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In re the Marriage of McKamey

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 12, 2003
662 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)

Opinion

No. 2-926 / 02-0603

Filed February 12, 2003

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, J. Hobart Darbyshire, Judge.

Neal McKamey appeals from district court orders granting postsecondary education expenses and attorney fees in a contempt action. REVERSED.

Paul Bieber of Gomez, May, Cartee Schutte, Davenport, for appellant.

Steven Jacobs, Jean Feeney, and Lisa Taylor of Betty, Neuman McMahon, L.L.P., Davenport, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.


Neal McKamey appeals from the district court's rulings in a contempt action which ordered him to pay a postsecondary education subsidy and attorney fees. We reverse.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In April of 1999, the district court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Neal and Michele McKamey. At the time the decree was entered, the parties' daughter, Katherine, was a freshman in college. On February 12, 2002, Michele filed a contempt action pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.23 (2001). Among other things, her application alleged Neal had failed to pay postsecondary education expenses for Katherine as ordered in the decree.

Following hearing on the contempt action, the district court determined the language of the decree regarding postsecondary education was ambiguous. As a result, the court found Neal had not willfully disobeyed the decree. The court did not find Neal in contempt. However, the district court did find Neal in default of the dissolution decree. The court then calculated his support obligation and ordered him to pay his daughter Katherine the sum of $11,140, or an average of $3713 for each of the past three years, as a retroactive postsecondary education subsidy. The court ordered the judgment to be paid within sixty days of the entry of its ruling. Later, the court entered a separate order requiring Neal to pay $1171.38 in attorney fees pursuant to section 598.24. Neal has appealed from both rulings.

II. Scope of Review.

Contempt proceedings under chapter 598 are reviewed at law, not de novo. Sulma v. Iowa Dist. Court, 574 N.W.2d 320, 321 (Iowa 1998); In re Marriage of Swan, 526 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1995). The question is whether the district court acted illegally or without jurisdiction. Madyun v. Iowa Dist Court, 544 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1996). If it is claimed that a ruling is not supported by substantial evidence, we examine the record, not de novo, but to assure ourselves the proper proof supports the judgment. In re Marriage of Spears, 529 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). We are not bound by the trial court's conclusions of law and may inquire whether the trial court applied erroneous rules of law that materially affect its decision. Id.

III. Discussion.

Neal challenges both the district court's entry of a judgment for postsecondary education expenses and its award of attorney fees. He claims the court's orders are unsupported by the record and contrary to the applicable statutes. We agree.

A person who has willfully disobeyed the provisions of a dissolution decree may be found in contempt pursuant to section 598.23(1). The order creating the duty in question must be clear and unambiguous. See Copic v. Iowa Dist. Court, 356 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1984). The remedies available to the court when a person willfully disobeys a decree include the imposition of sanctions or specific requirements. Iowa Code § 598.23(2)(d). In order for the court to impose such remedies, it must have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a party willfully violated the decree. See McKinley v. Iowa Dist. Court, 542 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1996).

The parties' decree contains the following provision regarding postsecondary education, "In respect to [Katherine's] post-high school education, the parties shall comply with the Iowa law and specifically Sections 598.1(8) and 598.21(5A) of the Code of Iowa (1999) as amended." Section 598.21(5A) grants a trial court discretion to order a postsecondary education subsidy if good cause is shown.

The district court concluded Neal could not be held in contempt based on the decree's lack of clear direction and ambiguity. Substantial evidence supports this finding. The decree does not establish the amount of Neal's support obligation, and the record reveals Michele has never provided him with information or documentation regarding the amount she claimed he owed as his share of postsecondary education expenses. After the dissolution decree was entered, neither party ever sought the district court's assistance in clarifying or modifying the provisions of the decree. Neal testified he tried to maintain a relationship with his daughter, but she does not respond to his inquiries. He has not received a grade report from Katherine since she has been in college. Michele did not attempt to enforce the postsecondary education provision of the decree until almost three years after the decree was entered. By then, Katherine was a senior in college.

Michelle does not challenge the district court's failure to hold Neal in contempt on appeal. She also acknowledges the language of section 598.23(2)(d), which provides the trial court may impose specific sanctions or specific requirements as an alternative to punishment for contempt, is premised on a finding that a party is in contempt of a dissolution decree. Nevertheless, she contends the district court had the inherent equitable power to enter judgment against Neal for postsecondary education support. We disagree. Section 598.23 provides the district court with a variety of remedies to deal with a party found in contempt for willfully disobeying a dissolution decree. The section contains no language granting courts authority to impose sanctions or specific requirements on a person found in default, but not in contempt. Moreover, we conclude the record does not support the district court's conclusion that Neal was in default of the decree when the judgment against him was entered. We reject Michele's suggestion that the trial court had the inherent equitable power to enter a judgment for postsecondary expenses against Neal after concluding that Michele did not prove that Neal violated any provision of the parties' dissolution decree.

We also conclude the court improperly awarded Michele attorney fees under section 598.24. Section 598.24 permits a court to award attorney fees when a contempt action is brought and a party is found in default or contempt of a dissolution decree. Based on our conclusion that Neal was not shown to be in default of the parties' decree, we find the statutory requirements for an award of attorney fees were not met. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's ruling granting attorney fees to Michele and awarding Katherine postsecondary education expenses.

REVERSED.


Summaries of

In re the Marriage of McKamey

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 12, 2003
662 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)
Case details for

In re the Marriage of McKamey

Case Details

Full title:IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF NEAL E. MCKAMEY and MICHELE A. MCKAMEY. Upon the…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Feb 12, 2003

Citations

662 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)