Opinion
No. 2-1032 / 02-0388.
Filed February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Humboldt County, Allan L. Goode, Judge.
Krystal Bell alleges the district court erred in construing the provisions of the dissolution decree relating to dependency exemptions. AFFIRMED.
David Skilling of Skilling Law Office, Algona, for appellant.
Joseph Straub of Winkel Straub, Algona, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Krystal Bell alleges the district court erred in construing the provisions of the dissolution decree relating to dependency exemptions. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. The marriage of Krystal and Daniel Bell was dissolved by decree on February 2, 1993. The dissolution decree provided that Krystal would have primary care of the parties' six minor children. The decree also adopted a stipulation entered into by the parties. Paragraph 5 of the stipulation provides as follows:
Dependent For Tax Purposes. The father shall be allowed to claim the children as dependents for State and Federal tax purposes as long as he is current in child support payments by January 15 of the following year, and they qualify as dependents under the Internal Revenue Code, with the following exception. If the mother's earned income in any year is in excess of $2,000 but less than $5,000 she shall be allowed one child as a dependent. If the mother's earned income in any year is in excess of $5,000 she shall be allowed two children as dependents.
Each party shall execute all forms required by the state or federal government to permit or to verify that dependency exemption status. If either party improperly refuses to execute such forms on request, he or she shall be personally liable for all expenses incurred by the other party, including any attorney's fees necessary to procure compliance with this stipulation.
For several years prior to 1999, Krystal signed Form 8332 — Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents — which enabled Daniel to claim the parties' six minor children as dependents for tax purposes. In 1999 Krystal refused to sign Form 8332 and since has refused to sign said form in years 2000 and 2001. On December 19, 2001, Daniel filed an application with the district court requesting that Krystal be compelled to sign Form 8332 for years 1999-2001. Krystal filed a response contending Daniel did not meet the requirements set forth in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to allow him to qualify for the dependency exemption.
At hearing, Krystal testified her earned income was zero in 1999 and 2000. She also testified Daniel was current in paying his child support obligation by January 15 of the following year as required by the stipulation. Following a hearing, the district court concluded Daniel was entitled to claim the parties' six children as dependency exemptions for tax years 1999-2001 because his child support payments were current and the children qualified as dependents. Krystal appeals.
Construction of Decree. The determinative factor in construing a dissolution decree is the intention of the court granting the decree as gathered from all parts of the decree. In re Estate of Jones, 434 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa Ct.App. 1988). To determine this intent, we take the decree by its four corners and try to ascertain its intent as disclosed by the various provisions of the decree. Id. In construing a judgment or decree, force and effect should be given every word, if possible, to give it a consistent, effective, and reasonable meaning. In re Marriage of Lawson, 409 N.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Iowa 1987). "Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as that which is expressed." Id. at 182.
Both parties agree Daniel can claim the children as dependents if he is current in his child support payment by January 15 of the following year. The parties disagree over the following language in the stipulation: "they qualify as dependents under the Internal Revenue Code." Krystal contends the disputed language means Daniel must qualify for the dependency exemption under the IRC. Daniel interprets the language "they qualify" to mean the children must qualify as dependents under the definition of dependent set forth in the IRC. The district court concluded and we agree:
The decretal language does not support [Krystal's] contention.
In the disputed clause, the word "they" obviously refers to the children, and it simply means they must come within the statutory definition of who a dependent is. It does not say that [Daniel] must qualify to claim them as dependents under the Code. If that's what the parties meant, they could have said so, but didn't.
Contrary to [Krystal's] assertion, the plain language of the stipulation provides that [Daniel] is entitled to the exemptions if his support is current, and the children qualify as dependents, not which parent would be entitled to claim them as a dependent under the several regulations of the IRS Code absent the stipulation and decree.
In substance, the stipulation supercedes the statutory test of who is entitled to exemptions. Indeed, one of the reasons why parties stipulate to the exemptions is to avoid an annual, contentious application of multiple, complex rules to determine who can claim the children as deductions on their tax returns.
Since Daniel is current in his child support obligation and the six children fall within the definition of dependent set forth in the IRC, we find Daniel is entitled to claim the six children as dependents for tax years 1999-2001 and Rachel is obligated to sign Form 8332. We further note if Rachel continues to have earned income of less than $2000, and Daniel is current on his child support obligation and the children continue to fall within the statutory definition of dependent then Rachel is obligated to sign Form 8332 in future years. On the other hand, if Rachel's earned income were to exceed $2000, then the stipulation provides she is entitled to claim one child and if her earned income exceeds $5000 she is entitled to claim two children. Then Daniel would be obligated to sign Form 8332.
For the reasons stated above, we hereby affirm the decision of the district court.