Opinion
356662
09-30-2021
In re THOMPSON, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
Saginaw Circuit Court Family Division LC Nos. 15-034534-NA; 18-034534-NA
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Shapiro and Swartzle, JJ.
Per Curiam.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to three minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). On appeal, mother argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds sufficient to terminate her parental rights and that termination was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
The parental rights of the children's father were also terminated, but he is not a party to this appeal.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition to remove the minor children from mother's care, alleging that she left the children without appropriate supervision, there was a distinct smell of garbage in the home, the children were covered in dirt, there was little food, the food available was rotting and there was an unacceptable amount of flies, there were sewage problems, the home had minimal furnishings, and there was no clothing for the children. Mother entered a plea to the allegations.
The trial court authorized the petition and the children were taken into protective custody. Over the next seven months, mother engaged in services and improved the condition of her home. She participated in substance abuse and mental health counseling as part of her probation for unrelated charges of driving under the influence of alcohol (OUIL) and involuntary manslaughter from the accidental death of one of her children as a result of improper supervision. She obtained new housing and participated in all parenting time, and the caseworker helped obtain new appliances and housing items. The children were returned to mother's care in March 2019, with Family Reunification Program (FRP) services offering hands-on assistance. FRP services ended on May 31, 2019, and by June, mother's home was once again in poor condition, with no running water, extremely dirty couches, stained carpet, dismantled cribs with no sheets on the beds, and one child smelling strongly of urine. Mother claimed that the water was shut off because of a dispute with her landlord, but she provided no explanation in regard to the other issues. The foster care worker helped mother relocate to her cousin's home and provided the children with air mattresses, but discovered several days later that mother had not used the mattresses and the children were sleeping on the floor. A supplemental petition requesting removal of the children was filed and a hearing was held on July 1, 2019. Mother did not contest the children's second removal.
In July 2019, mother was arrested and convicted of another OUIL offense for driving while intoxicated with her sister's three young children unrestrained in the backseat. She was required to wear an alcohol monitoring tether until January 2020, as part of her probation. In August 2019, mother completed the CAN Council parenting class. On August 6, 2019, she was referred to the Parents Actively Learning (PAL) program, which is a four-mouth program with hands-on parenting instruction through a parenting coach. She obtained new housing in September 2019. However, by the end of the month, the home had garbage littered throughout the backyard and piled up by the back door and had housing items scattered in the yard. Additionally, mother no longer had the appliances and household items that her caseworker had obtained for her last home. She claimed that the mess was from the previous tenants and the only way she could move in right away was to accept it as-is. By January 2020, although mother had completed two parenting classes, the conditions of her home had not improved-the kitchen floor was sticky, the master bedroom had clothes all over the floor, the laundry room had so many clothes that the caseworker could not see the floor, and the basement had multiple bags of garbage in it and what appeared to be a bed. At a July 31, 2020 visit, the foster care worker found the backyard scattered with garbage and found clothes piled up behind doors and tossed down the stairs. Mother explained that the laundry was piled up because she was incapacitated by a foot injury and animals had gotten into the garbage. However, two weeks later, at the August 12, 2020 visit, the foster care worker found the house in even worse shape-garbage was still scattered in the yard, clothing was still piled up on the stairs and behind doors, the kitchen floor felt slimy and greasy, and the children's room smelled of rotting food.
DHHS filed a petition to terminate mother's parental rights on February 21, 2020. Following several adjournments attributable in part to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court, at the conclusion of a three-day termination hearing, found statutory grounds to terminate mother's parental rights and that termination would be in the children's best interests. The court then issued a corresponding order terminating mother's parental rights. She now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Mother first argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights because DHHS did not make reasonable efforts to provide services to assist in reunification. We disagree.
To preserve the issue, mother was required to "object or indicate that the services provided to [her] were somehow inadequate" at the time the court adopted a service plan or shortly thereafter. In re Frey, 297 Mich.App. 242, 247; 824 N.W.2d 569 (2012). Because mother did not object to the services she was offered until after her rights were terminated, this issue is unpreserved. See In re TK, 306 Mich.App. 698, 703; 859 N.W.2d 208 (2014) ("In general, issues that are raised, addressed, and decided by the trial court are preserved for appeal."). We review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich.App. 1, 8; 761 N.W.2d 253 (2008). "Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. at 9.
DHHS "has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights," taking into account reasonable accommodations for a parent's mental-health issues. In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich. 79, 85; 893 N.W.2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c); MCL 712A.19a(2). There also "exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered." In re Frey, 297 Mich.App. at 248. "Not only must respondent cooperate and participate in the services, she must benefit from them." In re TK, 306 Mich.App. at 711.
In this case, mother argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights because her second caseworker did not provide her with any services aimed at reunification. This caseworker took over the case in February 2020, 17 months after the initial disposition. Although the caseworker did acknowledge that she did not refer mother to any services, she explained that this was because there were no services left that DHHS could offer. The previous caseworker offered a multitude of services throughout the case-she enrolled mother in two different parenting programs, implemented the FRP hands-on instruction program to assist with the reunification transition, and even obtained beds, a refrigerator, a stove, and other household items for mother. Although neither caseworker referred mother to therapy, she was already engaged in therapy through her probation. Further, contrary to mother's assertion, the second caseworker did offer services with a home health aide to assist with cleaning mother's home while she was injured, but mother refused the service. Additionally, the record does not illustrate any additional services that DHHS failed to offer, and mother does not specifically identify any services that she claims would have made her successful. In re Sanborn, Mich. App, ; N.W.2d (2021) (Docket Nos. 354915, 354916); slip op at 5 (stating that "when challenging the services offered, [the respondent] must establish that she would have fared better if other services had been offered"). Therefore, the record shows that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with her children by implementing a service plan with services meant to assist her with maintaining a clean and safe home and facilitate the children's return. However, mother failed to properly benefit from the services offered to her. See In re TK, 306 Mich.App. at 711. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by determining that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children.
B. STATUTORY BASIS FOR TERMINATION
Mother next argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights because the statutory grounds for termination were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
We review for clear error the trial court's determination that at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. 120, 139; 809 N.W.2d 412 (2011). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich.App. 286, 296-297; 690 N.W.2d 505 (2004).
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. at 139. If this Court concludes that termination is supported by at least one statutory ground, additional grounds for the trial court's decision need not be considered. In re HRC, 286 Mich.App. 444, 461; 781 N.W.2d 105 (2009).
Mother argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). We disagree.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) provides that termination is appropriate when:
The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . [t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
In this case, more than 182 days had elapsed since the initial dispositional order. The order of disposition was entered in September 2018, and the termination hearing began in November 2020. The children were originally brought into care due to a lack of supervision; the poor conditions of mother's home, which smelled of garbage, had an unacceptable number of flies, had no food, and had sewage problems; and the fact that the children were dirty and had no clothing. The Parent Agency Treatment Plan identified several areas that mother had to improve for reunification: maintain appropriate housing, obtain and maintain employment, participate in counseling, participate in probation, participate in recommended services, and remain substance free. However, she did not rectify all of these barriers.
Mother rectified many of the conditions that brought her children into care. By the November 6, 2020 termination hearing, she had suitable housing and was employed. Regarding mother's substance use, although the trial court found that she had not rectified this barrier, the record reflects that she made meaningful change. The trial court noted that despite ongoing substance abuse counseling since 2016, mother was arrested for another drunk-driving offense in 2019. Although this shows a setback in her sobriety, both mother and her psychologist testified that she recognized the error and that she had been sober since. The trial court repeatedly noted that mother had been on an alcohol tether throughout 2020 because of her conviction, and it determined that it was "unknown how she will respond and handle things when the tether is taken off." This was error because the foster care worker reported that mother had completed her probation and had been taken off her alcohol tether in January 2020. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the death of her father, and the death of her sister-in-law, mother remained sober. The record established that mother had been sober for more than a year without an alcohol tether and suggested that she rectified the barrier involving her sobriety. Regardless, this error does not require reversal because mother did not rectify other conditions that led to adjudication.
The most significant condition that led to adjudication was the unsanitary condition of mother's home. Although her home was clean by the time of the termination hearing, this Court held in In re Williams, 286 Mich.App. 253, 272; 779 N.W.2d 286 (2009), that even if conditions had improved in the months before the termination hearing, a trial court may look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a parent accomplished meaningful change in conditions that led to adjudication. In this case, mother demonstrated a clear pattern of allowing the home to fall into filthy conditions regardless of the services offered. DHHS returned the children to her care in March 2019, and weeks after FRP services ended, the house had no running water, extremely dirty couches, stained carpet, and dismantled cribs with no sheets on the beds. Mother found new housing in September 2019, which had garbage littered throughout the backyard and piled up by the back door. By January 2020, although mother completed her parenting classes, the conditions had not improved-the kitchen floor was sticky, the master bedroom had clothes all over the floor, the laundry room had so many clothes that the caseworker could not see the floor, and the basement had multiple bags of garbage in it and what appeared to be a bed. In July 2020, the foster care worker found the backyard scattered with garbage. Two weeks later, at the August 12, 2020 visit, foster care workers found the house in even worse shape-garbage was still scattered in the yard, clothing was still piled up on the stairs and behind doors, the kitchen floor felt slimy and greasy, and the children's room smelled of rotting food. Although mother's house was clean at the time of the termination hearing, she demonstrated a consistent pattern of repeatedly allowing her house to fall back into unsanitary conditions despite offering various excuses and participating in multiple services offered by DHHS.
In In re Williams, 296 Mich.App. at 272, this Court held: "Although respondent mother embarked on a commendable effort to treat her addiction several months before the termination hearing, the totality of the evidence amply supports that she had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions existing by the time of the adjudication."
Moreover, mother's repeated excuses also demonstrated that she continued to struggle with her mental health. In 2019, her therapist testified that she struggled with accountability, responsibility, and maturity. Mother's actions reflect this assessment. Throughout the case, she participated in counseling sporadically, attending only 50% of scheduled counseling sessions and sometimes skipping entire months of counseling. Further, mother offered several excuses for the poor conditions of her home at the termination hearing, including a dispute with her landlord, moving into the home as-is, and her foot injury. However, she did not contact her caseworker for help with the issues, did not report that the water had been turned off, and refused cleaning services. Mother also put multiple children in danger by driving with them unsecured in her backseat while she was intoxicated. Overall, mother's failure to seek or accept help, continued excuses regarding her failures, and tendency to put children in danger showed that she had not overcome the barrier of her mental health.
Further, we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that these barriers "will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child[ren's] age[s]." MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Although mother's home was suitable and she was employed at the time of the termination hearing, she exhibited a consistent pattern of obtaining new housing and then allowing that housing to become unsanitary and unsafe despite participating in two parenting classes and receiving hands-on assistance from DHHS. At the time of termination, the case had been open for 29 months and the children had already been returned to mother and removed again. The children, who were five years old and three years old, had spent a significant amount of their lives in foster care and there was no indication that they would be returned to mother's care within a reasonable time. Considering mother's history of instability, the trial court accurately concluded that it was inevitable that the children would be removed again if returned. Therefore, the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). In re Williams, 286 Mich.App. at 272-273.
Because termination of parental rights must be supported by only one statutory ground, we need not address whether termination was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). In re HRC, 286 Mich.App. at 461.
C. BEST INTERESTS
Mother also argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
We review for clear error a trial court's decision that termination is in a child's best interests. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich.App. 35, 40; 823 N.W.2d 144 (2012). Termination of parental rights is appropriate when the trial court determines that one or more grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that termination is in the child's best interests. In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich.App. 713, 732-733; 858 N.W.2d 143 (2014). "Best interests are determined on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 733. When determining the best interests of the child, this Court focuses on the child, rather than the parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. 406, 411; 890 N.W.2d 676 (2016). A trial court should weigh all the evidence and consider a variety of factors, including:
[T]he child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 713-714; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
In this case, the trial court acknowledged that mother was bonded with her children. However, the court found that this bond was not enough to prevent termination in light of the other factors. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the children's need for permanency and stability clearly favored termination. Mother was unable to keep her home safe and clean for the children to return despite the case being open for 29 months and mother receiving years of services. As previously discussed, mother demonstrated that even if the court gave her more time, she was unlikely to overcome the barriers for reunification. Meanwhile, the children had little stability and had been moved to nine placements over the course of two years. The foster care worker testified that she saw the children's personalities change from the trauma they experienced from the repeated placements, transitioning from sweet, bubbly children into inconsolable children who screamed and were clingy and upset after parenting time. The children had been in foster care for the majority of their lives, and had been in DHHS care for the 19 months prior to the termination hearing. Therefore, the record clearly showed that the children were in dire need of stability and permanency, which they could not achieve with mother. Further, the five-year-old child was in a pre-adoptive placement in her foster home, and her foster parents also expressed an interest in adopting the three-year-old twins. Although the twins had not lived with the foster family, both sets of foster parents had been conducting regular sibling visits to ensure a continued bond between the children. Therefore, the children had a prospective permanent, stable placement, which favored termination.
Mother's parenting ability also favored termination. As the trial court pointed out, although she did well with parenting time in a supervised setting, her skills without supervision caused concern. She repeatedly allowed her home to fall into filthy conditions despite services, she endangered three young children by driving drunk with them unrestrained in the backseat, and she refused to reach out for help from the caseworker when issues like her water being turned off arose. Ultimately, mother failed to benefit from more than two years of services, which favored termination. Given the total circumstances, the trial court did not err by finding that termination was in the children's best interests. See id. at 714 (concluding that, in a best-interest determination, the respondent's bond with the child did not outweigh the child's need for permanence and stability).
Affirmed.