Opinion
2015-07-15
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler, Marcia Egger, and Jess Rao of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing and Susan Paulson of counsel), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler, Marcia Egger, and Jess Rao of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing and Susan Paulson of counsel), for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.
Appeal from a corrected order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Michael Ambrosio, J.), dated April 24, 2014. The order adjudicated Tiyana D.R. a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order of that court (Jacqueline D. Williams, J.), dated February 24, 2014, which, after a hearing, found that she committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the corrected order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic,without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the corrected order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal from so much of the corrected order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period of placement has expired ( see Matter of Jonathan E., 119 A.D.3d 943, 989 N.Y.S.2d 876). However, since there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency, the appeal from so much of the corrected order of disposition as adjudged the appellant to be a juvenile delinquent, and which brings up for review the order of fact-finding, has not been rendered academic ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 783; Matter of Jonathan E., 119 A.D.3d 943, 989 N.Y.S.2d 876).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree ( see Matter of Kevin M., 64 A.D.3d 655, 883 N.Y.S.2d 125). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 617–618, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709; cf.CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Brooklyn B., 77 A.D.3d 934, 935, 909 N.Y.S.2d 382; Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 778, 799, 868 N.Y.S.2d 898). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination with regard to the appellant's intent, and its rejection of the appellant's justification defense, were not against the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Kevin M., 64 A.D.3d 655, 883 N.Y.S.2d 125).