Opinion
No. 65828-0-I.
Filed: April 18, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 09-7-01273-1, Steven C. Gonzalez, J., entered July 21, 2010.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Becker, J., concurred in by Leach, A.C.J., and Schindler, J.
Amanda Jones appeals the termination of her parental rights concerning her third child, D.L.-R.W. Jones contests the trial court's findings that she was offered all reasonably necessary services, that she was unlikely to correct conditions in the near future, that her continued relationship to her daughter would impair her daughter's chances of early integration into a stable home, and that termination was in her daughter's best interest. Because substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact, we affirm.
D.W. was born on August 20, 2006. She is the third child of Amanda Jones. Her two older sisters, born July 18, 2000, and April 1, 2002, were removed from Jones' care in the summer of 2002. They have since been adopted. By the time of trial, her younger sister, born May 9, 2009, had been removed from Jones' care in dependency status as well. Jones carried a fifth child to term in 2007, but the child was stillborn.
Dennis Williams is the biological father of D.W. and D.W's younger sister. He has a long criminal history, including several assaults and domestic violence convictions. His parental rights to both children have been terminated by default.
Jones has an extensive criminal history as well, dating back to 1995 when she was 12 years old. On January 31, 2007, when D.W. was 5 months old, Jones was arrested for testing positive for cocaine in violation of the terms of her probation on another cocaine related conviction. D.W. was with Jones when she was arrested. Jones left her daughter with the arresting officer. Jones later entered a voluntary placement agreement for D.W. to live with her paternal aunt, Evelyn Williams.
On March 8, 2007, Jones agreed to participate in a number of services, including drug and alcohol assessments, mental health counseling, parenting classes, psychological evaluations, and anger management classes. On May 16, 2007, the Department of Social and Health Services filed the dependency petition in D.W.'s case.
An agreed dependency order was filed on July 18, 2007. The order required the Department to provide Jones with casework services, to make referrals for service providers, and to monitor her case progress. Jones was to continue in drug and alcohol treatment, mental health counseling, random urinalysis, obtain a psychological evaluation with a parenting component, and to cooperate with any recommended treatment.
Jones obtained a psychological evaluation from Dr. Diane Fligstein on September 1, 2007. Jones gave Dr. Fligstein an account of her life that differed from the version she had recounted in a 2005 evaluation with another doctor. Dr. Fligstein diagnosed Jones with polysubstance abuse by history and a personality disorder with antisocial features. Dr. Fligstein suggested that Jones continue drug and alcohol treatment, regular supervised visitation with D.W., and parenting classes and support groups. She recommended Jones "participate in counseling to address her personality issues. However, she is likely to be quite challenging as a client as she minimizes and denies problems. Treatment is likely to be long-term, i.e., one to three years. Her ability to benefit from treatment remains in question."
The Department helped Jones to engage in the recommended services, which she did. Jones graduated from a three year substance abuse treatment program in January 2010. She took parenting classes and attended some support group meetings. She worked with Amy Ingram of Therapeutic Health Services as her mental health counselor.
The Department filed a termination petition in March 2009. But based on Jones' seeming progress after the petition was filed, the Department attempted to reunite her with D.W. in late 2009. D.W., though still in dependency status, moved in with her infant sister and Jones on December 15, 2009. On January 12, 2009, Jones was arrested for robbery and assault relating to an incident in August 2009. D.W. and her sister were removed from Jones' care. Several months later they were placed together in the same foster home.
Also in 2009, Jones tested positive for oxycodone and codeine. She never provided the Department with proof of a prescription for the codeine. She continued to test positive for prescription pain killers through May 2010. Her hospital and prescription records were not consistent with the test results.
In March 2010, the Department filed another petition to terminate Jones' parental rights concerning D.W. A fact-finding hearing was set for June 30, 2010. On May 26, 2010, the dependency court appointed special advocate program filed a report with the court for the fact-finding hearing. D.W.'s special advocate, Maryann Curran, said that D.W. was "physically healthy and developmentally on target in all areas." The advocate said she had been the special advocate for all four of Jones' children since 2004. Curran acknowledged some recent progress. But, Curran said, "Ms. Jones' most concerning issue does not appear to have been remedied. Ms. Jones has had an ongoing pattern of being with dangerous partners and acquaintances who have hurt her and her children and of engaging in criminal and violent activities which place her and her children at risk." Jones "actively resists requirements to not allow" her child's father to contact her children.
Curran wrote that Jones' mental health counselor, Ami Ingram, had reported to the Department in December 2009 that Jones appeared able to set boundaries and manage stress as learned in therapy. But Ingram told Curran in March 2010 that Jones kept her therapy separate from her life and would only discuss her depression and insomnia. Ingram said Jones refused to discuss her personality diagnosis and refused to take any medication for her depression.
The four day fact-finding hearing began on July 30, 2010. Curran testified in line with her May 26 report. Shawna Miller, Debra Linford, and Michelle Hetzel, social workers for the Department on Jones' case, testified in favor of termination. Their testimony centered on several similar themes: Jones' propensity to blame Williams, other people, or bad luck for her problems without accepting any responsibility for them herself; Jones could not change something she would not acknowledge; they tried unsuccessfully to talk with Jones about her need to accept responsibility, to acknowledge her challenges, and to work hard to correct them; Jones' motivation for engaging in services was limited to having her children returned, not for any actual personal growth or behavior change; Jones was so dishonest with them that they could not tell truth from fiction when talking to her. Another theme was that Jones was loving, attentive, and good with D.W. and her infant sister on supervised visits, and that the children reciprocated in kind.
When asked by the State if there were any other services that could have helped Jones, Hetzel said that, in hindsight, they should have coordinated meetings between Jones' providers to catch her in her conflicting reports and confront her with the inconsistencies. Hetzel and Curran said that the only thing that would have possibly helped was for Jones to engage seriously and truthfully in counseling for her personality disorder. Linford said she could not think of any other service that could have helped.
One police officer testified about responding to a domestic violence incident by Williams against Jones when D.W. was present. Another police officer testified that he helped arrest Jones and Williams for assaulting other patrons of a restaurant in a 15 person "melee."
Jones testified. She said she did not agree that she had a personality disorder. She said Williams had never been abusive towards her. She acknowledged that the court had terminated Williams' parental rights and prohibited him from contacting the children. Even so, she thought Williams should be involved in her children's lives. She admitted that she had facilitated his contact with them even just a few weeks before the hearing. As to taking prescription pain killers, she said she took them as prescribed for a bad tooth and back pain. She could not provide the receipts or remember all her specific doctor visits. If it meant she could have her daughter back, she said, she would work on the personality disorder with a mental health counselor.
Jones called several friends to testify on her behalf. They praised her progress in changing her life and described her as a loving and attentive mother. One said that Jones told her that Williams had been "abusive" toward her.
At the end of the hearing, Jones argued that she had made substantial progress in correcting her parental deficiencies and had faithfully participated in the services the Department provided. She asked the court to continue the dependency another six months to allow her to prove she could offer D.W. safety and stability.
The court ordered termination of Jones' parental rights regarding D.W. Jones appeals.
"An order terminating parental rights may be entered when the six statutory elements set forth in RCW 13.34.180 are established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, and the court finds that termination is in the best interests of the child." In re Dependency of T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. 181, 197, 108 P.3d 156 (2005) (footnote omitted). Jones argues that the State failed to prove three of the six statutory elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
Clear, cogent and convincing evidence exists when the ultimate fact in issue is shown to be "highly probable." T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. at 197. "If substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings in light of the degree of proof required, an order terminating parental rights must be affirmed. An appellate court will not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses." In re Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 161, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001) (footnote omitted). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Welfare of C.B., 134 Wn. App. 336, 349, 139 P.3d 1119 (2006).
Jones argues that the Department failed to prove that it provided her with all necessary services and challenges the court's finding to that effect. To establish this statutory element, the State must prove that it has offered or provided "all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future." RCW 13.34.180(d). The services offered must be tailored to each individual parent's needs. T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 161. "When a parent is unwilling or unable to make use of the services provided, DSHS is not required to offer still other services that might have been helpful." T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 163.
Jones argues that she specifically needed intensive mental health counseling and case management to expose the inconsistencies of her reports to different providers. Exposing her inconsistencies, she argues, would have been the only way to force her to engage in honest counseling about the personality disorder she denied. She points to testimony by Shawna Miller.
Miller testified that, in hindsight, the Department had been mistaken not to have better, face to face communication between Jones' providers to confront "the deception and dishonesty from the mother." "But again," Miller said, "that's not often necessary, because typically parents aren't this dishonest with their providers and with the Department." Further, before her January 12, 2010 arrest, Miller said, they had no indication that they should not have been believing Jones.
Jones argues that Miller's testimony shows the Department failed to provide services specifically tailored to her individual needs. She relies on In re Dependency of H.W., 92 Wn. App. 420, 961 P.2d 963, 969 P.2d 1082 (1998), and T.L.G. The Department of Social and Health Services failed to refer H.W.'s developmentally disabled mother to the Division of Developmental Disabilities. The Division could have offered her parenting skills services more accessible to the mother's concrete learning style. The mother had willingly and earnestly engaged in the services the Department had provided and had made improvements. But her learning style was the significant obstacle that had prevented her from fixing her parental deficiencies. The trial court ordered her parental rights terminated. On appeal, this court reversed. Because the Department had simply assumed that the mother lacked the ability to acquire and apply parenting information she needed, this court determined that not all necessary services likely to correct her parental deficiencies had been provided. H.W., 92 Wn. App. at 429.
H.W. does not stand for the broad proposition Jones advocates, that failure to provide particularized services to improve parental fitness requires reversal of a termination order. T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 164. Here, it is undisputed that Jones received drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment, random urinalysis testing, psychological evaluations with parenting components, a psychiatric evaluation, and mental health services during D.W.'s dependency. These services offered her sufficient opportunity for intensive counseling on her personality disorder. They were tailored to address her mental health needs. Though Jones participated in the services, she refused to confront her personality disorder and frequently lied to her providers, social workers, and Department staff. Her request for nuanced management of her attempts to avoid treatment are not required by the court's conclusions in H.W.
Her case is also not like T.L.G. where the Department failed to identify specific parental deficiencies and to provide obviously needed mental health and anger management services to difficult parents for over a year until they completed a psychological evaluation. T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. at 203. Here, the Department provided Jones with a wide array of services targeted at correcting her identified parenting deficiencies. Her case is more like T.R. In that case, T.R.'s mother had been provided with multiple services over a six year period and the only service she requested on appeal would not have improved her ability to function as a parent. T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 163. The order of termination was affirmed.
Ultimately, Jones does not show how providing yet another case manager would force her to admit and address her parenting deficiencies, her mental health issues, or to be honest with her providers and caseworkers. Jones does not show that any of her mental health providers recommended the service she now requests. Jones does not challenge the trial court's finding that she "did not make use of the services that she engaged in." The fact that she did not make use of services provided significantly undermines her claim that further services should have been offered. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that all necessary services were provided.
Another statutory element requires the State to prove that "there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future." RCW 13.34.180(e). Jones contests several of the trial court's findings supporting the conclusion that this element was satisfied:
1.41 The mother's failure to recognize her own mental health issues as well as her overall resistance to change significantly hinders her ability to address the underlying behaviors and issues that render her unable to parent this child now or in the child's near future.
. . . .
1.72 Six months is not in the near future for this child. [D.W.]'s near future has already passed.
. . . .
1.76 There is no evidence to suggest that waiting longer will bring about the necessary change in the mother to adequately parent and protect this child.
. . . .
1.81 The mother's parental deficiencies of untreated mental health, drug addiction and poor decision-making have existed for some time and continue to exist despite the opportunity and wealth of services offered to her. The mother would need to actively engage in treatment for her personality disorder for one to three years, refrain from criminal activity for at least a year, demonstrate sobriety for at least one year and demonstrate stability for at least one year before she could be in a place to be a healthy and appropriate caregiver for [D.W.]. Six months is too long for [D.W.] to wait in the slim hope that her mother will make the necessary and sustained changes to parent her.
. . . .
1.83 There is little likelihood that the conditions could be remedied such that the child could be returned to the mother within the child's near future.
1.84 There is no reason to believe that allowing the mother an additional six months would make a difference and it would only result in the child remaining in limbo contrary to her rights.
Jones argues that because the State failed to provide her all necessary services, the possibility remains that she would have been able to remedy her parental deficiencies with the missing services. As discussed above, the State did provide all necessary services. We therefore reject her argument. In any case, the testimony of the Department social workers, the special advocate, and the psychological evaluation reports constitute substantial evidence supporting the challenged findings.
Jones next contends that the State did not prove that allowing her relationship with her daughter to continue for another six months would diminish D.W.'s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. RCW 13.34.180(f). But this necessarily follows from an adequate showing that there is "little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future." T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 166. The theoretical possibility that Jones may someday correct conditions sufficiently to provide a safe and stable home is not enough to delay D.W.'s right to permanency in her parental relationship. See T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 166. By the time of trial, D.W. had spent 41 of 47 months of her life in out-of-home care. An attempt at the long promised reunification with her mother failed after less than one month. Curran, the special advocate for D.W., testified that despite D.W.'s resiliency thus far, the constant unfulfilled promise that she would return to her mother's care undermined her ability to integrate into a stable home.
Finally, Jones challenges several of the trial court's findings supporting the conclusion that terminating her parental rights is in D.W.'s best interests:
1.85 It is contrary to the child's best interests to delay permanency as her mother has not demonstrated she is able to achieve mental health stability, achieve sobriety from prescription drugs, and protect her child from known risks such as Mr. Williams in order to provide the child with a safe, stable permanent home.
. . . .
1.88 The mother is not capable of providing the child with a safe, stable home. Continuing the parent-child relationship prevents [D.W.] from having long overdue stability and permanence, which the mother cannot provide now or in the child's near future.
. . . .
1.90 Termination of the parent-child relationship between the child and her mother is in the child's best interest.
These findings are supported by substantial evidence. The testimony showed that Jones refuses to cut Williams out of her children's lives. She testified that Williams had never been abusive towards her. A police officer, her friend, and a social worker contradicted her. When the State asked Jones what role Williams should have in her ability to parent her younger daughter, she said, "I feel that he can be there, you know, to do stuff with her." She said she planned to involve him in her children's lives "at some point in time." She said his violent past was not a concern to her because they did not have a violent history together.
Jones does not challenge the court's finding that D.W. "would be at serious risk and jeopardy if placed with the mother due to her failure to recognize the risks posed by Mr. Williams, her ongoing prescription drug use, her ongoing engagement in criminal activity, and her untreated personality disorder." The trial court did not err in determining that ending D.W.'s exposure to those risks is in her best interest.
Finally, Jones argues that terminating her parental rights is not in D.W.'s best interest because it would sever their parent-child bond. It is clear from the record that Jones loves D.W. and that D.W. returns that affection. But, as each social worker testified, love alone is not enough. A parent must also provide safety and stability. The record establishes that in D.W.'s near future, Jones cannot provide these things.
Affirmed.