Opinion
No. 2-012 / 01-0404.
Filed February 20, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, RICHARD G. BLANE, II, Judge.
James Poppe appeals a district court ruling denying his motion to quash his former wife's garnishment proceeding instituted to satisfy a judgment entered as part of their original dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.
Susan Ekstrom, Des Moines, for appellant.
Harvey Harrison, of Harrison Dietz-Kilen, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
James Poppe appeals a district court ruling denying his motion to quash his former wife's garnishment proceeding instituted to satisfy a judgment entered as part of their original dissolution decree. James argues the district court erred in ruling that: (1) he had failed to show that he had already satisfied the judgment when Peggy Poppe signed a quit claim deed to marital property; (2) Peggy's action was not barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel; and (3) Peggy's recovery was not barred by the doctrine of laches. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . The marriage of James and Peggy Poppe was dissolved by decree in March 1984. Peggy was awarded a $15,000 property settlement, secured by a lien against business property in Greeley, Iowa, that was awarded to James. In July 1984, Peggy executed a quitclaim deed to the property releasing the lien. The quitclaim deed cited consideration of less than $500. On July 30, 1984, James sold the property to the City of Greeley for $35,000.
On November 13, 2000, Peggy filed a notice of garnishment directed to Wells Fargo, James's bank, to satisfy the $15,000 judgment. James filed a motion to quash the garnishment action, claiming that he had satisfied the judgment at the time Peggy signed the quitclaim deed in 1984.
Peggy testified she was intimidated into signing the quitclaim deed by James's threat to not return their minor child to her care if she did not sign it. She maintained James told her he was giving the property to the City of Greeley, and the quitclaim deed would not affect the money he owed her under the property settlement. Peggy claimed she waited nearly seventeen years to enforce the terms of the property settlement because she was afraid of James and wanted to wait until she was no longer dependent on his child support payments.
James, however, asserted that he borrowed against his truck, took money from his checking account, and used a student loan to pay the $15,000 judgment. He asserted Peggy should be equitably estopped from raising this claim after waiting so long, especially since she had previously instituted actions to modify his child support obligation. He further claimed Peggy's recovery was barred by the doctrine of laches.
The district court denied James's motion to quash, concluding he had introduced no evidence that the judgment had been paid except for Peggy's execution of a quitclaim deed. The court also ruled Peggy's action was not barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel as she had done nothing to waive her right to collect the judgment. The court lastly ruled Peggy's claim was not barred by the doctrine of laches because James failed to prove he was prejudiced by any delay in enforcement of the decree. James has appealed.
II. Scope of Review . Our scope of review in this equity action is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4. We give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially in matters of credibility, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(7). The appeal in an equity case is not a trial de novo, but is limited to de novo review of identified and preserved error. Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996).
III. Satisfaction of Judgment. James first argues the district court erred in concluding he failed to prove he satisfied the $15,000 judgment when Peggy signed the quitclaim deed. He asserts the only way Peggy would have signed the quitclaim deed was if she had received payment. We find no merit to this argument.
The quitclaim deed is the only evidence James introduced to support his assertion the judgment was satisfied. He introduced no check, receipt, or independent witness to verify that he paid Peggy $15,000 at the time she signed the quitclaim deed. James acknowledged at trial that because Peggy was receiving government assistance following their divorce, government records would have indicated whether such a payment had been made to her, yet he failed to conduct any discovery to obtain such information. He also failed to obtain Peggy's bank account records, which might have indicated whether any large deposits to her account were made.
Peggy testified there was a restraining order against James at the time she signed the quitclaim deed and that she was afraid of him. She claimed James threatened to withhold the return of their minor child to her care if she did not sign the deed. She asserted James informed her when she signed the quitclaim deed that it would not affect his obligation to pay the judgment. Peggy further testified she waited sixteen years to enforce the judgment because she was dependent on James's child support payments, and decided to enforce it only after James's child support obligation terminated.
The district court was in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. Kuta v. Newberg, 600 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Iowa 1999). We conclude that based on the record before the district court, the court correctly ruled that James failed to prove satisfaction of the $15,000 judgment.
IV. Equitable Estoppel . James next argues Peggy's claim was barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. He disputes Peggy's' claim that she waited to institute the garnishment action because she was scared of him, noting that she twice instituted modification proceedings to increase his child support obligation. He maintains Peggy should be estopped from instituting a garnishment sixteen years after the challenged event occurred when she had prior opportunities to do so.
In support of his equitable estoppel argument, James cites to In re Marriage of Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 755 (Iowa 1994); Davidson v. Van Lengen, 266 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1978); and Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W. 829 (Iowa 1973). We find all three cases distinguishable from the present case.
The elements necessary to prove equitable estoppel are well established: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts by the opposing party; (2) a lack of knowledge of the true facts on the part of the party asserting the defense, (3) intention on the part of the opposing party that the representations be acted upon; and (4) reliance by the asserting party on such representations to their prejudice or injury. Hendricks v. Great Plains Supply Co., 609 N.W.2d 486, 493 (Iowa 2000). All of these elements must be proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence in order to establish a claim of equitable estoppel. Cranston v. Saggau, 526 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
In Harvey,the wife orally agreed that the husband would not have to pay child support while their minor child lived with him. Harvey, 523 N.W.2d at 756. She further agreed to execute a satisfaction of judgment for the husband's accruing child support, but later disavowed her promise and instituted garnishment proceedings to collect the arrearage. Id. The supreme court concluded the wife was equitably estopped from collecting the past-due arrearages since the wife had knowingly entered the oral agreement to forego child support payments during the period in question. Id. at 757.
In Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 1973), a mother sought to enforce a child support judgment entered for the benefit of her daughter who was then an adult. The court found the mother knew of her right to child support for seventeen years but failed to pursue it, leading the father to believe she intended to waive or abandon it. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d at 834. Based on the father's reliance on the mother's acquiescence, the supreme court ruled the mother was equitably estopped from enforcing the child support judgment. Id.
In Davidson v. Van Lengen, 266 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Iowa 1978), the father filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the mother was equitably estopped from enforcing a child support judgment because of her near twenty-year acquiescence in the status quo, whereby he ceased visitation and she agreed not to enforce the support obligation. The supreme court concluded the mother was equitably estopped from enforcing the child support judgment since she was aware of her right to enforce it but chose not to. Davidson, 266 N.W.2d at 439.
Peggy vehemently denied she received payment, and explained her failure to enforce the judgment by testifying she was afraid of James, and that she waited until his child support obligation terminated in order to gain a better bargaining position. She further testified James informed her that signing the deed would not affect the payment of her judgment. Peggy did nothing over the years to lead James to believe she did not intend to collect the judgment. The trial court concluded that James failed to prove he paid the debt. He could not reasonably believe that Peggy would never attempt to collect. His hope she would not attempt to enforce her judgment does not allow him to avoid his obligation. See Cullinan v. Cullinan, 226 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Iowa 1975). Based on these facts, we do not believe the district court erred in concluding Peggy was not equitably estopped from enforcing her judgment.
V . Laches . For similar reasons, we reject James's argument that Peggy's claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. The doctrine of laches relates to the unreasonable delay in the assertion or prosecution of a claim, working to the disadvantage or prejudice of another. Henderson v. Millis, 373 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Iowa 1985). The mere passage of time is not enough to establish laches, and each case is governed by its own circumstances. Id. James financially benefited from the property's sale by receiving $35,000 and had unbridled discretion in its use over the years. The accrual of $25,000 interest on the debt is not a detriment as he has had the use of the funds over the years. He cannot show prejudice merely because he believed he had escaped his obligation to pay the judgment. See Cullinan, 226 N.W.2d at 36 (Iowa 1975). We therefore affirm the district court's ruling denying James's motion to quash garnishment.
AFFIRMED.