Opinion
No. 1-953 / 01-0304
Filed February 12, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, James E. Kelley, Judge.
The defendant appeals a district court judgment, following a jury trial, finding that he was a violent sexual predator pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Mark Smith, First Assistant Public Defender, and Thomas Gaul, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Charles Echols appeals a district court ruling, following a jury trial, that he is a violent sexual predator as defined in Iowa Code section 229A.2(3) (1999). Echols argues (1) he was denied his due process right to a fair trial when the district court refused to adopt his proposed jury instruction concerning the definition of "mental abnormality", and (2) the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts and victim testimony. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The State filed a petition alleging Echols was a violent sexual predator. Prior to trial, the district court ruled that under section 229A.2(3) the State was only required to prove Echols had an impairment of his ability to control his behavior. Jury Instruction #11 defined a "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity of a person and predisposing that person to commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others."
The jury returned a verdict finding Echols was a sexually violent predator, and the district court entered judgment and committed Echols to the medical and classification center in Oakdale, Iowa, until such time as his mental abnormality was successfully treated and it was safe for him to be released. Echols appealed. We filed our decision in this case on May 31, 2002 affirming the district court's ruling. Echols's petition for rehearing was granted.
Echols contends the district court's jury instruction defining "mental abnormality" violated his due process rights. Echols proposed the following language be included in the instruction:
Before you the jury may find the Respondent suffers from a mental abnormality, you must find the mental abnormality suffered by the Respondent is a volitional impairment that makes it difficult if not impossible for him to control his dangerous behavior. Furthermore, the law requires proof of more than mere predisposition to violence; it requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior from the Respondent and a present mental condition that creates a high likelihood of such sexually violent conduct in the future if the person is not confined in a secure facility.
The district court denied the proposed instruction, concluding that section 229A.2(3) did not require the State to prove Echols had a complete lack of control over his behavior, but only an impairment of his ability.
In In re Detention of Barnes, N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2003), our supreme court ruled that in chapter 229A cases, a serious lack-of-control requirement must be included in the jury instructions to safeguard an accused's due process rights. The court suggested the following instruction be used:
As used in this instruction, "mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.
The district court's jury instruction in the present case did not reflect this concept. Based on the holding in Barnes, we reverse and remand this case for a new trial.
Echols also contends the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts and testimony from one of the victims. Because these issues may arise on retrial we address them here. He argues it was prejudicial to introduce evidence of prior bad acts since there was already evidence of his mental illness and since he stipulated to his conviction for the underlying offense. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and victim testimony. This evidence was essential to the State in rebutting Echols's claim he had no intent to commit a violent sexual offense, and provided a more complete picture of a person unwilling to admit to past behavior. In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001).