Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD217706 & JD217707
SCOTLAND , P.J.
Deborah C. (appellant), the mother of twins T.P. and J.P. (the minors), appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.) Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in denying her request for a bonding study. We disagree and shall affirm the orders.
FACTS
In 2002, the newborn minors were detained due to appellant’s history of substance abuse and failure to reunify with siblings of the minors. The case was dismissed with the understanding that the minors’ parents would participate in voluntary services. They did and successfully completed services.
Four years later, the minors were again detained as a result of appellant’s drug activities. They had been in the custody and care of an adult sister who admitted recent use of methamphetamine. Appellant said she signed the minors’ custody over to the sister a year earlier. Appellant did not live with the minors but was frequently in the home.
A social worker reported that the minors had a strong personal bond and that T.P. had assumed almost a parental role toward J.P. Appellant, who minimized her substance abuse and its effect on the minors, was intoxicated when she came to a post-detention visit with the minors.
In August 2006, the court sustained dependency petitions, denied services to appellant, and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
Five months later, the social worker informed the court that T.P.’s therapist reported the minors’ visits with appellant were hard on T.P. because appellant made negative comments about the prospective adoptive family and told the minors that they would be returning to appellant’s home. Visits were chaotic, appellant was not prepared to handle the minors when they cried, and the visitation resulted in regressive behavior by both minors. Thus, the frequency of visitation was decreased from weekly to monthly.
The assessment for the section 366.26 hearing stated that the regular, supervised visits were generally appropriate until October 2006 when pre-placement visits with the prospective adoptive parents began. Appellant, who was in denial about the status of the case, told the minors that she did not want to hear them refer to the prospective adoptive parents as parents, talk about visiting them, or express happiness about the visits. The minors were confused that appellant was not happy for them. In November 2006, appellant again appeared to be intoxicated at a visit. T.P. was withdrawn for several days after visits with appellant. Both children had developed a strong relationship with the prospective adoptive parents and said they very much wanted to live with them.
When in February 2007, a date was set for the section 366.26 hearing, appellant requested a bonding assessment to address whether the parent-child relationship satisfied the benefit exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). The court denied the request, stating: “[The social worker’s report] does give me information on the bond. And also quite frankly, it gives evidence as to [counsel’s] potential arguments for the bond from [appellant’s] position . . . but I think the Court can properly make the findings that are necessary. And I’m not going to order the bonding assessment.”
A subsequent report stated that the minors had been placed in the prospective adoptive home and that appellant was arrested in February 2007 on drug-related charges. Following her release, appellant set up a visit in March 2007. The visit went well, but the visitation supervisor observed that appellant was possibly under the influence of alcohol, and J.P. had behavioral problems after the visit. The social worker said that, after the minors were placed in the prospective adoptive home, they did not ask to see appellant.
At the hearing, appellant testified as follows. The minors were glad to see her during visitation and sometimes cried when the visits ended. She was not intoxicated at the March 2007 visit, and her arrest in February was not for new drug abuse but for her failure to complete work project on prior charges.
The court found the minors were adoptable. As to the benefit exception in section 366.26 subdivision (c)(1)(A), the court found that appellant visited the minors regularly but that continued contact would not outweigh the benefit to the minors of adoption. The court concluded the evidence did not show that termination of parental rights would deprive the minors of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the minors would be greatly harmed. Although visits were overall good for the most part, the quality of the visits did not overcome the preference for adoption. Thus, the court terminated parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to order a bonding assessment and that the lack of a bonding assessment prevented her from establishing an exception to the preference for adoption.
Evidence Code section 730 states in part: “When it appears to the court, at any time before or during the trial of an action, that expert evidence is or may be required by the court or by any party to the action, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be required.”
The juvenile court has broad discretion whether to order a bonding assessment. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339-1340; In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195.) Thus, the question on review is “whether, under all the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the juvenile court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding study.” (In re Lorenzo C., supra, at p. 1341.)
“The kind of parent-child bond the court may rely on to avoid termination of parental rights . . . does not arise in the short period between the termination of services and the section 366.26 hearing.” (In re Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196.) When the juvenile court makes a determination of the nature and quality of the parent-child bond, the child generally has been in the dependency process for a significant period of time, and the characteristics of the bond should be apparent. (Ibid.)
Here, the twin minors had been in placement as dependent children for nearly a year. As summarized, ante, the visitation reports reflected that the minors’ relationship with appellant was, at best, ambivalent and, at worst, negative. Appellant continued sporadic substance abuse and confused the minors and caused them to suffer some emotional distress during visitation. Once they were placed in a secure home, the minors did not ask to see appellant. Based on this, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude the relationship was not a “substantial, positive emotional attachment,” parental in nature, which is contemplated to support an exception to the preference for adoption. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th, 567, 575.)
Because there was ample evidence before the court of the nature and quality of the parent-child bond, and the court had an understanding of the legal standards and potential arguments regarding a bonding study, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order a bonding assessment.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE , J., HULL , J.