The portion of the order of fact-finding and disposition which placed the appellant in the custody of the Dutchess County Department of Social Services for a period of up to 12 months has expired by its own terms. Therefore, the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as placed the appellant in the custody of the Dutchess County Department of Social Services for a period of up to 12 months must be dismissed ( see Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 AD3d 563; Matter of Andrew Y., 44 AD3d 1063). The petitioner met its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was a person in need of supervision ( see Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 AD3d at 564; Matter of East Islip High School v Ian M., 33 AD3d 921; Matter of Joel P., 16 AD3d 511, 512; cf. Matter of Iris R., 33 NY2d 987, 988).
We agree with the Family Court's determination that the appellant is a person in need of supervision. The presentment agency proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was habitually truant during the 2015–2016 school year by presenting the testimony of a school attendance teacher and the appellant's attendance records (see Matter of Alexander C., 83 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 922 N.Y.S.2d 186 ; Matter of Shakeel Mc., 67 A.D.3d 913, 888 N.Y.S.2d 422 ; Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 A.D.3d 563, 564, 867 N.Y.S.2d 504 ; Matter of Joel P., 16 A.D.3d 511, 512, 791 N.Y.S.2d 613 ). There is no basis to disturb the court's determination to credit the presentment agency's evidence and to discount the appellant's testimony (see Matter of Serenity S. [Tyesha A.], 89 A.D.3d 737, 738, 931 N.Y.S.2d 693 ; Matter of Shamasia M., 4 A.D.3d 359, 361, 771 N.Y.S.2d 541 ; Matter of Shena SS, 263 A.D.2d 809, 810, 693 N.Y.S.2d 313 ).
The portion of the order of fact-finding and disposition that placed Alexandria P. in the custody of the Dutchess County Commissioner of Social Services for a period of up to 12 months has expired by its own terms. Therefore, the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as placed Alexandria P. in the custody of the Dutchess County Commissioner of Social Services for a period of up to 12 months must be dismissed as academic (seeMatter of Shakeel Mc. , 67 A.D.3d 913, 888 N.Y.S.2d 422 ; Matter of Bryanna P. , 66 A.D.3d 784, 784, 886 N.Y.S.2d 342 ; Matter of Toni Ann O. , 56 A.D.3d 563, 867 N.Y.S.2d 504 ; Matter of Joseph R. , 49 A.D.3d 651, 852 N.Y.S.2d 805 ; Matter of Jeffrey McG. , 8 A.D.3d 571, 778 N.Y.S.2d 723 ). ROMAN, J.P., MILLER, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.
In any event, the contention is without merit, since counsel repeatedly consented to adjourn the proceedings ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 340.1), thereby waiving speedy fact-finding hearing objections and tolling the 60–day statutory period within which the fact-finding hearing must be commenced ( see Matter of Curnelle T., 17 A.D.3d 472, 792 N.Y.S.2d 344). Contrary to the appellant's contentions, counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the petition on speedy fact-finding hearing grounds ( see Matter of Shaheen P.J., 29 A.D.3d 996, 817 N.Y.S.2d 304). The appellant's counsel provided meaningful representation ( see Matter of John M.P., 54 A.D.3d 1041, 1042, 864 N.Y.S.2d 550; cf. People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400). The appellant's contention that the Family Court failed to hold a proper dispositional hearing is unpreserved for appellate review ( see Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 A.D.3d 563, 867 N.Y.S.2d 504) and, in any event, is without merit ( see Matter of Timothy C., 31 A.D.3d 1222, 818 N.Y.S.2d 890). The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in placing the appellant on probation for a period of 12 months ( see Matter of Racheal M., 108 A.D.3d 770, 970 N.Y.S.2d 249). Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the Family Court imposed the least restrictive disposition in accordance with the requirements of Family Court Act § 352.2.
The Family Court properly considered the petition and determined that the appellant was a person in need of supervision. After finding beyond a reasonable doubt, after the fact-finding hearing, that the appellant, by his own admission, was illegally absent from school at least 13 times during the 2009-2010 school year ( see Family Ct Act § 744 [b]; Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 AD3d 563), the Family Court properly determined, upon a preponderance of the evidence, after the dispositional hearing, that reasonable efforts had been made prior to the dispositional hearing to prevent the need for removal of the appellant from his home ( see Family Ct Act §§ 745, 754 [a]). There is no basis to disturb the Family Court's determination. The appellant failed to preserve for appellate review his contentions that placement outside the home, at Berkshire Farm Center and Services for Youth ( see Social Services Law §§ 472-e, 472-k), constituted cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of his due process rights, as he did not make those arguments before the Family Court at the dispositional hearing.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements. The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the placement has expired ( see Matter of Willie J., 76 AD3d 1075; Matter of Crystal B., 63 AD3d 1056, 1057; Matter of Dominique R., 57 AD3d 550; Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 AD3d 563; Matter of Joseph R., 49 AD3d 651). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of forcible touching ( see Penal Law § 130.52), menacing in the second degree ( see Penal Law § 120.14), menacing in the third degree ( see Penal Law § 120.15), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree ( see Penal Law § 265.01).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements. The appeal from so much of the order as placed the appellant in the care and custody of the Orange County Department of Social Services for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the placement has expired pursuant to its terms ( see Matter of Crystal B., 63 AD3d 1056, 1057; Matter ofDominique R., 57 AD3d 550; Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 AD3d 563; Matter of Joseph R., 49 AD3d 651). Although the Family Court should have granted that branch of the appellant's motion which was to dismiss the second allegation of the violation of probation petition because it was not based upon a properly sworn supporting deposition ( see Family Ct Act § 360.2; Matter of Neftali D., 85 NY2d 631, 634-635), the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in revoking the dispositional order which had placed the appellant on probation.
Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements. The appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as placed the appellant in the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services of the County of Dutchess for a period of 12 months must be dismissed, as that portion of the order has expired by its own terms ( see Matter of Toni Ann O., 56 AD3d 563; Matter of Shamasia M., 4 AD3d 359, 361; Matter of Jonathan G., 278 AD2d 324, 325). We have reviewed the record and agree with the appellant's assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel's application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted ( see Anders v California, 386 US 738; People v Paige, 54 AD2d 631; cf. People v Gonzalez, 47 NY2d 606).
The party seeking to hold another in contempt of court has the burden of proof (see, Beverina v West, 257 AD2d 957, 975 [3d Dept., 1999], citing Matter of Powers v Powers, 86 NY2d 63, 70). In order to support a finding of civil contempt based upon a violation of a court order, it is necessary to establish that a lawful court order clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect and that the party alleged to have violated that order had actual knowledge of its terms (see, Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583, amended 60 NY2d 652; Matter of Aurelia v Aurelia, 56 AD3d 563 [3rd Dept., 2008];Matter of Gonzalez v Hunter, 50 AD3d 1262 [3rd Dept., 2008]). Contempt should not be granted unless the order violated is clear and explicit and unless the act complained of is clearly proscribed (see Alson v Hudson River Black River Regulating, District, 54 AD3d 457, 457 [3rd Dept., 2008]; Matter of Cloey Y, 51 AD3d 1078, 1079 [3rd Dept., 2008]).