Opinion
No. 2-986 / 01-1944
Filed January 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Decatur County, Darrell Goodhue, Judge.
Christopher Short appeals a district court finding that he is a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2001). AFFIRMED.
Mark Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Greg Bal, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Lisa Nelson and Linda Hines, Assistant Attorneys General, and Carol Clark, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Christopher Short appeals a district court finding that he is a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2001). He claims: (1) chapter 229A violates the substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the jury instructions violated his right to substantive due process; and (3) evidence based on actuarial risk assessment instruments should not have been admitted. We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
The State filed a petition requesting Short's commitment as a sexually violent predator, pursuant to chapter 229A. In 1995 Short was convicted of lascivious acts with a child. While on probation from that offense, Short re-offended, resulting in a conviction of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The victim of the second offense was physically and mentally challenged. Short was diagnosed with pedophilia, which the State alleged would predispose him "to engage in future acts of sexual violence directed toward a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." The district court determined there was probable cause to conclude Short was a sexually violent predator.
Short filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.104(a), seeking to exclude expert testimony based on actuarial risk assessment instruments because such testimony was based on unsound scientific principles. The district court determined the evidence was admissible.
The case was tried before a jury. Dr. Harry Hoberman, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified Short suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and an impulse control disorder. He testified that because of the impulse control disorder, Short had a volitional incapacity regarding sexual offense acts. In assessing Short's risk to re-offend, Dr. Hoberman used actuarial risk assessment instruments. The jury found Short was a sexually violent predator. The district court committed Short to the Department of Human Services for "control, care, and treatment until such time as his mental abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be at large and will no longer constitute a menace to the health, safety and welfare [of] the people of the State of Iowa." Short appeals.
II. Standard of Review
This civil action was tried at law, and our review is for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001). On constitutional issues, however, our review is de novo, in light of the totality of the circumstances. In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000).
III. Substantive Due Process
Short claims chapter 229A violates the substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not narrowly tailor its application only to those who have serious difficulties controlling their behavior. He also claims the jury instructions were constitutionally improper for this same reason. For both of these arguments Short relies on Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002).
These issues were not raised before the district court. We will only review an issue raised on appeal if it was first presented to and ruled on by the district court. State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 2002). Because this constitutional claim was not asserted in district court, it will not be considered on appeal. See State v. Leutfaimany, 585 N.W.2d 200, 209 (Iowa 1998).
IV. Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments
Short contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony based on actuarial risk assessment instruments. These instruments consider several factors, such as criminal history, treatment history, and social background, to assess whether a person is at risk to re-offend. Short asserts the instruments are too scientifically unreliable to be admissible on this issue.
In Iowa, we are committed to a liberal view on the admissibility of expert testimony. Leaf v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 531 (Iowa 1999). The decision to admit or exclude opinion evidence rests within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Iowa 1999).
In previously considering this issue, we stated:
Following a careful review of the record, we conclude the district court ably summed up the issues and was correct in determining the evidence concerning actuarial risk assessment instruments went to the weight the evidence should receive as opposed to the issue of admissibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa Ct.App. 2002). As in Holtz, the actuarial risk assessment instruments were not introduced alone, but were part of a clinical evaluation. We conclude Short's complaints concerning the instruments go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See Hunter v. Bd. of Trustees, 481 N.W.2d 510, 520 (Iowa 1992); Mercy Hosp. v. Hansen, Lind Meyer, P.C., 456 N.W.2d 666, 671-62 (Iowa 1990).
We affirm the decision of the district court.