Opinion
No. 2-863 / 02-0190.
Filed February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County, Patrick Carr, Judge.
The respondent appeals a district court ruling denying her request for reinstatement of petitioners child support obligation. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Willis Hamilton of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Storm Lake, for appellant.
Dave Jennett, Storm Lake, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A divorced parent caring for an adult child seeks to have a child support obligation reinstated. The district court ruled it did not have authority to grant the request. We reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
David and Debra Allen divorced in 1997. Pursuant to a stipulation incorporated into the decree, Debra received physical care of the parties' three children and David agreed to pay child support until each child reached age eighteen or graduated from high school. The stipulation also provided that the child support obligation would continue between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two if the child was regularly attending school or college.
The parties' second child, Douglas, graduated from high school and attended college for two months. He then quit college and moved home. David stopped paying support for him.
At the age of twenty and while living at home, Douglas suffered severe injuries in a car accident. Debra quit her job to care for him.
Debra applied to modify the decree to revive David's support obligation for Douglas. The district court awarded temporary support but, in a subsequent summary judgment ruling, concluded there was no statutory basis to mandate support for an adult child who became dependent after the parent's support obligation expired. This appeal followed.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review the district court's summary judgment ruling on error. In re Marriage of Rykhoek, 525 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). We must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In re Marriage of Romanelli, 570 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Iowa 1997).
III. Support
Support of an adult dependent child is governed by Iowa Code section 598.1(6) (1995). See In re Marriage of Sojka, 611 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Iowa 2000) (looking to statute in effect on date of decree). This provision states in pertinent part:
"Support" or "support payments" means an amount which the court may require either of the parties to pay under a temporary order or a final judgment or decree, and may include alimony, child support, maintenance, and any other term used to describe these obligations. . . . The obligations . . . may include support for a child of any age who is dependent on the parties to the dissolution proceedings because of physical or mental disability.
(Emphasis added). Debra contends the emphasized language authorizes David to support Douglas. The district court rejected this contention, concluding:
The statute authorizes support for a child of any age who is disabled at the time of his or her parents' original divorce decree, or who becomes disabled at any time the original child support obligation continues. However, the statute does not authorize child support for a child of divorced parents who attains his or her majority and ceases to be eligible for any child support, and who later becomes disabled and dependent.
We believe In re Marriage of Pieper, 369 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1985), dictates a contrary result. Our highest court there held the district court had authority to revive a child support obligation after the payor had completed his obligations under the decree. Pieper, 369 N.W.2d at 440-41. The court reasoned that Iowa Code section 598.21(8), addressing modification of decrees, affords a district court continuing authority to modify a child support clause in the original decree. Id. at 441. The court further held that the court could modify the decree even after the child reached the age of majority because the statute provided for educational support to the age of twenty-two. Cf. In re Marriage of Marshall, 394 N.W.2d 392, 396 (Iowa 1986) (holding district court had power to modify alimony award after payor's obligation had expired); Wilcox v. Bradrick, 319 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1982) (holding child support order could be modified after payment obligation ended, up to the age of majority). See generally Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colorado 1983) (holding court's authority to order child support not limited by age of child); Sininger v. Sininger, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (Md.Ct.App. 1984) (holding parent who has means to do so has duty to support incapacitated adult whose disability commenced after he became adult).
This case is no different from Pieper. Iowa Code section 598.1(6) authorizes support for a child "of any age" who is dependent on the parents because of physical or mental disability. Because the court had the power to award adult dependent support at the time of the decree, it also had the power to modify a decree to provide such support, upon a showing of changed circumstances. Pieper, 369 N.W.2d at 442. See also Marshall, 394 N.W.2d at 396.
Debra has clearly established a substantial change in circumstances since the decree was entered. What is less clear from the summary judgment record is whether Douglas is "dependent" within the meaning of Iowa Code section 598.1(6) and, if he is, the amount of support that should be awarded. See In re Marriage of Nelson, 654 N.W.2d 551, 554-55 (Iowa 2002); In re Marriage of Clark, 577 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998); In re Marriage of Hansen, 514 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings to address these issues.