Opinion
No. 3-092 / 02-1321.
Filed April 30, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, WILLIAM THOMAS, Judge.
Peter Jones appeals from the spousal support provision of the decree dissolving the parties' marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Steven Howes and Sherry Schulte of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Karen Volz of Ackley, Kopecky and Kingery, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Peter Jones appeals from the decree dissolving his marriage to Betty Jones. Peter argues the district court erred when it awarded Betty $1200 per month in permanent or traditional spousal support. While we find an award of permanent support to be appropriate under the circumstances, we conclude the amount of the award should be reduced.
Background Facts and Proceedings . Peter and Betty Jones were married in 1972. Peter, who holds a high school diploma, was the primary earner during the parties' twenty-nine year marriage. He began working for Mid Iowa Tools in the early 1990s. Before joining the company, Peter had not earned over $40,000 a year. He did well with Mid Iowa Tools, however, and by 2001 was earning $130,000 a year.
Due to a serious economic downturn in the company, Peter accepted a $55,000-a-year salary decrease in January 2002. Fearing an eventual loss of his job, Peter made extensive efforts to obtain a new position. In May 2002 he took a job for $26,000 to $28,000 a year, and in July 2002 accepted a job with one of Mid Iowa's competitors for $48,000 per year.
Betty has a two-year AA degree in business from a community college, and for all but five years of the marriage held various full and part-time service, retail, in-home health care, and clerical-related positions. From 1988 to 2000 Betty worked in a credit union and then a bank, in both clerical and financial positions. During that time her average salary was around $13,000, with a top yearly salary of $23,171. In 2000 Betty lost her job with the bank due to a corporate merger. She then took an administrative assistant job, working thirty to thirty-five hours a week for $9 or $10 an hour, for an approximate gross yearly salary of $16,000.
At the time of the July 2002 dissolution, Peter was fifty-one years old, and Betty was fifty years old. Their two daughters were both adults. While Betty had some limited medical concerns, both parties were in good heath. Neither party had health insurance at the time of the hearing, but Peter was soon to receive single coverage from his employer at a cost to him of $80 per month.
In dissolving the parties' marriage the district court made a nearly equal property division. Peter was awarded the heavily encumbered marital home, a vehicle, and some furniture. Betty was awarded a vehicle, a small savings account, and some antiques and furniture. Neither party had a pension, but each received one-half of Peter's $65,000 401K plan from Mid Iowa Tools. After debt allocation, and an equalization payment from Peter to Betty, each party received about $52,700 in net assets. The district court also awarded Betty $1200 a month in permanent spousal support, to terminate upon the death of either party, or Betty's remarriage. Peter appeals, challenging both the duration and amount of the support award.
Scope of Review . We conduct a de novo review of dissolution proceedings. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. We give weight to the district court's findings of fact, but are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g).
Spousal Support . A spousal support award compensates a party who leaves the marriage at a financial disadvantage, particularly where, as here, there is a large disparity in earnings. In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). An award is dependent upon each party's earning capacity and present standard of living, as well as the ability of the paying spouse to meet the obligation, and the other party's need for support. In re Marriage of Volding, 544 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). A number of factors are relevant to a support award, including the length of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the educational level of each party, the earning capacity of the spouse seeking support, particulars surrounding that spouse's ability to become self-sufficient, and the property distribution. Iowa Code § 598.21(3) (2001). In a marriage of long duration, especially if there is a great disparity in earning capacity, both a spousal support award and a substantially equal property division may be appropriate. See In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Iowa 1993).
Peter contends that Betty is entitled to only five years of rehabilitative support of $500 per month. However, the purpose of rehabilitative spousal support is to sustain an economically dependent spouse during a limited period of education and retraining. In re Marriage of O'Rourke, 547 N.W.2d 864, 866-67 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). The primary goal of such an award is self-sufficiency by the previously-dependant spouse. Id. Under the record in this case, there is little or no evidence indicating further education or training would allow Betty to achieve an appropriate level of self-sufficiency. On the contrary, this twenty-nine year marriage is typical of those where a traditional or permanent support award is appropriate.
Although Betty worked outside the home the majority of the marriage, it is clear that her earning capacity did not increase greatly but Peter's did. We are mindful of the fact that Peter's income has decreased significantly in the past couple of years, and that it appears he is working at or near the top of a significantly reduced earning capacity. Nevertheless, his earning capacity remains far superior to Betty's. Even if Betty could obtain a job with slightly better pay, or more hours and benefits, given her employment background it does not appear any such position would provide a salary sufficient for self support at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to award Betty permanent alimony. See id. at 866 (noting traditional alimony is payable for life, or for as long as the dependent spouse is incapable of self-support).
Betty, as a dependent spouse, is entitled to be supported at a level that resembles, as closely as possible, the standard of living that existed during the marriage. In re Marriage of Stark, 542 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). The amount of the support award is constrained, however, by Peter's ability to meet the obligation without destroying his own right to enjoy a comparable standard of living. Id. Given the decrease in Peter's income, neither party will be able to achieve the standard of living enjoyed in the last few years of the marriage. We therefore look to a monthly payment that is appropriate given the parties' present financial circumstances, including incomes and earning capacities.
In reviewing the relevant information, we find that a monthly obligation of $1200 is somewhat excessive, and conclude that an award of $800 per month more appropriately balances Betty's need for support with Peter's ability to meet the obligation. We therefore modify the dissolution decree to reduce Peter's support obligation to $800 per month. However, given the present uncertainty as to each party's post-retirement situation, we decline Peter's invitation to further reduce his support obligation when he reaches retirement age. If Peter finds that he is unable to meet the current level of his support obligation once he reaches retirement, he may petition for modification of the dissolution decree. See In re Marriage of Bell, 576 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
Attorney Fees . Betty seeks attorney fees on appeal. Such an award is discretionary and is determined by assessing the needs of the requesting party, the opposing party's ability to pay, and whether the requesting party was forced to defend the appeal. In re Marriage of Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Iowa 1991). In considering the facts of this case, we decline to award Betty appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.