Opinion
No. 64634-6-I.
Filed: April 25, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 09-5-00536-3, Patricia H. Clark, J., entered November 24, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, J., concurred in by Dwyer, C.J., and Becker, J.
Conarro appeals pro se the dismissal of his petition for establishment of parentage. We affirm.
FACTS
The marriage between Patrick and Kathy Conarro dissolved in 2000 in Colorado. Two children were born during the marriage. One of the children, I.C., was born on August 26, 1993. A September 19, 2003, paternity test showed that Conarro was not the father of I.C. In January 2009, Conarro filed a petition for establishment of parentage in King County Superior Court. Conarro sought a declaration that Clifford Pitcher was the father of I.C.
To avoid confusion, we will refer to the appellant as "Conarro" and to Kathy Conarro by her first name in this opinion.
The trial court dismissed the action. Conarro apparently requested reinstatement. The trial court then denied Conarro's motion to reinstate the case for the following reasons:
The orders relating to dismissal of this case, and any related motions, were not designated by the appellant here. Therefore, we infer these facts to be true, even though we do not actually have evidence of this in the record.
It appears from Conarro's brief that there may have been a procedural irregularity when the trial court decided the motion "prior to the time set forth in its prior ruling." Conarro does not allege that the trial court erred in doing so or make any argument why his action should be reinstated on these grounds. Therefore, we do not address any procedural irregularity.
[(1)] This court does not have jurisdiction over the parties. [(2)] The petitioner is the "presumed father" and this action was not brought [within] two years of the child's birth. And [(3)] This matter was adjudicated in Colorado under District Court, County of El Paso, Colorado #99DR4070 Feb 18, 2009.
Conarro appeals the denial of the motion to reinstate the petition.
Conarro does not appeal the original denial of the petition, nor is that order contained in the record. But, even if we reviewed the denial of the petition directly, the result would be the same.
DISCUSSION
Conarro appeals the trial court's refusal to reinstate his petition for establishment of parentage. Our review of dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is de novo. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 200-01, 961 P.2d 333 (1998). We generally review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Lilly v. Lynch, 88 Wn. App. 306, 321, 945 P.2d 727 (1997). Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 654, 683, 15 P.3d 115 (2000).
The appellant bears the burden of providing a record from which the appealed issues can be decided. Brothers v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of Wash., 88 Wn. App. 398, 409, 945 P.2d 208 (1997). When the appellant fails to provide an adequate record for review, we must affirm the trial court's ruling. See Hyatt v. Sellen Constr. Co., Inc., 40 Wn App. 893, 897, 700 P.2d 1164 (1985). Because Conarro fails to meet these burdens with respect to the jurisdiction and res judicata findings by the trial court, we cannot consider his arguments on appeal and must affirm.
Even if the court had jurisdiction and was not precluded from reaching the issue by res judicata, we would still agree that the trial court properly found the petition was untimely. A man is presumed to be the father of a child if he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage. RCW 26.26.116(1)(a). According to Conarro's motion to terminate child support, I.C. was born during the marriage. A presumption of paternity established under this section may be rebutted only by an adjudication under
If the marriage occurs after the birth of a child, the presumption also applies if the father agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate. RCW 26.26.116(1)(d)(ii). Conarro apparently agreed to be named as the father on the birth certificate of I.C. Therefore, even if Conarro and Kathy were not married at the time of I.C.'s birth, his action is still untimely.
RCW 26.26.500 through 26.26.630. RCW 26.26.116(2). RCW 26.26.530 provides a time limit on challenging a presumption of paternity:
Conarro filed his petition for establishment of parentage under RCW 26.26.540. RCW 26.26.540 involves acknowledged or adjudicated parentage. There is no evidence of an acknowledged or adjudicated parentage here, therefore the proper statute for determining timeliness is RCW 26.26.530, which relates to a presumed father.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, a proceeding brought by a presumed father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father must be commenced not later than two years after the birth of the child.
(2) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between a child and the child's presumed father may be maintained at any time if the court determines that:
(a) The presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception; and
(b) The presumed father never openly treated the child as his own.
Conarro's action was filed 16 years after the birth of I.C. His action is prohibited as being filed more than two years after the birth of I.C. unless he can show that section two of the statute applies. In the limited record before us, Conarro alleges that Kathy was engaged in a sexual relationship with Pitcher during the probable time of conception. But, no evidence in the record suggests that Conarro was not cohabitating or engaging in sexual intercourse with Kathy during the time of conception. And, Conarro does not dispute that he treated I.C. as his own during his seven year marriage and beyond. Therefore, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, it properly dismissed Conarro's petition as untimely.
We affirm.