Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County, No. RIJ112565, Gary Vincent, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.J.
Kate M. Chandler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.L.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Sophia H. Choi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
OPINION
RICHLI, Acting P.J.
R.L. (Father) and C.J. (Mother) appeal the termination of their parental rights to T.L. at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.
Although the dependency involves T.L. and his two siblings, this appeal is from the termination of parental rights only as to T.L., as will be discussed in more detail, post. Counsel for T.L. has filed a brief agreeing with the termination of parental rights.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Father and Mother now claim as follows:
1. Both Mother and Father contend that the juvenile court erred by finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply and by terminating parental rights.
2. Mother claims that the juvenile court erred by refusing to find that the sibling exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) applied and terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Father joined in Mother’s arguments that benefitted him, but since the siblings were not his children, he does not appear to have standing in this argument. Moreover, Father did not join in the objection in the lower court and does not claim in his reply brief that he is arguing that this exception applied to him.
We find no error. Hence, we will affirm the termination of parental rights.
I
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2009, we incorporated the record in case No. E045467, the prior case involving writ petitions filed by both Father and Mother pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a) on behalf of all three of the children. The facts are derived from our unpublished opinion in that case unless otherwise indicated.
A. Detention
On July 19, 2006, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) received an immediate-response referral for 10-year-old S.J., 5-year-old K.J., and 4-month-old T.L. The Department was informed that Mother had placed multiple topless advertisements on a website. On July 19, 2006, Mother offered an undercover police officer sex in exchange for money and gave the officer directions to her house. Police arrested Mother for prostitution at her house while the three children were present.
Father and Mother reported that Mother was a model, and modeling agencies sent photographers to their home. The house in which Mother, Father, and the three children lived smelled of cat feces; dirty sheets and clothes “were all over the floor” and there were many used condoms in the trashcan. The three children were taken into protective custody due to Mother’s arrest for prostitution in the house and Father’s failing to protect the children.
On July 20, 2006, an employee of the Department interviewed S.J. S.J. reported that photographers came to the house every day to take photographs of Mother in the master bedroom while the door was closed and Father watched television in the living room. Mother breastfed T.L. once during the day, and the rest of the day T.L. drank fruit juice or cow’s milk. S.J. often fed T.L. and K.J.
Mother’s firstborn son, K.H., was with maternal grandmother because he was removed from Mother’s care in April 1999. The whereabouts of the father of S.J. and K.H. were unknown. Mother said K.J. was conceived during a rape, and she did not know the assailant. The juvenile court found Father to be the presumed father of T.L.
On July 24, 2006, in regard to all three children, the court found (1) there was a substantial risk that the children would suffer serious physical harm or illness if placed in Mother’s or Father’s care (§ 300, subd. (b)); and (2) the children had been left without any provision for support (§ 300, subd. (g)). The court ordered that the children continue to be removed from Mother’s and Father’s custody and that the Department provide the family with reunification services.
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition
On August 16, 2006, both K.J. and S.J. reported that they had seen men enter into Mother’s bedroom and she would then lock the door. They also both reported that Father was frequently not home and that they had witnessed Father hit Mother. K.J. reported that Father was often upset with her and called her a “bitch”; Mother did not intervene. Both Mother and Father had spanked her buttocks with a belt or their hands. K.J. stated that, during a bath, Father rubbed her vaginal area. K.J. told Mother, and Mother hit Father and told him to stop.
Father often yelled at S.J. and had hit the side of her abdomen and legs, leaving bruises. Mother did nothing to stop the abuse. S.J. said Father had used a screwdriver to unlock the bathroom door and enter the bathroom while S.J. was bathing. When she told him to leave, he told her to “shut up.” S.J. reported the bathroom incidents to Mother, but Mother did nothing.
According to a report filed by the Department on October 31, 2006, therapists had assessed S.J. and K.J. and expressed concerns that the children had been neglected and possibly sexually abused. K.J. was reported to have smeared her feces on the walls of her foster home. S.J. was testing “as if she is ‘retarded,’” but she was not. Mother and Father continued to deny Mother was a prostitute.
On September 9, 2006, Mother told the children during a visit that they were going to be “adopted by another family.” In response, the Department changed the visitation appointments so that they would be supervised at the Department’s offices.
On November 13, 2006, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing in the matter. As to S.J. and K.J., the court found (1) there was a substantial risk that the children will suffer serious physical harm or illness if placed in Mother’s care (§ 300, subd. (b)), and (2) the children had been left without any provision for support (id., subd. (g)). In regard to T.L., the court found there was a substantial risk that he would suffer serious physical harm or illness if placed in Mother’s or Father’s care (id., subd. (b)). The court declared the siblings to be a sibling set, and they were placed together.
C. Six- and 12-Month Review Reports
In the Department’s six-month status report, it recommended that services regarding all three children be terminated. On January 12, 2007, Mother pled guilty to charges of prostitution. Mother was placed on house arrest and granted three years’ probation. Mother’s psychological evaluation revealed that she suffered from a personality disorder. S.J’s and K.J.’s therapists recommended that they not be returned to Mother’s custody. S.J. refused to have contact with Father. Mother tried to force S.J. and K.J. to see Father and offered them money to do so. Both S.J. and K.J. were prescribed Prozac for depression and Benadryl to help them sleep.
T.L. was reported to be a happy baby, bonded to his siblings and well adjusted to his foster home. Mother and Father were participating in their case plan. Father was employed.
On April 23, 2007, at the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found that returning the three children to Mother’s and Father’s care would place the children at substantial risk of detriment to their physical or emotional well-being. The court found Mother’s and Father’s participation in their case plans had been “adequate but incomplete.” The court ordered the Department to continue providing services for them.
In the 12-month review report, the Department recommended that Mother and Father receive an additional six months of services. The report reflected that Mother, Father, K.J., and T.L. were “moving towards stability.” The only problem remained with S.J. On August 29, 2007, the children’s foster parent informed the Department that she could no longer manage all three children. S.J. was placed in a group home in San Diego County due to her unstable behavior, including threatening K.J.
K.J. and T.L. were placed together in a foster home; however, the foster parents requested K.J. be removed from their home due to her disturbing behavior. K.J. hit T.L. in the mouth, causing him to bleed, and on a separate occasion hit his stomach. K.J. urinated and defecated on herself and on one occasion went into a catatonic state where she did not respond to the foster parents’ voices. Additionally, K.J. was reportedly having conversations with two other personalities. On November 28, 2007, K.J. was moved to a different foster home. T.L. was doing well in the foster home and had bonded with his foster parents.
In the Department’s December 2007 addendum report, it recommended that services be terminated. During an unsupervised visit, Mother and Father took K.J. and T.L. to Mother’s and Father’s house, which was not authorized. Unsupervised visits were terminated, and meetings were moved back to the Department’s offices. Visitation between Mother and S.J. had been terminated.
On March 7, 2008, S.J. told a Department employee that she did not want to live with Mother because she had to take care of K.J. and T.L. “all the time.” S.J. also disclosed that Mother had offered to let men who came to the house pay to spend time with S.J.
D. Contested 12-Month Review Hearing
On March 25, 2008, the court held the contested 12-month review hearing in the matter. At the hearing, the Department social worker testified that Mother and Father had completed their service programs and classes, but neither parent appeared to have benefitted from the services. The social worker opined that Mother was not bonded to any of her children, based upon her conduct during visitation over the past year. The social worker testified that Father was nurturing and caring toward K.J. and T.L. When the social worker was asked if she would consider placing K.J. and T.L. in Father’s care if the court ordered Mother and Father to stay away from one another, the social worker said she would consider placing T.L. with Father, but not K.J. The social worker expressed concern with Father’s ability to follow a court’s order to stay away from Mother, since Father had violated the Department’s instructions to not take the children to Mother’s and Father’s house during visits.
Father testified that he participated in parenting classes, anger management classes, and counseling. He described the various things he learned from the classes and counseling. He testified that if K.J. and T.L. were placed in his care, he would attend more counseling sessions. He also said that he would abide by any court order requiring Mother to stay away from the family residence; however, he believed Mother was a good parent.
The court found that returning the children to Mother and Father would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children. It concluded that the Department offered reasonable services to Mother and Father; however, the parents’ progress in alleviating or mitigating the problems that caused removal of the children had been unsatisfactory. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother’s and Father’s services. The court scheduled a section 366.26 hearing to consider terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights for July 23, 2008.
E. California Rules of Court, Rule 8.452 Petitions
Both Mother and Father filed petitions for extraordinary writs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services as to T.L. and the setting of the section 366.26 hearing. Father’s petition raised issues that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that it would place T.L. at a substantial risk of detriment to return him to Father’s custody, and the court did not state a factual basis for its finding that T.L. faced a substantial risk of detriment if placed in Father’s custody. Mother’s petition, which applied to all three children, raised as to T.L. that the Department erred by not placing him in Father’s custody, that the court’s finding that she was offered reasonable reunification services was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the court erred by not stating a factual basis for its finding that reunification services should be terminated. We denied the writ petitions, as will be discussed in more detail, post.
F. Reports for Section 366.26 Hearing
In a report filed July 8, 2008, the Department recommended that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights be terminated as to T.L. and that he be freed for adoption. The Department was seeking a continuance as to S.J. and K.J., as no suitable adoptive home had been found. All three children were in separate placements.
S.J.’s biological father had been located. The report detailed that S.J. had disclosed that Mother had men pay for sex with S.J. on numerous occasions. S.J. had regular visitation with K.J. and T.L. The plan for S.J. was a permanent living arrangement with her father. K.J. was adjusting well in her foster home.
T.L. was reported to be a “very happy baby” and had a bond with “his siblings and caregivers.” Visitation between K.J. and T.L. and Mother and Father occurred weekly. Both parents were consistent and appropriate during visitation. They seemed more focused on spending quality time with their children. When the visitations occurred at local eateries, however, the social worker had to remind the parents to supervise the children.
T.L. was bonded with the adoptive parents. The Department noted that T.L. was more bonded with his adoptive parents than with Mother and Father. The adoptive parents requested that visitation between Mother and Father and T.L. be terminated, and they refused to supervise visits. They reported that after parental visits, T.L. had temper tantrums, cried, and displayed an “unwillingness to follow adult directives.”
An addendum report was filed on November 17, 2008. S.J. was continuing contact with her father, and K.J. remained in a foster home. T.L. was continuing to thrive in the adoptive parent’s home. There were some problems during visitation (as will be discussed in more detail, post), and it was stated by one social worker that visitation was not beneficial to the children. On January 8, 2009, an addendum report was filed to update on all three children. The Department again recommended that the parental rights be terminated as to T.L. and that he be freed for adoption. An adoptive family had been found for K.J. T.L. had a “secure attachment” with the prospective adoptive parents.
On February 17, 2009, Father filed a section 388 petition. He asked for reunification services or, in the alternative, that T.L. be returned to his custody. Father also indicated that Mother would be willing to vacate the home to facilitate T.L. being returned to Father. Father also asked that family therapy be ordered. Mother was not filing a petition and agreed to move out. The juvenile court denied the section 388 petition on February 25, 2009, finding that Father had never acknowledged the horrendous acts committed on the children.
G. Section 366.26 Hearing
The contested section 366.26 hearing was conducted on March 3, 2009. The Department submitted on their reports. Mother and Father both testified. The juvenile court found that none of exceptions in section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) through (F) applied. It terminated parental rights, freeing T.L. for adoption.
II
BENEFICIAL PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
Father and Mother both contend that the juvenile court erred by finding the beneficial parental relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply here.
A. Additional Factual Background
At the contested section 366.26 hearing, T.L.’s social worker testified. The three children were placed together for the first year but had to be separated. K.J. was biting and fighting with S.J. T.L. seemed to be following their behavior. S.J. had to be put in a group home because of her behavior.
Mother was consistent in visitation with T.L. A majority of the visits were supervised because Mother and Father had not followed the rules during an unsupervised visit. The social worker reported that Mother was inconsistent in attentiveness at the visits, but Father was generally attentive.
The social worker did not see Mother exhibit nurturing qualities toward T.L. during visitation. Father took care of his needs. T.L. was more attentive and bonded to Father. The social worker had never seen the current caretakers of T.L. interfere with visitation. Father had not missed any visitation and stayed the entire time. T.L. seemed happy to see Father during visitation.
Mother testified. She was currently living in the same home with Father. She claimed that T.L. called her “mommy” and wanted to be with her. She and T.L. were bonded. She insisted that T.L.’s adoptive parents had interrupted two of the visitations. T.L. would not want to end visits with her. She indicated Father was also attentive.
Father testified that he was attentive during all visitation. T.L. would reach for Father and recognized him. T.L. would cry at the end of the visits. T.L. and K.J. would be sad when the visits ended. Father believed there was a bond between him and T.L. There had been no visitation since December 2008. Father felt Mother was attentive during visits.
Father argued that the beneficial relationship exception applied since he had maintained consistent visitation and had a strong bond with T.L. Mother claimed there was evidence supporting that she was attentive during visitation and joined in Father’s argument that the beneficial parental relationship exception should apply.
The juvenile court first noted that, had there not been continuances of the section 366.26 hearing, the issue would have been resolved in December 2008, so any visitation past that point was “gratis.” The juvenile court stated, “This spurious presentation of problems with placement and problems with visitation is not in front of me today.” The juvenile court also looked back at the reason for the detention and stated that it was one of the “most shocking, horrendous petitions” it had seen. The juvenile court noted that the focus in the hearing was what was best for T.L. Any argument that visitation was inadequate was not before the court.
The juvenile court found that Mother and Father had maintained regular, consistent contact with T.L. However, even though visitation was going well, it did not establish a parental relationship strong enough to outweigh T.L.’s current living situation. Further, there were reports that visits between T.L. and Mother and Father were causing emotional harm to T.L. T.L. had been in the safe and stable environment of the prospective adoptive parents since October 2007. The juvenile court concluded, “The child’s in a stable relationship now. The parents have to show me I should up[root] that or put a hold on that because they are so significant in this child’s life. They failed to do so. To that end, the parents have failed to meet their burden.”
B. Analysis
“[B]y the time dependency proceedings have reached the stage of a section 366.26 hearing, there have been multiple specific findings of parental unfitness.” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 253.) At the section 366.26 hearing, the sole issue “‘is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is adoptable.’ [Citations.]” (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 733; see § 366.26, subd. (c).)
As our state Supreme Court has explained, “[i]t is not the purpose of the section 366.26 hearing to show parental inadequacy, which had to have been previously established, and there is no burden on the petitioning agency to show at the section 366.26 hearing that the parents are ‘at fault.’” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 254.) “By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, no state interest requires further evidence of the consequences to the child of parental unfitness....” (Id. at p. 256.) Nor does the failure to require such a finding at the section 366.26 hearing violate a parent’s right to due process. (In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 819; In re Brittany M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1403.)
Here, in denying Father’s and Mother’s writ petitions filed pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, we found that the juvenile court’s determination of unfitness was proper. We held, “The [juvenile] court could reasonably infer from the foregoing evidence that Father would not obey a court order to stay away from Mother. The evidence supports a finding that Mother posed a substantial risk to her children, because Mother was detached from her three children; Mother’s two daughters were emotionally disturbed; and Mother continued to deny that she worked as a prostitute, despite pleading guilty to prostitution. Accordingly, placing T.L. in Father’s care would place T.L. at substantial risk of detriment. In sum, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding.” (Richard L., et al. v. Superior Court (June 11, 2008, E045467) [nonpub.opn.].) We also found that Mother’s failure to address the issues that led to the removal of all of her children and the failure to benefit from court-ordered services justified the denial of additional reunification services. (Id. at p. 20.)
We have already concluded that Father and Mother are unable to care for T.L. and that the juvenile court properly terminated reunification services. It is well settled that when reunification efforts have failed, adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at a full emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) In general, at a section 366.26 hearing, if the juvenile court finds that the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1).)
This rule is subject to a number of statutory exceptions (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(B)(i)-(c)(1)(B)(vi)), including the beneficial parental relationship exception, which applies when “termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) There must be a “‘compelling reason’” to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349.)
“The parent contesting the termination of parental rights bears the burden of showing both regular visitation and contact and the benefit to the child in maintaining the parent-child relationship. [Citations.]” (In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80-81.) “We must affirm a juvenile court's rejection of these exceptions if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.) “We... review[] the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling. [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1235.) Because Father and Mother had the burden of proof, we must affirm unless there was “indisputable evidence [in their favor] evidence no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected....” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)
Initially, both Mother and Father claim that they were given inadequate visitation and that the foster parents of T.L. “curtailed” the visits because they reported bad behavior after the visits, and the parents were not given adequate visitation during the pendency of the section 366.26 hearing. Any issues that the visitation was improper, as noted by the juvenile court, was not an issue to be resolved at the section 366.26 hearing. The question was whether there was a bond between T.L. and his parents.
Further, the record supports there was visitation from September 2008 through December 2008. When there was an attempt to have a visit in March 2009, Mother and Father never scheduled the visit. It should be noted that this case went on for two and a half years, mostly due to the inability to find homes for T.L.’s siblings, and the parents were given numerous opportunities for visitation throughout the process. Further, visitation was discretionary after reunification services were denied. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 457.) Regardless, as discussed, post, taking account of all the visitation during the entire process showed that there was no significant bond between the parents and T.L.
In the alternative, Father and Mother claim that they have maintained consistent contact with T.L. The Department concedes this point. We agree that both maintained consistent visitation.
Hence, we must address whether there was significant bond between the parents and T.L. to supersede adoption here. “[C]ourt[s] ha[ve] interpreted the phrase ‘benefit from continuing the relationship’ to refer to a ‘parent-child’ relationship that ‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.’ [Citation.]” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207.)
T.L. was taken from Mother and Father when he was four months old because of “horrendous” behavior in the home through Mother’s prostitution and Father’s apparent approval of such conduct.
The Department notes as early as March 2007 that the quality of visitation was unsatisfactory between Father and T.L., although Father became more attentive at subsequent visits. Additionally, Mother paid attention more to S.J. and K.J. than to T.L. Reports in December 2007 showed that Mother and Father had progressed to unsupervised visits with T.L. However, they broke the Department rules, and supervised visits were reinstated. It was reported that Mother was not attentive during the visits, spending much of the time on the telephone.
During another visit, in March 2008, both parents arrived late and were “very indifferent” in their affection. They failed to advise T.L. to stop throwing blocks. T.L. appeared “stressed” during the visit. The visitation between Mother, Father, and T.L. was not exemplary, as the parents suggest.
Furthermore, there was no indication of a significant bond or relationship or that Father or Mother could assume a parental role. During a visit in September 2008, T.L. acted out by throwing toys and biting and choking K.J., but neither parent did anything to stop him. He did not exhibit such behavior in the prospective adoptive parent’s home. Moreover, during one visit, Mother terrorized T.L. with a spider and told him to stop crying and acting like a “little sissy.” Also, the record supports that T.L. was traumatized by the visits. He would have night terrors and be unwilling to follow the prospective adoptive parent’s directives after visitation.
This is unlike the case of In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, relied upon by Father and Mother. In Brandon C., the evidence supported that the mother had maintained consistent contact with the children and the bond between the mother and children in that case was strong. Further, there was no evidence or reports that suggested any problems during visitation. (Id. at pp. 1537-1538.) Here, unsupervised visits were terminated because of rule violations by Mother and Father, Mother was inattentive during visitation, and T.L. appeared to be traumatized by the visits.
Nowhere in the reports of visitation is there evidence of any significant bond between T.L. and the parents. Although Father was reported as attentive, there is no indication, except for Father’s own testimony, that T.L. was upset that the visits ended or that he missed Father. There was no evidence of bond between Mother and T.L. Additionally, Mother clearly was inappropriate in her interactions with T.L., and the Father’s claims that he would have Mother move out of the house were not credible.
For the above reasons, we conclude the juvenile court reasonably found there was insufficient evidence T.L. would benefit more from continuing his relationship with Mother and Father than from adoption. T.L. was doing well in his adoptive parent’s home, and there was no evidence that either Mother or Father had significantly addressed the problems that led to his removal from their home. There is no evidence that he would be “greatly harmed” by severing his relationship with Mother and Father. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953.) The juvenile court properly found that the beneficial parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights did not apply.
III
SIBLING EXCEPTION
Mother argues that the sibling exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) was applicable here and that the juvenile court never properly addressed the issue because it found the argument “spurious.”
A. Additional Factual Background
At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother argued that the sibling exception applied. She argued that the three siblings were placed together for a period of time and that the juvenile court should have looked closely at the exception.
In finding the sibling exception did not apply, the juvenile court found, “Here all three are separated. They had to be separated. I don’t know why they are acting out as they did, but you could argue just as well it was because of what happened in terms of the conduct of the parents that caused that home to disintegrate. [¶] All I know is that these three children are not together. They are going separate ways. In some sense I have no way of suggesting that they are not going to maintain contact. But for [T.L’s] case to go to permanent plan is not going to interfere substantially with a relationship with the sibling to the extent contemplated by the code is a spurious argument.”
B. Analysis
The juvenile court undertakes a two-step analysis in evaluating the applicability of the sibling relationship exception pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). First, the court is directed “to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship by evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds. [Citation.] If the court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption.” (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-952.) “[T]he concern is the best interests of the child being considered for adoption, not the interests of that child’s siblings.” (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 822.)
“Reflecting the Legislature’s preference for adoption when possible, the ‘sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a “compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be “detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’ [Citations.] Indeed, even if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption. [Citation.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) We review the court's finding on this issue for substantial evidence. (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.)
We reject Mother’s argument that the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard in finding that the exception did not apply and that remand is necessary in order for the juvenile court to properly exercise its discretion. Although the juvenile court did state that the argument was “spurious,” that argument was preceded by the juvenile court assessing the bond between T.L. and his sisters. It also noted that T.L.’s stable environment was not going to be interrupted. The record supports that the juvenile court understood the legal standard for the application of the sibling exception.
Moreover, even if it could be argued that the juvenile court did not properly exercise its discretion, substantial evidence supports that the sibling exception did not apply here. The three children were together from the time of the detention July 19, 2006 until S.J. was placed in a group home on November 13, 2007. K.J. and T.L. were placed in separate foster homes on November 28, 2007. Hence, at the time of the section 366.26 hearing in March 2009, T.L. had been separated from his siblings for over one year. They had seen each other during some visitation since being separated.
Prior to being separated, it was reported that the siblings were not getting along. S.J. had threatened K.J. prior to being moved into a group home. Moreover, K.J. had to be removed from the foster home she shared with T.L. because she had caused T.L. to bleed by hitting him in the mouth, and she had hit him on the stomach. T.L. had been hitting to defend himself but had stopped the behavior when K.J. moved out.
After being separated, in September 2008, during a visitation, T.L. threw a toy that K.J. wanted against a wall and tried to bite and choke her. T.L.’s adoptive parents reported that K.J. was “too aggressive” and “mean” to T.L. during visitation.
The record does not support that there was any meaningful relationship between the three children. Moreover, S.J. and K.J. suffered from significant mental health issues based on the events occurring in the home. There is little evidence that they can enjoy any type of sibling relationship with T.L.
On the other hand, T.L. was very bonded with his prospective adoptive parents. They were willing to continue sibling contact. Based on the foregoing, Mother and Father did not meet their burden of establishing that the sibling exception applied.
IV
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, J., KING, J.