Opinion
April 5, 2004
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On December 18, 2002, the Department of Children and Families, (hereinafter "DCF"), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Ebony Y. and Andre W., the mother and father of Tnajai W., born May 31, 2000. Both parents were duly served with notice of the petition seeking termination of their parental rights through publication in the New Haven Register, a newspaper of general circulation in the New Haven area. Notice was caused to be published to the attention of the mother, Ebony Y., on January 7, 2003, and to the attention of John Doe, father of child born to Ebony Y., on January 7, 2003. Thereafter, on March 27, 2003, mother appeared for the plea hearing and was appointed counsel to contest the petition. A default entered against the respondent father, John Doe, on March 27, 2003, due to his failure to appear.
The identity and whereabouts of the child's father are unknown. Paternity testing was done on two previously named fathers. On 12/20/01, paternity tests excluded Andre W. as the child's biological father and on 02/22/02, paternity tests also excluded James D. as the child's biological father.
Notice of this proceeding was provided in accordance with the Practice Book and this court has jurisdiction. No other action is pending in any other court affecting the custody of Tnajai W. Trial on the contested petition commenced on October 14, 2003, thence to November 12, 2003, and next to December 1, 2003, whereupon the parties again appeared and the trial concluded. Ebony Y. was in attendance throughout the trial proceedings.
At trial, DCF introduced five exhibits; the testimony of Drs. Derick A. Franklin, Psy. D. and Nancy Randall, Psy. D., each was qualified as an expert in psychology; two assigned social workers, Francette Carson and Melissa Giammarco; and Ms. Joddie Weyel, a Teen Parent Outreach Program Facilitator. Ebony Y. called Ms. Fabienne Moore, who purported to be her lessor, as a witness. The Child's attorney called Mrs. Doshia Bowling, Tnajia's foster mother, as a witness. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the petition for termination of parental rights. CT Page 5188-b
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the verified petition, the social study, the psychological evaluations, Specific Steps, dated 02/28/02, all submitted into evidence as full exhibits for DCF, and has heard the testimony of the witnesses. The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial, and a review of the judicially noticed court records, supports the finding of the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
A. Case History
On November 28, 2001, a Petition of Neglect and a Motion for an Order of Temporary Custody were filed by DCF on behalf of Tnajai. An ex parte order of temporary custody was granted on the filing date and was confirmed by agreement on December 7, 2001, after a hearing attended by the respondent mother, Ebony Y. and putative father, Andre W. On the date the court sustained the order of temporary custody in DCF, it also issued preliminary specific steps for mother and paternity tests were ordered for Andre W. Ebony Y. was ordered to return to court on January 24, 2004, for a case status conference.
On January 24, 2002, the results of the court-ordered paternity tests excluded Andre W. as the biological father of Tnajai and the petition was withdrawn as to him. James D. had also been identified by mother as a possible biological father of Tnajai. Subsequently, court-ordered paternity tests also excluded James D. as being Tnajai's biological father. Ebony Y. failed to appear for the court-ordered case status conference on January 24, 2002, and was defaulted. Tnajai was thereupon adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF.
Final specific steps were approved by the court, (Conway J.) on February 28, 2002, when mother appeared and the court denied her motion to vacate the default entered on January 24, 2002. The final specific steps informed Ebony Y. of what would be expected of her in order to have Tnajai returned to her care. Ebony's presenting problems were a lack of parenting skills, lack of appropriate supervision for Tnajai, and a transient living situation. The specific steps issued by the court required Ebony to address her mental health, domestic violence, homelessness and parenting problems.
Ebony was advised and ordered, inter alia, to keep all CT Page 5188-c appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with home visits, whether they were announced or unannounced visits; keep her whereabouts known to DCF, her attorney and the attorney for Tnajai; participate in counseling (both parenting and individual); cooperate with the adult education/parenting program; participate in the New Haven Family Alliance intensive family preservation, domestic violence and anger management programs; make progress toward identified treatment goals; accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF; cooperate with court-ordered testing and evaluations; secure and maintain stable and adequate housing, obtain employment and a legal income; and to visit Tnajai as often as DCF permitted.
Mother signed the final specific steps form, acknowledging ". . . that failure to achieve these specific steps will increase the chance that a petition may be filed to terminate my parental rights permanently so that my child may be placed in adoption. I understand that I should contact my lawyer and/or DCF worker if I need help in reaching any of these steps." John Doe did not come forward to avail himself of services in order to be able to assume a responsible position in the life of Tnajai.
Ebony failed to keep her whereabouts known to DCF, her attorney and the attorney for Tnajai from October 25, 2002, through January 31, 2003. DCF provided and arranged appropriate services for Ebony for reunification. Because Ebony failed to keep scheduled appointments at R' Kidds Family Center for visits with Tnajai, R' Kidds discontinued the supervised visitation. R' Kidds discontinued the parenting skills/support group for Ebony due to her failure to be present at parenting group meetings. She failed to follow though with the individual counseling and anger management therapy arranged for her at the Dixwell/Newhallville Mental Health Center. Case management services were offered to Ebony by DCP through Manos. They were discontinued by Manos because she did not make herself available for the services. Ebony was discharged from the Adult Education program, where she was offered the parent-teen program and educational services, due to a lack of attendance.
On August 27, 2003, DCF filed its motion to maintain the commitment of Tnajai and for the court's approval of its permanency plan for Termination of Parental Rights (TPR)/Adoption. Counsel for the respondent mother timely filed an objection to the motion for maintenance of the commitment and to the permanency plan of TPR/Adoption. The court's rulings on the CT Page 5188-d motion, permanency plan and objections were deferred by agreement of the parties and ordered consolidated with the trial on the petition for termination.
B. Mother, Ebony Y.
Ebony Y. is now 21 years old. She was born to Mr. Billy H. and Annette Y. on November 04, 1982, in New Haven, Ct. She has four siblings, she is the second child born to her mother. Ebony and her siblings were placed in the care of DCF as a result of neglect by her mother. Ebony's mother had an extensive history of substance abuse. Ebony was in the care of DCF from the age of 1 year until she refused at age 16 to continue to accept services from DCF. Her commitment to DCF was allowed to expire as a result of her refusal to accept services.
Ebony has never been married and has given birth to only one child. She did not finish high school. She enrolled in Adult Education but failed to complete the program and was discharged due to lack of attendance. In 1999, she was employed as a cashier for several months. She secured employment at McDonald's in North Haven, Ct., but quit after approximately three weeks. She is currently employed nights as a bartender and exotic dancer.
During the period October 25, 2002, through January 31, 2003, Ebony's whereabouts were unknown to DCF, the child's attorney and her attorney. Ebony has a history of transient living. Since August 2001, she has resided in at least seven different residences, including on Admiral St. with a family friend, White St. with a cousin, Sheldon Terrace with a cousin, again on Admiral St. with a family friend, Lombard St. with a sister and on Coleman St. with a boyfriend. At start of this TPR trial on October 14, 2003, Ebony offered the testimony of Fabeline M. Ms. M. testified that Ebony had entered into a written lease with her, to commence on October 15, 2003, for a term of six months. The rent was $675.00 per month, and that Ebony had paid a $1,000.00 security deposit and one-half month's prepaid rent, to secure an apartment on Bassett St. with another woman. No receipt was given to Ebony for the security deposit and prepaid rent. The written lease was not offered as evidence.
Ebony has a history of leaving Tnajai in the care of inappropriate caretakers. On November 25, 2001, she left 16-month-old Tnajai with a 16-year-old for approximately 12 hours. The 16-year-old was also caring for two other children, CT Page 5188-e ages 4 and 6. Subsequently, Ebony left Tnajai with a 15-year-old overnight. The following day, Ebony left Tnajai with a male acquaintance. This caretaker took Tnajai to the Hill Health Center reporting that Tnajai was ill. The Hill Health Center advised that Tnajai be taken to the Yale New Haven Hospital Primary Care. Upon examination Tnajai was diagnosed with a spiral fracture of the right humerus, a bruise on her forehead, a bruise on her right arm, a bruise on her right leg and a bruise on the inside of her right leg near her groin area. Tnajai was hospitalized for these injuries. Upon her discharge from the hospital, she was placed in DCF's care and custody. DCF placed her into a foster home where she continues to reside.
Ebony Y. was scheduled on two separate occasions (03/03/03 and 04/02/03) to meet with Dr. Nancy Randall for a court-ordered individual psychological evaluation. She arrived 25 minutes late for her interview and chose to leave early, saying that she had a doctor's appointment. A second appointment was scheduled for her to complete her individual evaluation. She did not attend the second appointment. Because she did not participate in a complete clinical interview, Dr. Randall provided no psychological information beyond that provided by Dr. Derek Franklin in his evaluation of mother on July 09, 2002.
Dr. Franklin testified that Ebony obtained clinical elevations for anxiety, depression, obsessive compulsive tendencies, phobias, interpersonal hostility, paranoia, and mild psychoticism. Her "capacity to effectively provide child care to an infant is not one that has been acquired and indeed a rather faulty model exists, i.e., leaving the child with inappropriate care givers, inadequate knowledge of the emotional and physical needs of a small child, and resistance to the immediate needs of the child." Her capacity to provide child care appears to be the result of poor parenting skills. Dr. Franklin was of the opinion that Ebony appears to possess adequate common sense and reasoning, but had poor insight and judgment and did not fully appreciate DCF's involvement.
Dr. Franklin recommended that prior to any discussion of reunification, Ebony "needs to exhibit consistency with regards to her involvement with DCF's community services, which at a minimum should include parenting classes, anger management, and domestic violence education." He also strongly recommended that Ebony engage in individual counseling with a clinician familiar with the impact of childhood trauma in adulthood. Although DCF CT Page 5188-f provided the recommended services, Ebony failed to follow through with the service providers.
Substance abuse evaluations and screens were completed by mother on October 17, 2001, and in September 2002. The results of each was negative and there were no recommendations for treatment. There is no evidence of substance abuse by Ebony.
C. Father, John Doe
Paternity tests concluded that Mr. Andre W. is not the biological father of Tnajai W. Paternity tests for a second putative father James D., concluded that he is not the biological father of Tnajai W. Ebony Y. has not been able to identify another possible father for Tnajai; therefore the court finds that the identity and whereabouts of the father are unknown and that was unavailable for reunification services by DCF.
D. The Child, Tnaja W.
Three-year-old Tnajai W. has been in foster care for more than one-half of her life. She was born on May 31, 2000. She was placed in a DCF-licensed foster home on November 28, 2001. She continues to reside in her original foster home. She has adjusted well to the home and has developed a bond with the foster family. Prior to her foster care placement, and while in the custody of her mother, she suffered from a fracture to her right arm which has healed properly. Tnajai has exhibited some aggressive behaviors with her peers and has engaged in risk taking behaviors such as jumping off of furniture and stairs. She has received services through Birth to Three to work on her speech and fine motor skills. She has made progress and her vocabulary has increased. Overall she is in good health and medically up to date. The foster parents' son and daughter-in-law have expressed an interest in adopting Tnajai and would like to be considered as an adoptive family for her.
Tnajai was seen on March 3, 2003, by Dr. Nancy Randall in a parent/child evaluation with Ebony. A second evaluation was scheduled for Ebony with Dr. Randall for April 02, 2003, but Ebony failed to attend. Dr. Randall's assessment of the relationship between Ebony and Tnajai is contained in her May 4, 2003, Report of Psychological Evaluation, marked at trial as State's Exhibit C. She testified that the parent/child evaluation lasted for one hour. It was held at the DCF office in New Haven. CT Page 5188-g Tnajai was brought into the session by someone from DCF. Tnajai appeared quite uncomfortable coming into the room. When she entered, her mother put her arms out and Tnajai walked over and allowed Ebony to take off her coat. Ebony asked Tnajai for a kiss and Tnajai leaned against Ebony, but did not kiss her. Ebony asked Tnajai for a hug and Tnajai hugged her. Tnajai began looking around the room and picked up a doll which she played with near Ebony. Tnajai was completely expressionless throughout the evaluation session. She was generally compliant when Ebony asked her to do something, but she showed no signs of affect or affection. Tnajai allowed Ebony to read books to her and to briefly hold her in her lap and redo her hair. Tnajai did not speak, except to repeat a series of numbers and letters after Ebony a couple of times.
Tnajai was reported to be passive much of the time, allowing Ebony to tell her what to do. A couple of times during the hour, Tnajai walked to the door and indicated that she wanted to go out. One time, she went into the waiting room and began playing with toys. Ebony had to coax Tnajai back into the evaluation room. Another time, they both went out to go to the rest room. After about forty minutes, Ebony starting telling Tnajai that she, (Ebony) had to leave. Tnajai gave no response. Ebony asked Tnajai, "Do you love me?" and again received no response. Ebony said to Tnajai, "show mommy some love." Tnajai ignored this and Ebony repeated the statement about six to eight more times before Tnajai finally gave her a hug. Ebony then asked if Tnajai misses her and received no response. Ebony said "say yes" several times and Tnajai finally said "yes." When the DCF supervisor arrived to take Tnajai, Ebony asked for a kiss, but Tnajai ignored this request and took the supervisor's hand to walk out the door. Tnajai did not show any signs of difficulty at separating from Ebony.
Dr. Randall noted that Ebony does not appear to be a psychological parent to Tnajai. Tnajai did not demonstrate a significant relationship with Ebony. Tnajai was notably passive and did not show signs of attachment with Ebony. There does not appear to be a strong relationship.
II ADJUDICATION
As to the adjudicatory phase of this proceedings, each statutory basis set out in General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(3) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., CT Page 5188-h 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1 (1982). The petitioner is required to prove one or more of the grounds alleged as to each parent in its petition by clear and convincing evidence. The petition alleges abandonment as grounds for termination of the parental rights of Ebony Y. and John Doe. It also alleges the additional ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship as to John Doe.
General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(3), in pertinent part, provides for termination if "(A) The child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;" and "(B)(i) the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;" and "(D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child."
Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that any one of the grounds pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied 221 Conn. 901 (1992). If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both issues is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979). In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, cert. denied 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Tabitha P., CT Page 5188-i 39 Conn.App. 353, 360, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).
The court has considered the evidence related to the circumstances and events prior to December 18, 2002, the date upon the TPR petition against Ebony Y. was filed, insofar as the allegations pertaining to abandonment and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship are concerned. With regard to the allegation of failure to achieve rehabilitation against Ebony and John Doe, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances through the conclusion of the trial, for purpose of assessing the degree of rehabilitation, if any, that Ebony Y. and John Doe have achieved. Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist.
"It is axiomatic that the court can rely on factors occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering if additional time would promote rehabilitation. In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989);" In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776, 785, 746 A.2d 222 (2000). Compare Practice Book Section 35a-7.
A. Reasonable Efforts Finding
Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, DCF must initially show by clear and convincing evidence that it "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, in order to terminate parental rights, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 17a-112(j)(1). "Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate both parents and to reunify Tnajai with them in a timely manner. Reasonable efforts to reunify Tnajai with the father were not possible because the identity of the father was and remains unknown. As a result, DCF was unable to offer father services that might have helped him reunite with Tnajai. Ebony Y. was issued preliminary specific steps on December 7, 2001, and signed the form on December 7, 2001. It set forth what was expected of her in order to regain custody of Tnajai. The final specific steps were signed by Ebony Y., and accepted and approved by the court on February 28, 2002, five weeks after Tnajai's commitment.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Tnaja with Ebony Y., and that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts. Although Ebony's whereabouts weren't always known to CT Page 5188-j DCF, it is clear that she was advised of the steps she needed to take in order to reunify. The efforts extended to Ebony are clearly set forth in parts I., II.B. and II.C., as well as in the State's Exhibit C, which the court has relied on, in part, as the basis for this determination. DCF's efforts to reunite Ebony with Tanaji were hindered only by Ebony's lack of cooperation, transient housing and failure to keep DCF consistently advised of her whereabouts. Ebony's. lack of compliance with the specific steps is fully discussed on pages two through thirteen of this decision.
B. Abandonment — C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
This ground, alleged as to both Ebony Y. and John Doe, is established when the child has been abandoned by the parents in the sense that the parents have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of "interest, concern or responsibility." In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). However, negating allegations of abandonment "does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of the child." In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).
"The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted. In re Kezia M., supra, 33 Conn.App. 17-18; In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).
Tnajai has been in foster care continuously since November 28, 2001. Prior to July 2002, Ebony visited with her on an inconsistent basis. From July 2002, through October 25, 2002, she visited with Tnajai only nine out of sixteen opportunities. In July 2002, she missed three visits. Two were no shows and one was cancelled by Ebony. In August 2002, five visits were scheduled. Ebony attended four and one was cancelled by R' Kidds staff. In September visits were scheduled and attended. In October 2002, CT Page 5188-k visits were scheduled but none were attended by Ebony. From October 25, 2002, through on or about January 31, 2003, Ebony's whereabouts were unknown and she did not visit Tnajai. On or about January 31, 2003, Ebony reappeared. DCF attempted to resume supervised visits with Tnajai. However, all visitation was ceased in March 2003, because Ebony did not attended any of the scheduled visits with Tnajai.
Neither Ebony or John Doe maintained regular contact with DCF to find out how Tnajai was doing or to ask how they could contact her, or contributed financially to her support. Neither sent any card or made phone calls to Tnajai or the foster mother to inquire about her. Ebony did appear unannounced at the home of the foster mother on two occasions with a gift for Tnajai, after Christmas in December 2002, and around time of Tnajai's birthday in May 2004. However Ebony and John Doe have fallen far short of the above standards for exhibiting interest, concern or responsibility. It would be an exaggeration to refer to Ebony's level of interest as more than "sporadic." Tnajai is a child who requires more than the "commonly" understood obligations of parenthood; her care will entail more than "minimum attributes."
Statutory abandonment on the part of the parents has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. They have not manifested a consistent, prolonged and reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Tnajai's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 37-38, 534 A.2d 897 (1987); In re Shavoughn K., 13 Conn.App. 91, 97, 534 A.2d 1243 (1987), cert. denied 207 Conn. 805, 540 A.2d 374 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 215 Conn. 31, 504 A.2d 203 (1990); In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 121-23, 614 A.2d 832 (1992).
C. Failure to Rehabilitate — C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
This is the second ground for termination alleged against both Ebony and John Doe. If the parents of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding fail to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, this ground for termination exists.
The evidence is clear and convincing that Tnajai was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on January 24, 2002. CT Page 5188-l
Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of the parent to a constructive and useful role as a parent. In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 532 (1986). In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, (2000) cert. denied 255 Conn. 934, (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2001).
Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Also, in determining whether further allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).
The evidence in this case is clear and convincing that Ebony Y. and John Doe, as of the date of the filing of the termination petition on December 18, 2000, had not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation, and there is no evidence of conduct prior or subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition which would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of their daughter, either could assume a responsible position in her life.
A parent's compliance with specific steps or service agreements set after the adjudication of the neglect or uncared for petition are a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding. General Statutes §§ 46b-129(j) and 17a-112(j)(3)(B); In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 170, 743 A.2d 165 (1999); In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 445-50, (2000); In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 241. The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parenting than the parent was at the time of the commitment. In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 126.
The evidence is clear and convincing that neither Ebony or John Doe has achieved a status where either is more able to parent Tnajai than they were at the time of Tnajai's initial commitment. There is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation into the CT Page 5188-m role of a constructive parent could be achieved by either parent within a reasonable period of time. Neither Ebony or John Doe has maintained a significant relationship with Tnajai. Both have failed to complete or fully avail themselves of the required reunification services. Both have been unwilling or unable to step into a responsible parental role for a child.
Further delay in this case in an attempt to begin rehabilitating Ebony, would be injurious to Tnajai. After more than two years of foster care, she is securely attached to her foster parents. The foster parent's son and daughter in-law are willing to provide her with a permanent, stable and loving home, a home that will insure Tnajai is allowed to develop to her full potential. It would be unfair to prolong her uncertain status based on what would be nothing more than an unfounded hope that Ebony or John Doe may one day make themselves available and cooperate with reunification services.
The ground of failure to rehabilitate, alleged as to both Ebony and John Doe, has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Both parents, as of the time of trial, remain unable to adequately parent Tnajai and they lack both the interest and ability to assume a responsible position in her life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. In this case, they have made no progress since the inception of the neglect petition in November 2001.
B. No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). CT Page 6782
This is the last ground alleged and DCF claims it only as to John Doe. The identity and whereabouts of the father are unknown. DCF made reasonable efforts to identify and locate the father, as has been previously stated herein. Tnajai has no present memories or positive feelings for John Doe, natural parent. Since November 28, 2001, when Tnajai was placed in the care and custody of DCF, John Doe has not visited with Tnajai, sent her any cards, gifts or made any phone calls to her. He has not contacted DCF to find out how she is doing or how he could contact her.
The statute defines a parent-child relationship as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child. It would seem from the plain meaning of the statutory language of this CT Page 5188-n ground that the respondent father, John Doe, clearly has not met the day-to-day parenting capability that the statute appears to require.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no parent-child relationship exists, and second that it would be detrimental to Tnajai's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to be established and developed. DCF has proven the third ground alleged as to John Doe for the termination of his parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.
III DISPOSITION A. Section 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that two of the statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of parental rights have been proven as to Ebony and all three of the statutory grounds as to John Doe.
Before making a decision whether or not to terminate Ebony and John Doe's parental rights, the court must also consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in Sec. 17a-112(k). In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
(1) "The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent."
DCF offered timely and appropriate services, to the extent possible, to facilitate reunification. The nature and extent of DCF efforts to engage both parents have been more fully discussed at pages two through thirteen of this decision. DCF's efforts were thwarted thoroughly by Ebony's lack of interest and cooperation and by John Doe's unavailability.
(2) "Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended." CT Page 5188-o
As noted previously, DCF made reasonable efforts, to the extent possible, to reunite Tnajai with her parents.
(3) "The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations."
Specific steps were entered into and approved by the court for Ebony on February 28, 2002, approximately one month after the adjudication and commitment of Tnajai to DCF. In addition, the court issued preliminary specific steps to Ebony on December 7, 2001. As more fully discussed on pages two through twelve of this decision, Ebony failed to comply with the specific steps. John Doe did not come forward to avail himself of services in order to be able to assume a responsible position in the life of Tnajai.
(4) "The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties." The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. § 670 et. seq., as amended, mandates that after 12 months in foster care a child must have a plan for a permanent home. In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 479, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998).
Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child. Tnajai is securely attached to the B. foster family, where she has been placed for more than two years. Tnajai has no parent-child relationship with Ebony and John Doe.
(5) "The age of the child."
Tnajai, born on May 31, 2000, is nearly four.
(6) "The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child." CT Page 5188-p
Ebony and John Doe have made little effort to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Tnajai to return to either parent's care in the foreseeable future. At times, Ebony failed to keep DCF or her own attorney notified as to residences or whereabouts. They both have failed to maintain regular contact with Tnajai, DCF or the foster home. They have not contributed regularly any gifts or money toward their daughter's support. They did not send her any cards or letters. In rendering this decision on the grounds alleged for termination, this court found that the derelict conduct of the parents constituted statutory abandonment of Tnajai.
(7) "The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."
There is no evidence that indicates that DCF or any other person interfered with the parents' abilities to maintain a relationship with Tnajai by unreasonable acts or conduct. Indeed, it was their insufficient level of interest in visiting with Tnajai that interfered with establishing a meaningful relationship with their daughter. There is no evidence that economic circumstances have constituted a significant factor in their failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Ebony was offered weekly visits and services by DCF at little or no cost to her, but was not cooperative.
B. Best Interests of the Child
The court must now address the issue of whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. This is the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. In re Valerie D., supra, 223 Conn. 511.
In this case, DCF properly sought the approval of a permanency plan for Tnajai after the parents had been given a period of twelve months to rehabilitate. DCF made reasonable and timely efforts to effectuate that permanency plan and the trial on the petition took place when Tnajai was three years of age. Tnajai, unlike so many children, should not have to suffer the effect of uncertainty or lack of permanency. She is old enough to be fully cognizant of her attachment to her foster parents such that CT Page 5188-q removal from their home would cause her considerable emotional harm as a result of the loss of that bond. Fortunately, a loving, permanent home for Tnajai is already secured. Tnajai's best interest will be served by expediting the process of legalizing her status in a family that can provide her with the love and care she requires. There is no point in giving either parent any more time to reconsider their lack of commitment to Tnajai.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered all the exhibits and testimony, the court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interests of Tnajai are served by the termination of her mother and father's parental rights so she may be free for adoption. The court notes that counsel for the child fully supports this result as in the best interests of the child.
IV CONCLUSION
The petition is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Ebony Y. and John Doe in Tnajai W. The objections to the permanency plan and for maintenance of the commitment, filed by Ebony Y. are overruled. Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(o), it is further ordered that the Commissioner of DCF is appointed statutory parent for Tnajai so she can be placed for adoption. In securing an adoption, the court urges DCF to give first consideration to the B. family. The Commissioner of DCF, shall file with the court no later than thirty (30) days following this judgment, a written report of its efforts to effect a permanent placement for Tnajai. Additional reports on the status of an adoption shall be filed as required by federal and state law until such time as an adoption is finalized. DCF must also notify the court immediately in writing, if an adoption is finalized.
These 9:00 A.M. filing deadlines will appear on the calendar as docket matters.
Turner, J. Judge of the Superior Court
CT Page 5188-r