Opinion
No. 2-035 / 01-1088.
Filed March 27, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, MARK J. SMITH, Judge.
Heike Dawson appeals the dissolution decree entered by the district court, which was based on the parties' settlement agreement. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Douglas Scovil, of Ruud, Scovil Marsh, Rock Island, for appellant.
Steven Jacobs and Jean Feeney, of Betty, Neuman McMahon, L.L.P. Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Heike Dawson appeals the dissolution decree entered by the district court, which was based on the parties' settlement agreement. She claims she withdrew her consent to the settlement agreement before the agreement was submitted to the court. She also claims the decree should have required Richard Dawson to name her as a surviving spouse in his pension plan. We reverse and remand.
Heike and Richard were previously married. After nearly thirty-four years of marriage, on July 5, 2000, Heike filed a petition for dissolution. The parties' circumstances were somewhat unusual because they had not lived together for about twenty years.
The parties, with their respective attorneys, had a settlement conference on February 22 and 23, 2001, on the issue of property division, which was the only point of contention between them. The parties reached an agreement, and this was incorporated in a proposed dissolution decree. Before the decree was presented to the district court, Heike decided she no longer consented to the settlement agreement.
Richard filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and a hearing was held on the matter. Heike's former attorney, Stephen Newport, testified he believed the parties had reached a final agreement. Richard also testified he believed the parties had a final agreement and the proposed decree reflected that agreement. Heike stated the proposed decree did not reflect the parties' agreement because it included a provision that she would not be named as surviving spouse on Richard's pension plan. She also claimed she did not have sufficient time to review the financial documents she received from Richard to be able to make intelligent decisions regarding the distribution of property.
The district court determined the parties entered into an agreement that should be enforced. The court stated the dissolution decree should eliminate the terminology that precluded Heike from receiving surviving spouse benefits under Richard's pension plan. The dissolution decree, based on the parties' settlement agreement, was filed on June 12, 2001. Heike appealed.
Our scope of review in this equitable action is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.; see also Linn County v. Kindred, 373 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa Ct.App. 1985). In equity cases, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court gives weight to the fact findings of the district court, but is not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
This was formerly Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.
This was formerly Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(f)(7).
Heike contends she could reject the settlement agreement at any time prior to its acceptance by the court, citing In re Marriage of Hansen, 465 N.W.2d 906, 908-09 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). Hansen provides:
It is not sufficient to support the judgment that a party's consent thereto may at one time have been given; consent must exist at the very moment the court undertakes to make the agreement the judgment of the court.Hansen, 465 N.W.2d at 908 (quoting Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar, 249 Iowa 504, 508-09, 87 N.W.2d 311, 313-14 (1958)); see also In re Marriage of Bries, 499 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993).
However, since Hansen and Bries were decided, our supreme court has repudiated Van Donselaar, stating:
To the extent that our decision in Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar, 249 Iowa 504, 87 N.W.2d 311 (1958), suggests that consent to judgment may be withdrawn as of right at any time prior to actual entry of judgment, that view is now specifically disapproved. We have recognized that a stipulation for disposition of an entire issue is entitled to all of the sanctity of an ordinary contract if supported by legal consideration.In re Property Seized, 501 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Iowa 1993). Because Van Donselaar is no longer good authority, we determine Hansen and Bries are no longer good authority on the question of whether consent to a settlement agreement may be withdrawn anytime prior to the entry of judgment by the district court.
When a settlement agreement encompasses an entire issue, the district court's function is as follows:
[A] court's role in approving a consent decree involves a determination of whether the provisions upon which the parties have agreed constitute an appropriate and legally approved method of disposing of the contested issues in the litigation. It is not necessary to uphold the validity of a consent decree that the solutions contained therein contained be those the court itself would have adopted if it were adjudicating the controversy.In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Property Seized, 501 N.W.2d at 485). In addition to being an appropriate and legally approved method of deciding the issues, the settlement agreement must be supported by consideration. Id.
In the present case, the only contested issue was the division of property. The settlement agreement encompassed this entire issue. We determine the settlement agreement constituted an appropriate and legally approved method of disposing of this issue. Iowa Code section 598.21(1)(k) provides, "Any written agreement made by the parties concerning property distribution" may be considered by the court. Furthermore, the settlement agreement was supported by consideration. Each party received a portion of the marital assets, and waived any further rights to the assets received by the other party. Based on all of these factors, we conclude the settlement agreement was enforceable.
The fact the settlement agreement was enforceable does not answer the question of whether the agreement should be enforced. In this regard, the supreme court has stated:
We are, however, not ousting the district court of its power to determine whether the court should approve the stipulation. In dissolution of marriage matters, for example, the court may determine the stipulation regarding property or support is unfair or contrary to law. In those circumstances, the court retains the power to reject the stipulation.Id.
In the present case, the district court determined the settlement agreement was enforceable and proceeded to enforce it, without consideration of whether the agreement was unfair. The court stated, "Whether or not it was a good agreement or not is irrelevant because [Heike] agreed to it." There is insufficient evidence in the record for us, on de novo review, to determine whether the settlement agreement was fair and equitable to the parties.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Because we are remanding we do not consider Heike's claim the decree should have required Richard to name her as a surviving spouse in his pension plan.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ., concur; HUITINK, P.J. dissents.
I agree with the majority that In re Marriage of Hansen, 465 N.W.2d 906 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990), and In re Marriage of Bries, 499 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993), are no longer good authority on the issue of whether consent to a settlement agreement may be withdrawn any time prior to the entry of judgment by the district court.
However, I would affirm the decision of the district court. Settlement agreements are essentially contractual in nature. Phipps v. Winneshiek County, 593 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1999). Thus, like a contract, a settlement agreement should be enforced absent fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment. Id. There is no evidence in the present case of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment. I would enforce the settlement agreement.