Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Super. Ct. No. 02J0022. George L. Orndoff, Judge.
Linda J. Conrad, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Peter D. Moock, County Counsel, and Bryan Walters, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Harris, A.P.J., Levy, J., and Dawson, J.
OPINION
Julie M. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her pre-school aged son and daughter. Appellant contends the court erred by rejecting her argument that termination would be detrimental to the children based on their parent/child relationship (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). On review, we will affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant’s lengthy history of drug abuse has twice necessitated juvenile court intervention. In January 2002, she and her newborn son T. tested positive for methamphetamine. The Kings County Superior Court in turn removed T. from appellant’s custody for approximately six months during which appellant successfully completed inpatient drug treatment. The court thereafter returned the infant to appellant’s care and in February 2003 terminated its dependency jurisdiction.
Appellant’s arrest on drug-related charges in April 2005 led to the current dependency proceedings. Respondent Kings County Human Services Agency (the agency) took then three-year-old T. and his 19-month-old half sister S. into protective custody and filed a new dependency petition on their behalf. The following month the agency placed the children with S.’s paternal aunt. In June 2005, the Kings County Superior Court adjudged both children dependents and removed them from appellant’s custody. The court also ordered reunification services for appellant.
Despite 12 months of services, appellant was unable to reunify with either of her children. Although she made progress, drugs remained an impediment for her. In November 2005, she was arrested for and pled guilty to narcotic possession. During the first half of 2006, she usually tested negative for drugs. However, drug treatment professionals expressed concern that appellant made only minimal progress and was still using. In addition, appellant only attended four AA/NA meetings during her 12 months of reunification, despite reminders by her case worker. On the other hand, appellant maintained regular, supervised visitation with her children. They met weekly for one hour until the last three or so months of services. At that point, the agency lengthened the weekly visits to two hours.
Consequently, the agency recommended the court terminate appellant’s reunification services and consider a permanent plan of adoption for T. and S. with the paternal aunt. The agency’s concern was that petitioner was going through the motions of completing her case plan, but not making the necessary changes in her life and utilizing the support offered to avoid a relapse.
At a July 2006 hearing, appellant challenged the agency’s recommendation. Relevant to her argument in this appeal, appellant cross-examined a social worker who acknowledged appellant had a close relationship with the children. The social worker also testified appellant displayed “exceptional[]” parenting skills during visits. The court nevertheless terminated services, having found the agency provided appellant with reasonable services and she failed to regularly participate and make substantive progress in her case plan. Accordingly, the court set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for the children.
The court eventually conducted the section 366.26 hearing in January 2007. In the interim, Ana Pedrali, an adoption specialist with the California Department of Social Services (CDSS), prepared and filed a “366.26 WIC Report” recommending that the court find the children adoptable and terminate parental rights. Each child was in good physical, mental and emotional health and was developmentally on track. Both of them enjoyed a positive and close relationship with the paternal aunt, having lived with her since May 2005. They called her “Mommy” and looked to her for affection and comfort.
The aunt wished to adopt both children. In the beginning, it took T. time to adjust to the structure and stability of her home. He had “abandonment issues with regard to living on and off with [appellant] and he had a problem with hoarding food.” However, his behavior vastly improved and he “thrived” in the aunt’s care. S. already had a positive and close relationship with her aunt. From the time she was nine months old, the toddler had weekend visits with her aunt.
Pedrali also summarized information she received from the aunt and the agency regarding appellant’s visits with the children. The adoption specialist had not observed any of those visits.
“According to the prospective adoptive parent and [agency] contact narratives, the birth mother visited the children on a weekly basis (one hour a week). During the last three to four months of family reunification services, the visits were increased to two hours a week. The interaction was appropriate between the children and the birth mother. Presently, the prospective adoptive parent indicated that the children are fine when they visit with their mother and do not become emotionally upset when the children are dropped off at the end of visits. During the last few months, the paternal aunt indicated that the children do not ask for their mother or talk about her. She did indicate that once in awhile [T.] has made pictures and other arts and crafts items for his mother in day care.
“The CDSS characterizes the birth mother’s relationship with her children to be a weak one. Though the birth mother visited on a weekly basis with her children, she failed to take the necessary steps to get her children back. The birth mother showed attention and affection towards the children at the visits but did not make it a priority to reunify with her children as she did not regularly drug test and attend NA/AA meetings as required in her court-ordered case plan. The children are not having a difficult time living in a separate home from their birth mother and are happy and quite attached to their prospective adoptive parent. The CDSS believes the relationship between the birth mother and the children are not substantial to preclude the termination of parental rights. Subsequently, it would not be emotionally detrimental for [T.] and [S.] to sever the relationship they have with their birth mother. The stability and sense of belonging the prospective adoptive parent is providing [T.] and [S.] far outweighs the benefit they may receive from maintaining a weak parent-child relationship they hold with their birth mother.”
According to Pedrali, the aunt did not believe continued visits would be emotionally beneficial for the children. Pedrali also noted the children were too young to verbalize their feelings about the adoption.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the agency submitted its case on Pedrali’s report. Appellant’s trial counsel cross-examined Pedrali regarding her opinion that there was a weak relationship between the children and their mother. Notably, the adoption specialist explained she cited appellant’s lack of compliance with services in connection with CDSS’s opinion that appellant’s relationship with her with her children was weak. Pedrali denied there would necessarily be a weak parent-child relationship in every case where reunification failed. She added every case was different. In this case, she cited the following reasons for her belief that there was not a substantial relationship between the children and appellant: the children’s behavior before and after visits; in the last several months, the children did not talk about appellant; they “don’t cry wanting her there”; they had adjusted; they had been in the same home for approximately two years; they had come to know the aunt as their mother; and they referred to her as “mommy.”
Pedrali also testified she had an opportunity to meet with the children and the aunt whom the adoption specialist identified as the prospective adoptive parent. Pedrali characterized their relationship as a healthy and positive parent/child relationship. She observed the children seek out the prospective adoptive parent to be held, to ask for things, to meet their needs, and to seek her attention. During Pedrali’s visit, T. told her he was happy living with “his mommy” (the aunt) and his sister. He thought of the aunt’s home as his. He also told Pedrali that once in a while he would like to visit with appellant.
In addition, appellant testified at the hearing. She described her life with the children before their dependency. In her view, she had provided for all their needs with day-to-day care. She stated T. had been in her care for approximately three and a half years and S. had been with her for between 14 and 17 months. Since then, the children and she shared regular weekly visits which started with the children running to greet her and giving her a hug. “At first” it was “hard” at the end of each visit. The children would cry and scream. As time passed, “they just got used to it.”
According to appellant, until the court reduced visits to once a month, the children told her they loved her when she would express affection for them. Also, “for a while” T. told appellant he wanted to come home.
Since the reduction in visits, appellant testified, T. appeared to ignore her and want to sit far away from her. Appellant thought T. seemed mad at her. S., on the other hand, did not behave differently toward appellant. Still, both children called her “mom” and brought her crafts they made at school. At the end of more recent visits, the children waved and kissed goodbye. They did not become upset.
In appellant’s opinion, she still had a close bond with the children “but it’s not like it was.” If the court terminated her rights, appellant believed T. would “have a lot of anger.” She also testified termination would be detrimental to both children because they considered her their mother.
Following argument, the court found the children adoptable and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the court erred when it declined to find termination would be detrimental to the children’s best interests. She claims she was entitled to such a finding because she maintained regular visitation with her children and they would benefit from continuing the relationship (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)).
Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the children for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If, as in this case, the children are likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides compelling reason for finding termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Although section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) acknowledges that termination may be detrimental under specifically designated circumstances, a finding of no detriment is not a prerequisite to the termination of parental rights. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347.) Instead, it is the parent’s burden to establish termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.) Thus, when a juvenile court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) On review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion.
It is undisputed appellant maintained regular visitation with her children throughout their dependency and they shared a parent/child relationship. However, appellant failed to establish that their relationship was so strong that the children would suffer detriment from its termination. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) The loss of a child’s frequent and loving contact with a parent is insufficient to show detriment. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418.)
At most, there was appellant’s speculation that T. would “have a lot of anger” if the court terminated her rights. She also testified he seemed angry at her during recent visits because he appeared to distance himself from her. On appeal, she recharacterizes her testimony as evidence that T. was showing signs of psychological distress and anger when the court reduced visits and thus proof that termination would be detrimental.
Not only does the appellate record fail to support this argument, it also reveals conflicting evidence on the point. According to the adoption specialist, both children’s emotional status was “very good.” T. in particular was thriving in the prospective adoptive parent’s care. Visits were no longer traumatic events for either child. Even appellant admitted the children were no longer upset at the end of visits and appeared adjusted. In appellant’s words “they just got used to it.” There were also T.’s statements that although he would like to see appellant once in a while, he was happy living with his “Mommy” (the prospective adoptive parent) and his sister.
“[T]he exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), requires that the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) A juvenile court must therefore: ‘balance[] the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.’ (Id. at p. 575.)” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342.)
Here, no such evidence was introduced to compel the court to find detriment. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting appellant’s argument..
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.