Opinion
2 CA-CV 2022-0115
04-20-2023
Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney By Neil Robert Poston, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Appellee State of Arizona Law Offices of Lawrence Y. Gee PC, Tucson By Lawrence Y. Gee Counsel for Appellant Damaris Rubalcava
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20211728001 The Honorable Lee Ann Roads, Judge Pro Tempore
Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney By Neil Robert Poston, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Appellee State of Arizona
Law Offices of Lawrence Y. Gee PC, Tucson By Lawrence Y. Gee Counsel for Appellant Damaris Rubalcava
Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Sklar and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STARING, VICE CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 Damaris Rubalcava appeals from the trial court's order forfeiting the appearance bond she posted for her brother, Isaac Martinez-Celaya. For the following reasons, we affirm the court's order.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 In May 2021, Celaya was charged with seventeen felony counts involving sexual conduct with a minor, sexual abuse of a minor, and molestation of a child. In July, U.S. Marshals arrested Celaya on an outstanding warrant in this matter, and his bond was set at $100,000. At Celaya's arraignment later that month, he entered a plea of not guilty, and the trial court scheduled a case management conference to take place in September 2021.
¶3 In August 2021, Rubalcava posted a $100,000 appearance bond to secure Celaya's release. Celaya failed to appear at the September case management conference, and his attorney explained to the trial court that there had been "an order of deportation." He continued,
[Celaya] posted a bond. There was an ICE hold on him. He was advised by the jail that ICE was going to pick him up. In fact they picked up a different Mr. Celaya and the jail actually just let him out.
Given the order of deportation he has- he's returned to Mexico. He's in Nogales, Sonora. I actually met with him yesterday .... He can't come back to the United States unless the government paroles him in.
¶4 The trial court asked defense counsel to clarify whether Celaya had been "lawfully deported," and counsel responded that there had "been an order of deportation for sometime apparently. I'm not his immigration lawyer. And so . . . I think rather than wonder what ICE was going to do he knew he needed-he knew he wasn't allowed to remain in the United States." Over defense counsel's objection, the court issued a warrant for Celaya's arrest. It further ordered commencement of bond forfeiture proceedings.
¶5 In July 2022, a bond forfeiture hearing was held before a different judge. During the hearing, Rubalcava acknowledged that the state had "met its burden" for forfeiture but nevertheless asked the trial court to "only take part of the bond." The court ordered forfeiture of the entire $100,000 appearance bond. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Discussion
¶6 Rubalcava argues "the state is entirely responsible for Celaya's failure to appear at the . . . case management conference" based on its "failure to honor the ICE hold and order of deportation," which "prevented his return to the United States unless the State paroled him into this country." Specifically, she asserts that because the state lacked "authority to release Celaya upon . . . [her] posting [of the] $100,000 cash bond," his release is "void ab initio" and the forfeiture judgment "must be reversed." Alternatively, Rubalcava asks us to order "the remission or exoneration of a substantial portion of the bond," apparently arguing the trial court only refused to do so because the state misled the court at the hearing by "promot[ing] the false narrative" that Celaya had "fled the country with no intention of returning" and "could have easily surrendered at the border with the arrest warrant in place."
¶7 Rubalcava, however, fails to cite any pertinent legal authority supporting her arguments on appeal. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A) (opening brief must contain argument with "[a]ppellant's contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record" relied upon); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (appellant waives claims by failing to provide "an argument supported by authority in . . . opening brief"). Moreover, although Rubalcava briefly referred to Celaya's attorney's explanation for Celaya's absence at the initial case management conference, she failed to meaningfully raise the arguments she now asserts on appeal- let alone present any supporting evidence-in the course and context of the forfeiture proceedings. See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994) ("Because a trial court . . . should be afforded the opportunity to correct any asserted defects before error may be raised on appeal, absent extraordinary circumstances errors not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal."). Rubalcava has waived her arguments on appeal.
Disposition
¶8 We affirm the trial court's judgment forfeiting the bond in its entirety.