In re Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc.

14 Citing cases

  1. Fleetwood Servs. v. Ram Capital Funding LLC

    20-cv-5120 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. May. 18, 2021)   Cited 3 times

    See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 1992 WL 121726, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1992) ("The scope and meaning of a release will be determined by the manifested intent of the parties—in Corbin's words, 'by the process of interpretation, just as in the case of determining the meaning of an executory contract.'") (quoting In re Thomas McKinnon Secur. Inc., 132 B.R. 9, 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)).

  2. PRO BONO INVESTMENTS, INC. v. GERRY

    03 Civ. 4347 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that “the statute applies only to joint tortfeasors”

    The cases on which the plaintiff relies for the proposition that the Release should be interpreted to exclude Bishop's actions as a partner of Bishop Co. do not support that proposition. In re Thomas McKinnon Securities, 132 B.R. 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), involved a defendant who borrowed money from the plaintiff, his employer at the time, for personal reasons and subsequently became an officer and director of a partnership affiliated with the plaintiff. With the debt still unpaid, the plaintiff, for unrelated business reasons, released all claims that it held against the partnership and all directors and officers of the partnership, among others.

  3. In re Relativity Fashion, LLC

    Case No. 15-11989 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jun. 7, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., In re Thomson McKinnon Secur., Inc., 132 B.R. 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). In TMSI, the debtor filed an action to collect the unpaid balance of a loan it had made, prior to bankruptcy, to an individual who at the time of the loan was a vice president and director of the debtor.

  4. In re Ocean Power Corporation

    Case No. 02-15989 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007)

    The terms of both the DIP Order and the Sale Order are plain and unambiguous, and thus no genuine issues of material fact exist. If the parties intended the Sale Order to supersede the terms of the meticulously drafted DIP Order and to waive their duties to pay the DIP loan, they would have included appropriate language to do so. Because the Court finds that the Sale Order and the DIP Order were unambiguous, the Committee's reliance on In re Thomson McKinnon Secur. Inc., 132 B.R. 9, 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Schwartzberg, J.), which involved a release determined by that court to be ambiguous, is inapposite. When the instrument is between sophisticated, counseled business persons, the presumption that an executed written contract manifests the true intention of the parties applies with even greater force.

  5. In re Worldcom, Inc.

    296 B.R. 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)   Cited 7 times
    In WorldCom, the debtor sought disallowance of a creditor's claim because the debtor and creditor had entered into a pre-petition settlement agreement.

    See Pickwick, 1994 WL 620950, at *12 ("[A] broad release . . . bars all claims, irrespective of whether these claims had ripened at the time of the release's execution or whether the releasor was even aware of them at the time of execution."). See also In re Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 132 B.R. 9, 13 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Gordon v.Vincent Youmans, Inc., 358 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1965)) ("The scope and meaning of a release will be determined by the manifested intent of the parties — in Corbin's words, `by the process of interpretation, just as in the case of determining the meaning of an executory contract.'"). New York courts have recognized that under certain circumstances, broad releases may be avoided with respect to uncontemplated transactions. See Mangini, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 513, 249 N.E.2d 386.

  6. In re Worldcom, Inc.

    Case No. 02-13533 (AJG), Jointly Administered (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2003)

    See Pickwick, 1994 WL 620950, at *12 ("[A] broad release . . . bars all claims, irrespective of whether these claims had ripened at the time of the release's execution or whether the releasor was even aware of them at the time of execution."). See also In re Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 132 B.R. 9, 13 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Gordon v. Vincent Youmans, Inc., 358 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1965)) ("The scope and meaning of a release will be determined by the manifested intent of the parties in Corbin's words,`by the process of interpretation, just as in the case of determining the meaning of an executory contract.'"). New York courts have recognized that under certain circumstances, broad releases may be avoided with respect to uncontemplated transactions. See Mangini, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 513.

  7. In re Kerzner

    250 B.R. 487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)   Cited 4 times

    On a summary judgment motion, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Scudder Tax Free Inv. Account No. 2505103, 998 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc. v. Leasure (In re Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc.), 132 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1991). Once the movant has made its showing, the burden of production shifts to the non-movant who must "go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, establish that there is a specific and genuine issue of material fact warranting a trial."

  8. In re Centennial Textiles, Inc.

    220 B.R. 165 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)   Cited 84 times
    Stating that satisfaction of the balance sheet test, i.e. that the debtor's liabilities exceed its assets, is sufficient for the purposes of meeting the definition of insolvency

    On a summary judgment motion, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Scudder Tax Free Inv. Account No. 2505103, 998 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc. v. Leasure (In re Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc.), 132 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1991); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Once the movant has made its showing, the burden of production shifts to the non-movant who must "go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, establish that there is a specific and genuine issue of material fact warranting a trial."

  9. In re Blankfort

    217 B.R. 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)   Cited 60 times
    Finding aggravating circumstances where defendant persistently, blatantly, and willfully violated court orders enjoining the underlying conduct

    On a summary judgment motion, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences to be drawn forth the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Scudder Tax Free Inv. Account No. 2505103, 998 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc. v. Leasure (In re Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc.), 132 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1991); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Once the movant has made its showing, the burden of production shifts to the non-movant who must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file'", establish that there is a specific and genuine issue of material fact warranting a trial.

  10. Petitioning Creditors of Minpeco USA., Inc. v. Swiss Bank Corp. (In re Minpeco USA., Inc.)

    237 B.R. 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)   Cited 13 times
    Granting summary judgment because a "claim . . . is not a claim but a remedy . . . cannot afford an independent basis for holding [defendant] liable"

    See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. On a summary judgment motion, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Scudder Tax Free Inv. Account No. 2505103, 998 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc. v. Leasure ( In re Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc.), 132 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1991); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Once the movant has made its showing, the burden of production shifts to the non-movant who must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," establish that there is a specific and genuine issue of material fact warranting a trial.