Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0700443
Jones, P.J.
In a May 18, 2010 juvenile wardship petition, the People alleged T.J. (the minor) committed second degree robbery. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5.) At a jurisdictional hearing on June 14, 2010, the minor pleaded no contest to felony grand theft from a person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)) and misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and the court determined she came within the provisions of section 602. The court ordered the probation and social services departments to conduct an assessment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1 after determining the minor appeared to be a dependent of the court. (§ 300.) In late June 2010 — and pursuant to the court’s order — the probation and social services departments conducted the section 241.1 assessment. At the dispositional hearing on July 16, 2010, the court dismissed the minor’s section 300 petition, adjudged her a ward of the court, and placed her on probation. The court concluded that declaring the minor a ward of the court would serve her best interests and the protection of society.
Unless otherwise noted, all further references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 241.1 “requires that whenever it appears a minor may fit the criteria of both a dependent child and a delinquent ward, the child protective agency and the probation department must jointly ‘initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society.’ [Citation.] Both agencies present their recommendations to the juvenile court, which then must determine the appropriate status for the child. [Citation.]” (D.M. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (D.M.).)
On appeal, the minor contends “the section 241.1 assessment should have been conducted before the juvenile court proceeded with the... jurisdictional hearing....” She also argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s determination that declaring her a ward of the court would serve her best interests and the protection of society. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2010, the minor — then 17 years old — was a dependent of the court pursuant to section 300 and was living in a group home in Concord. “Social services ha[d] been involved with the minor and [her] family since [she] was twelve years of age.”
On the afternoon of May 14, 2010, the minor approached two 12-year-old boys, S.T. and William S., who were standing in front of a movie theater in Concord. The minor asked to use S.T.’s phone and he handed it to her. The minor pushed both boys and ran away with the phone. S.T. chased the minor, caught up with her, and demanded she return his phone. The minor replied, “‘What are you going to do about it?’” and punched S.T. in the face. The minor then jumped into a waiting car and drove away. A counselor at the minor’s group home learned the minor had stolen the phone and demanded she return it. The minor left the phone on a street corner, where the minor’s group home counselor retrieved it and returned it to S.T.
On May 18, 2010, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging the minor committed second degree robbery. (§ 602, Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5.) At the detention hearing on May 20, 2010, counsel for the minor did not request a section 241.1 assessment or object to the court’s proceeding on the section 602 petition without having such an assessment.
At a jurisdictional hearing on June 14, 2010, the minor pleaded no contest to felony grand theft from a person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)) and misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242). The court determined the minor came within the provisions of section 602 and that she appeared to be a dependent of the court pursuant to section 300. The court therefore ordered the probation and social services departments to conduct a section 241.1 assessment. On June 21, 2010, the probation and social services departments met pursuant to section 241.1.
The record on appeal does not include a copy of the section 241.1 report. It does not appear that the probation and social services departments issued a written report following their meeting; instead, the probation and social services departments signed the disposition report, wherein they agreed that declaring the minor a ward of the court would serve her best interests and the protection of society and discussed the factors listed in Rules of Court, rule 5.512(d).
In a report prepared for the dispositional hearing, the probation department described the minor’s history in detail, including her: (1) “hard and disadvantaged” family history; (2) schooling; (3) previous referrals to the probation department; (4) drug and alcohol issues; and (5) medical and psychological concerns. The report explained that the minor was repeatedly abused by various family members and claimed to have been raped when she was approximately 16 years old. The report noted that the minor needed approximately 110 credits to graduate from high school. According to the report, “[t]he minor’s attendance [at school] is poor. She had two discipline referrals in April 2010 for disruptive and defiant behavior” and was suspended for three days. Additionally, the report noted that the minor had been referred to the probation department on two previous occasions for petty theft. According to the report, the minor uses marijuana and MDMA (ecstasy) and “would be willing and would benefit from a substance abuse counseling program.” Further, the disposition report stated the minor was taking medication for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), anxiety, and depression.
Finally, the report noted that “a [section] 241.1 meeting was held” wherein the probation and social services departments “determined that it was in the best interest[s] of the minor that she be adjudged a [section] 602 [w]ard of the Court and her [section] 300 dependency status be vacated and dismissed. The minor will also still be able to pursue her Independent Living Program. The Probation Department will be the lead agency with supportive services through the Social Services Department.”
The disposition report determined: “The minor needs to be held accountable for her actions; therefore, it is recommended due to her sustained felony conviction, she be adjudged an indefinite [w]ard of the Court. Because the minor is currently a [section 300] dependent, it is also recommended her dependency be ordered vacated and dismissed.” The probation department explained that the minor had not “made substantial progress in stabilizing herself” during the five years she had spent in a group home and that “[b]eing made a [w]ard of the Court... will provide the Probation Department the opportunity to supervise the minor with more structure and intensive therapy than what can be provided through the Social Services Department. Placement will also encourage and hold the minor accountable for attending school so she can gain the necessary credits in order to graduate and pursue her collegiate goal.”
At the disposition hearing on July 16, 2010, the court indicated it had reviewed the disposition report, transcripts from the minor’s school, a student progress report, and a letter from the minor’s mother. Counsel for the minor expressed the minor’s “desire to maintain her status as a [section] 300 dependent minor....” The minor’s attorney from her section 300 case also asked that the minor “remain under [section] 300 dependency... rather than being made a ward of the court.” In response, the prosecutor argued the minor “has done very well in juvenile hall. She hasn’t done as well when she’s been in social services placement or dependency placement. She needs a more structured environment. She’s approaching her 18[th] birthday where social services would essentially be phased out because she would have reached the age of majority.” The prosecutor explained that the minor needed substance abuse counseling and that services provided pursuant to section 602 “would best serve [the minor] going forward. They [the probation department] can provide mental health. They can provide transitional living. But she needs a more structured environment.... [¶] I think for her benefit, the treatment as a [section] 602 case is more appropriate given the circumstances, given her age[, ] and given her needs.”
The court dismissed the section 300 dependency, declared the minor a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, and placed her on probation. The court explained that it had considered the disposition report and that “several factors” demonstrated that declaring the minor a ward of the court was appropriate, specifically: (1) the minor’s “sustained felony violation;” (2) the fact that she needed “to be held accountable for her actions;” (3) the minor’s lack of “substantial progress” in the group home setting over a five-year period; and (4) the minor’s observation that “she does better in school when she is in a structured environment.” The court noted that placing the minor with the probation department would “provide a structure for her and the intensive therapy that... [the] minor needs to help her to be successful.” The court remarked that “[t]here will be therapy. There will be counseling available to her, as well as to her family. And I think that the counseling can also assist with the mental health issues that have confronted the minor. [¶] So I do think that this is the best plan for her[.]”
DISCUSSION
A child who qualifies as both a dependent and a ward of the juvenile court cannot simultaneously be both. (§ 241.1; In re Marcus G. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1012, 1015 (Marcus G.).) In cases with potential dual jurisdiction, both the social services agency and the probation department must submit recommendations to the juvenile court for its determination on “which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society.” (§ 241.1, subd. (a); In re Henry S. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 248, 259.) The statute requires a joint report of the probation and social services departments to be filed with the petition giving rise to the potential dual jurisdiction — here, the May 18, 2010 delinquency petition. (§ 241.1, subd. (a); Marcus G., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013.) Notwithstanding this requirement, “[i]n most instances... the minor will already be a dependent or a ward and the assessment under [section] 241.1 will be done after the second petition is filed.” (Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2010) § 3.25[2], pp. 3-47-3-48, italics added.)
Here, the minor contends the section 241.1 assessment was untimely, specifically that the court violated her due process rights by holding the jurisdictional hearing “before a section 241.1 assessment was done.” We requested and received supplemental briefing on whether the minor forfeited this issue. Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefing, we conclude the minor has forfeited her complaints about the timing of the section 241.1 assessment.
The People filed the juvenile wardship petition on May 18, 2010. At the detention hearing on May 20, 2010 the minor’s counsel was aware of the minor’s status as a dependent of the court. Counsel, however, failed to either request that a section 241.1 assessment be conducted before the jurisdictional hearing or object to the court’s proceeding on the section 602 petition without such an assessment. And at the jurisdictional hearing on June 14, 2010, counsel for the minor did not ask the court to order the probation and social services departments to conduct a section 241.1 assessment or note that such an assessment had not been conducted. Instead, counsel merely “ask[ed] the Court to reconsider [the minor’s] custodial status.”
That section 241.1 imposes a statutory duty on the juvenile court does not preclude the application of the forfeiture rule. Several courts have determined that a minor’s failure to object forfeits appellate review of the adequacy of — or the failure to prepare — mandatory assessment reports in juvenile proceedings. (See, e.g., In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [citing cases in which appellate courts have applied the forfeiture doctrine “in dependency proceedings in a wide variety of contexts, including cases involving failures to obtain various reports required by statute”]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [father’s failure to request a bonding study in trial court constituted waiver on appeal]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [minor forfeited objection to alleged deficiencies in section 366.21 assessment report]; United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 731 [constitutional rights in civil and criminal cases may be forfeited by failure to object or assert rights in the trial court].)
We reject the minor’s contention that she was not required to raise the timeliness of the section 241.1 assessment in the juvenile court because the dependency court, having already assumed jurisdiction over her, had “exclusive jurisdiction to hear all matters involving” her. The minor relies on Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 295, 297, but that case does not assist her. The Summers court held that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to decide a fee dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant court reporter after a reporter’s transcript on appeal had been filed. (Id. at p. 297.) Summers is completely factually distinguishable. We conclude the minor has forfeited this issue on appeal by failing to object to the timing of the section 241.1 assessment in the juvenile court.
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the minor had preserved this issue on appeal, we would conclude the court’s failure to consider the section 241.1 assessment before the jurisdictional hearing was harmless. (See D.M., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The minor argues she was prejudiced by the untimely section 241.1 assessment because the court relied on her “sustained felony violation” as a basis for declaring her a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. We are not persuaded. The minor’s felony violation was only one of multiple factors the court considered when it decided to adjudge her a ward of the court. At the dispositional hearing on July 16, 2010, the court had before it the information required by section 241.1, specifically: (1) the nature of the minor’s referral; (2) her age; (3) the physical, sexual and emotional abuse the minor had suffered; (4) the minor’s prior record and the record of her parents; (5) her functioning at school; (6) information about the minor’s home environment; and (7) the history of services the minor and her family had received. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.512, § 241.1, subd. (b).) As discussed above, all of the factors set forth in the disposition report — regardless of when it was prepared — favored wardship rather than dependency. There is simply no likelihood the outcome would have been different had the court considered the section 241.1 assessment before the jurisdictional hearing.
We reject the minor’s contention, unsupported by any authority, that the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 should apply here.
The minor’s reliance on Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Fam. Services v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 320, 326 (Jaime M.) is misplaced. In that case, the juvenile court received a section 241.1 report but declined to determine the minor’s status as either a dependent or a ward of the court. (Jaime M., supra, at p. 326.) The Jaime M. court explained that the decision whether to treat the minor “as a dependent of the court or a ward of the court remains.... [S]uch a decision must be made clearly and carefully. A determination as important as [the minor’s] status before the court cannot be implied from a few statements made during an ex parte hearing on placement.” (Ibid.) Here and in contrast to Jaime M., the court determined the minor’s status in accordance with section 241.1.
Finally, we disagree with the minor’s claim that there was “scant information to justify the court’s decision regarding [her] status” as a ward of the court. The lengthy disposition report explained why declaring the minor a ward of the court and dismissing her section 300 dependency status would benefit the minor and promote the safety of society. At the dispositional hearing, the court explained that wardship was appropriate because of the minor’s escalating criminal behavior and the ineffectiveness of the “group home setting... in stabilizing” the minor’s life. Additionally, the court noted that placing the minor with the probation department would provide the structure, stability, therapy, and counseling the minor needed. This information amply supports the court’s conclusion that declaring the minor a ward of the court would serve her “best interest... and the protection of society[.]” (D.M., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.)
DISPOSITION
The court’s July 16, 2010 dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur: Needham, J.Bruiniers, J.