Opinion
No. 2-923 / 02-0516.
Filed February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, John Bauercamper, Judge.
Georgia N. Vajpeyi appeals from the economic provisions of a decree dissolving her marriage to Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi. AFFIRMED.
David Correll of Correll, Sheerer, Benson, Galles Demro, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellant.
Edward Gallagher of Gallagher, Langlas Gallagher, Waterloo, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Georgia Vajpeyi appeals from the decree dissolving her marriage to Dhirendra Vajpeyi. She contends the district court failed to make an equitable division of the parties' property and awarded her an inadequate amount of rehabilitative alimony. She also claims she should have been awarded additional trial attorney fees and requests an award of attorney fees on appeal. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The parties met at the University of Northern Iowa in 1979 and were married in 1983. The marriage was Georgia's first and Dhirendra's second. At the time of the marriage, Georgia was twenty-three years old and Dhirendra was forty-seven. The couple has two minor children, Eashaan, born in 1985, and Varun, born in 1988.
Dhirendra is a professor at the University of Northern Iowa. He teaches political science, international relations, and comparative politics. Dhirendra has a Master's Degree in English Literature, a Master's Degree in Public Administration, and a Ph.D. in Political Science. His current salary is $85,471. He began drawing social security retirement benefits in March of 2001. He has no current plans to retire from teaching.
Georgia earned a B.A. from the University of Northern Iowa prior to the marriage. Her major was public relations. In 1993, she completed additional coursework and earned a second major in economics. She earned a Master's Degree in Business Administration from the University of Northern Iowa in 1999. She was unemployed at the time of trial, but worked at several different jobs during the marriage.
Georgia filed a petition to dissolve the parties' marriage in January of 2001. At the time of trial, Georgia was forty-one and Dhirendra was sixty-five. The court dissolved the parties' marriage by decree entered February 5, 2002. The decree awarded the parties joint legal custody of their children. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, primary care was placed with Georgia. The court also ordered child support, alimony, and divided the parties' marital assets. Georgia appeals.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of dissolution decrees is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. We give weight to the district court's factual findings, particularly as to witness credibility, but are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g); In re Marriage of Knickerbocker, 601 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1999).
III. Discussion. A. The Property Division.
Georgia first contends the trial court failed to make an equitable division of the parties' marital assets. The trial court awarded Georgia net assets of $439,799. Her property award amounted to slightly more that thirty-seven percent of the net marital assets. The court awarded Dhirendra net assets of $744,054. Georgia does not challenge the court's valuation of the marital assets. Instead, she claims the parties' assets should have been equally divided because of the length of the marriage and her contributions to the marriage.
The parties to a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). Iowa courts do not require an equal division or percentage distribution. Id. The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each circumstance. Id. The distribution should be made in consideration of the criteria codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (2001). In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983).
The trial court concluded an unequal division of property was appropriate primarily because of the disproportionate share of premarital assets contributed by Dhirendra and his age at the time of trial. By her own admission, Georgia brought no property of significant value to the marriage. Dhirendra, on the other hand, brought a home with equity, an automobile, and a pension plan to which he had been contributing for a number of years. His pension plan had a value of $68,267.85 in 1983. By the time of trial, the pension assets Dhirendra brought to the marriage had increased in value to the sum of $422,987.03 because of appreciation in the stock market. The trial court found the total value of his pension plan, including the appreciated value of contributions made after the marriage, was $991,580. Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude the trial court made an equitable division of the assets of this marriage.
B. Alimony.
The trial court awarded Georgia alimony of $500 per month for six months following the decree. Georgia contends the court's alimony award should be increased to $1000 per month for sixty months.
Alimony is an allowance to the former spouse in lieu of a legal obligation to support that person. See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Alimony is not an absolute right; an award depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We consider the length of the marriage, age, health, earning capacities, levels of education, and the likelihood the party seeking alimony will be self-supporting at a standard of living comparable to the one enjoyed during the marriage. In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
Georgia is much younger than her former spouse and is in good health. She holds a B.A. and earned a Master's Degree during the marriage. She does not need additional education or training to achieve self-sufficiency. Although she was unemployed at the time of trial, Georgia has a significant work history. She has teaching experience at the college level and was employed full-time at Principal Financial during the latter part of the parties' marriage. The trial court found Georgia had the capacity to earn at least $30,000 per year based on her education and experience. Georgia received a substantial property award and will receive child support of $1442 per month until the parties' oldest child completes high school. We find it unnecessary to increase either the amount or the duration of the court's alimony award.
C. Trial Attorney Fees.
Georgia contends the trial court erred in failing to award her an additional $1500 in trial attorney fees. Iowa trial courts have considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees. Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d at 99. To overturn an award, the complaining party must show the trial court abused its discretion. Id. Dhirendra was ordered to pay Georgia $1000 in temporary attorneys fees as part of a temporary support order entered by the district court. Georgia received a sizable property award. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to award her additional attorney fees.
D. Appellate Attorney Fees.
Georgia seeks an award of appellate attorney fees. An award of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right but rests within our discretion. Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d at 389. We consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court's decision on appeal. Id. We decline to grant Georgia any appellate attorney fees.
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the trial court's property distribution and its alimony award. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant additional trial attorney fees. We award no attorney fees on appeal.