670 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), trans. denied, 683 N.E.2d 591 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 299. The intent of Congress may be "express," i.e., expressly stated in the statute, or "implied," i.e., implicitly stated in the statute's structure and purpose.

  9. New Albany-Floyd County Educ. v. Ammerman

    724 N.E.2d 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 16 times

    Although the trial court specifically granted Holman's motion to dismiss and did not rule on his motion for summary judgment, we must nevertheless treat the former as a motion for summary judgment on review. See In re Train Collision at Gary, Ind. on Jan. 18, 1993, 670 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), trans. denied, Dillon v. Chicago Southshore, 683 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied, Dillon v. Northern Indiana Transp. Dist., ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 299 (1997) ("When a motion to dismiss is filed pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) and matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the trial court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Ind. Trial Rule 56.") (citing Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(8)). The Association filed a motion to correct error on March 1, 1999, in which it argued that the CBA did not "run afoul" of 1995 Ind. Acts 199; that this statutory amendment did not "prevent the Association from collecting a fair share fee for 1996-97"; and that the Association had properly supported its motion for summary judgment, to which the Teachers had failed to respond.

  10. Monarch v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.

    70 Cal.App.4th 1197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 14 times
    Holding FELA preempted a railroad employee's claim against a railroad that defendant's fraudulent concealment led to plaintiffs hearing loss

    Under the FELA, the court observed, railroad workers may "recover against their employers for all occupational injuries, including hearing loss caused by locomotive noise. . . . [¶] Thus, the federal government has established a comprehensive mechanism for vindicating the rights of railroad workers — a mechanism that doesn't undermine the BIA's goal of uniformity." ( Ibid.; see also First Sec. Bank v. Union Pacific R. Co. (8th Cir. 1998) 152 F.3d 877, 880-881; Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp., supra, 130 F.3d at pp. 244-245; Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Railroad Com'n of Texas (5th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 264, 268; Marshall v. Burlington Northern Inc. (9th Cir. 1985) 720 F.2d 1149, 1152; Eldridge v. Missouri Pacific R.R. (E.D.Okla. 1993) 832 F. Supp. 328; In re Train Collision at Gary, Indiana (Ind.App. 1996) 670 N.E.2d 902.) We agree with the reasoning of Law, but are presented with an additional issue not directly confronted in that opinion: whether a cause of action for the intentional tort of fraudulent concealment falls within the comprehensive preemptive reach of the FELA.